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The thesis provides a comprehensive examination of the impact of the 1988 Basel
Accord on the capital adequacy regulations of developed economies. The study seeks 
to understand if the Accord affected broad or isolated convergence of 18 developed 
states' bank credit risk regulations from 1988 to 2000, and understand what political 
economic variables influenced levels of regulatory isomorphism.
The thesis argues that previous research has failed to effectively address 
whether the Accord accomplished its “level regulatory playing field” objective by 
employing small sample sizes. In order to address this lacuna, the thesis creates a 
quantitative database of developed states’ interpretations of the Basel rules. The 
results indicate that the Accord may have successfully provided a regulatory floor as 
most states implemented the agreement in some form by 1991. Yet, some persistent 
distinction remained in the way states implemented the Accord.
Second, the thesis aims to understand why convergence emerged among a 
subset of states, yet not others, by testing a battery of political economic explanations. 
Statistical tests reveal that initial interpretations of the Accord’s provisions were 
conditioned by the severity of a state’s capital adequacy regime prior to 1988. States 
with weak (severe) pre-Basel capital adequacy regimes tended to implement weak 
(severe) interpretations of the Accord. Departures from “path dependent” positions 
resulted mostly from the presence of acute banking crises and the impact of private 
financial market influences. The qualitative studies of implementation in the United 
States, France, Germany, and Japan tend to support the quantitative finds, yet also 
emphasize the importance of considering tax, accounting, and loan-loss provisioning 
policies in assessments of capital adequacy regulation. These results should have 
implications for revised studies of the economic effects of the Accord and studies of 
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In 1988, the G-10 states agreed to a series of prudential capital adequacy guidelines 
for the credit risks of their internationally active commercial banking institutions. 
These rules, called the Basel Accord, endeavored to increase the soundness and 
stability of their largest financial intermediaries and ameliorate the competitive 
regulatory advantages conferred by some G-10 regulators to their domestic banks.1
Though, by the late 1990s, a major international effort was initiated to 
fundamentally amend the agreement, the original Basel Accord ostensibly produced a 
highly successful international regime. Initially created by a small group of 
industrialized states, the Basel Accord (‘Accord’) has become the worldwide 
prudential standard, or benchmark, for the commercial banking industry. The Accord 
was negotiated by an informal organization of G-10 central bank governors and 
financial services regulators, now known as the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. The ambitions of the Committee were to create a common definition of 
bank regulatory capital, formulae for weighing the relative credit risks of banks’ 
assets, and to enforce uniform capital-to-assets minima. The agreement was 
concluded in 1988 and was to be fully implemented in the G-10 economies by 1992.
1 See Basel Committee (1988), at §3. Throughout the thesis, the German spelling “Basel” will be 
employed. Early documents related to die G-lO’s discussions on bank cooperation bore the anglicized 
spelling “Basle” yet the G-10 adopted the Germanic spelling in the mid-1990s and this thesis will 
follow their example, though the anglicized spelling has crept back into usage from the late 1990s. See 
Marshall (1999).
2 The Basel Committee has been alternatively known as the Cooke Committee (after its first chairman 
and then head of the Bank of England, Peter Cooke) and the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation 
and Supervisory Practice. The committee is often, inaccurately, simply termed the BIS and viewed as 
synonymous with the Bank for International Settlements. Though the Basel Committee utilizes the BIS 
facilities in Basel, Switzerland for its secretariat, the committee it is not a component of the BIS.
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Yet the goal of the Committee was to extend the Accord’s influence beyond the G-10 
and the Accord was, “circulated to supervisory authorities worldwide with a view to 
encouraging adoption of [the] framework in countries outside the G-10 in respect of 
banks conducting significant international business.” This ambition was fully 
realized as the Accord was adopted by the European Community, Australia, Ghana, 
Hong Kong, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore during the late 
1980s and early 1990s.4 Over the next decade, this number increased exponentially so 
that over 100 states had unilaterally committed to the Basel standards by 1999.5
This global diffusion of the Basel rules has been accompanied by an enormous 
production of research by political scientists, international lawyers, and financial 
economists eager to examine the political origins and economic impacts of the 
Accord. Tomes of research have been dedicated to understanding the effects of the 
Accord on the banking sector and broader economies of implementing countries. 
Economists have questioned whether the Accord increased, or indeed decreased, the 
safety and soundness of country banking systems, influenced the long-run 
competitiveness of multinational banks, or contributed to downturns in 
macroeconomic growth during the 1990s.6 Scholars of international relations and law 
have similarly produced much research to understand how such a successful inter­
state regime could have emerged in an issue area—financial services—in which very 
little international cooperation had occurred before the 1990s.
3 See Basel Committee (1988), at §2.
4 This list of states is derived from Murray-Jones and Gamble (1991) and data from various national 
bank regulatory authorities.
5 This is confirmed by the Basel Committee (1999) and in a World Bank sponsored study, see Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine (2001a).
6 Information concerning many of these economics studies of the Basel Accord’s effects is 
conveniently aggregated in Basle Committee (1999).
7 See Kapstein (1989,1991,1994), Murray-Jones and Gamble (1991), Tobin (1991), Scott and Iwahara 
(1994), Scott (1995), Oatley and Nabors (1998), Reinicke (1998), Alexander (2000a), Lutz (2000), 
Simmons (2001), Ho (2002), Singer (2002), and Tamura (2003b).
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Yet, before academic attention shifts away from the 1988 Basel Accord to its 
successor “Basel II Accord” currently being negotiated, there are several important 
dimensions of the 1988 Accord that have yet to be systematically investigated and 
which, ex ante, appear to have ramifications for a full evaluation of the Accord’s 
significance.8 Such research could have crucial implications for the results of 
previous findings on the politics of the Accord’s negotiation and its micro- and 
macroeconomic effects. This research could also contribute to a broader 
understanding of the implementation of international financial regulatory regimes and 
the process of transnational policy convergence and divergence.
In particular, little empirical evidence has been produced that illustrates how 
the Accord was implemented in some or all of the one hundred adhering states. 
Minimal academic attention has been given to understanding how domestic political 
actors interpreted the Basel Accord rules when creating the regulatory guidelines and 
legislation that implemented the Accord. This is a critical handicap to bear when 
gauging the political economic effects of the agreement. Though a key goal of the 
1988 Accord was to level the regulatory playing field for banking risks, the agreement 
is an example of “soft law.” National regulators were given extensive discretionary 
powers for determining the exact manner in which the Accord was operationalized 
and enforced in their domestic banking space.9 This discretion was established, 
explicitly, by laying out a minimum regulatory baseline that national policymakers 
were invited to exceed in critical issue areas. Also, the Accord implicitly provides for 
high levels of discretionary policy by not seeking to harmonize cross-national tax and
8 Though not of chief concern here, for further information on the Basel II Accord see Basel Committee 
(2001).
9 Alexander (2000), Ho (2002).
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accounting standards and other prudential regulatory policies that are believed to bear 
upon the stringency of prudential banking regulation.10
The importance of understanding the implementation of the Basel rules was 
recognized in research by banking practitioners and economists during the first 
several years after the Accord’s negotiation. The results of these studies suggested 
that the Accord was implemented in widely different fashions by the core group of 
industrialized states in the G-10 and European Community that adopted the agreement 
shortly after its completion.11 Some states implemented very strict or 
“superequivalent” interpretations of the Basel rules while other implemented loose, 
barely in compliance or noncompliant, interpretations. Econometric research has 
provided support for the view that these disparities matter as the domestic rule 
interpretations may have financially advantaged some banks at the expense of 
others. In other words, the Accord may have failed in its objective to level elements 
of the banking regulatory playing field and allowed or exacerbated the problem of 
competitive regulation in the area of capital adequacy.
Yet, this thesis argues that extant research into the Accord’s negotiation is not 
extensive enough to draw any firm conclusions about the effects of the Basel 
Accord’s implementation. The research on the Accord that has progressed over the 
last decade lacks attempts to operationalize its implementation in such a way that we 
can measure it across a wide range of cases over a period of time. Research has 
generally focused on implementation in two or three states and most of this work was 
completed with late 1980s data.
This thesis will address this empirical lacuna. Subsequent chapters analyze 
the Accord’s implementation with the preliminary aim of answering the question of
10 This point is well established in Scott (1995) and Scott and Iwahara (1994).
11 The key study investigating this issue was commissioned by Price Waterhouse (1991).
12 See Wagster, Kolari, Cooper (1996); Wagster (1998).
how were the baseline Basel rules interpreted in the core implementing countries and 
how, if it all, did such interpretations change over time? In so doing, two specific 
questions will be addressed:
1. Did the Accord produce or contribute to transnational convergence or 
divergence in industrialized states’ capital adequacy policies shortly after the 
Accord’s negotiation?
2. Did the Accord produce or contribute to transnational convergence or 
divergence in industrialized states’ capital adequacy policies during a twelve- 
year period (1988 to 2000) after the Accord’s negotiation. Put differently, did 
initial levels of convergence or divergence alter over time?
Addressing this set of questions permits a unique study of comparative political 
economy. The Accord provides an opportunity to conduct a yardstick comparison of 
the way that states make bank regulatory policy in relation to a common, baseline 
standard. Before the Basel Accord, cross-sectional bank regulatory capital 
comparisons were almost impossible because of the distinctions in regulatory 
approach and vocabulary utilized among developed economies. It was common for 
academics to observe that if State A’s banks maintained an average capital adequacy 
ratio of 7 percent and State B’s banks maintained a 5 percent ratio then the latter were 
less sound and, by virtue of being less severely regulated, maintained a competitive
1 'Iadvantage. Yet, such statements ignore the rules that underpin how banks are 
required to tabulate such ratios and thus ignore one of key areas of cross-border 
regulatory advantage—or “non-market” advantage—that banks may compete for 
when interacting with their domestic supervisors. From a positive political economy 
perspective, the absence of a common regulatory approach and language made the
13 Such an argument is employed extensively in Oatley and Nabors (1998) in their discussion of the 
Basel Accord.
detection of capital adequacy policy convergence and divergence very difficult and 
confounded efforts to learn if financial internationalization produced a global “race to 
the bottom” through the adoption of a common, lax regulatory standard or increased 
prudential oversight.
Two methodologies will be employed to address these questions. First, univariate 
statistical analysis will be employed to determine the degree of implementation 
severity that emerged in a large sample of industrialized states that committed to the 
Basel Accord in 1988. A quantitative index of implementation will be constructed to 
provide numerical comparisons of the degrees of implementation stringency for the 
sample states. This index is constructed from two under-utilized studies of Accord’s 
implementation produced by Price Waterhouse (1991) and Murray-Jones and Gamble 
(1991) and documentation provided by G-10 and EU regulators. In addition to 
presenting data for a cross-section of states, the index will provide implementation 
data across a period of time. It will thus be possible to judge whether there has been a 
convergence in Basel rule interpretations from 1988 to 2000.
Qualitative case studies will accompany this quantitative analysis. These 
cases allow for a much more empirically detailed examination of rule implementation. 
This will be provided in a selection of focused, comparison case studies of the United 
States (chapter 6), France and Germany (chapter 7), and Japan (chapter 8). Each case 
country study will provide data of the country’s pre-Basel Accord capital adequacy 
rules and their interpretations of the Accord from 1988 to 2000. Though the 
quantitative indicators seek to be exhaustive in capturing the empirical phenomena of 
rule implementation, there are several regulatory issue-areas that are difficult to 
capture with quantitative measures. As will be made clear, the implementation of the 
Basel rules, and capital adequacy regulation more generally, is quite complex. Some
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elements that can affect the severity of capital regulation are difficult to directly 
observe while others are simply difficult to capture in a quantitative measure.14 
Moreover as Tamura (2003a: 2) observed, evaluating implementation “requires a 
considerable element of judgment about compliance—the degree to which national 
regulators adhere to the spirit of an international regulatory accord.” The case studies 
afford such a close, “on the ground,” inspection of some of the more complex 
elements of Basel rule implementation.
Beyond providing these descriptive data on the content of Basel rule 
interpretations, however, the thesis endeavors to address the question of why did some 
countries adopt strict interpretations of the Basel Accord while other countries 
adopted more lax approaches. Another way to address this question is why has there 
been convergence among some states’ capital adequacy regime rules over time but not 
others? Adding to the two questions posed above, the two questions addressed here 
are:
3. Why did states adopt loose or strict interpretations of the broad, “soft law” 
provisions of the Accord?
4. What led states to increase or reduce the stringency of their initial 
interpretations of the Accord over 12-year period of time (1988 to 2000)?
As before, quantitative and qualitative methodologies will be employed to address 
these questions. Statistical techniques will be utilized to test a battery of hypotheses 
in an effort to corroborate and eliminate some explanations for the uneven amounts of 
implementation over the sample time period, 1988-2000. In these analyses, the 
implementation index, described above, will constitute the dependent variable and
141 thank an official at the UK Financial Services Authority for pointing out the great difficulty of 
directly measuring numerous elements of the capital adequacy regulation process.
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measures of statistical association will be generated between it and a number of 
explanatory variables generated by the hypotheses.
These “why” questions will also be treated in the case studies of the United 
States, France, Germany, and Japan. Given the difficulties in determining the 
convergence of results from different research strategies in studies employing 
triangulation techniques, the case studies will not test the exact theories tested in the 
quantitative exercise, but will use the regression results as a guide to exploring the 
rich empirical detail behind the implementation of the Basel Accord.
The hypotheses are drawn from a wide spectrum of political science and 
economic approaches to public policy implementation. Relying on a previous study 
of the implementation of the Accord, a battery of hypothesis is collected that predicts 
implementation will vary by four domestic and international attributes15:
1. Domestic bank preferences
2. Macroeconomic environment
3. Domestic political institutions
4. International imitation effects
By addressing the why questions the thesis is positioned to generate insights 
into two significant problems in the study of international relations. By providing an 
understanding of the conditions for strict versus liberal forms of interpretation of the 
Basel rules, it highlights those variables that might be significant for understanding 
the implementation of international regimes. Second, by looking at the extent of rule 
convergence over time, the thesis sheds light on the applicability of political economic 
policy convergence and divergence theories. The key theoretical contribution of the
15 Ho (2002).
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thesis is the testing of theories from these distinct, though highly related, international 
relations research programs.
Moreover, the thesis suggests a substantial improvement is necessary to the 
study of international regime implementation. Most existing approaches to the topic 
seek to understand why states commit or defect from their international commitments. 
The process of compliance is characterized as a binary phenomenon: states either 
comply or they do not. Little consideration is paid to whether states substantially fail 
to comply or fail in small respects or whether committed states simply meet the 
minimum international standards or adopt superequivalent interpretations. I suggest 
that implementation studies have failed to come to grips with some of the key issues 
of regime implementation through this dichotomy.
It is necessary to focus less on whether states comply and more on 
understanding why they comply. This shift in perspective would probably yield 
important empirical and theoretical insights for all forms of international agreement. 
Yet it is mandatory in the study of non-binding agreements or what have been termed 
“international soft law.” Such agreements very often do not require states to 
implement a discrete series of rules, but suggest a vague string of “best practices” to 
be adopted on a voluntary basis. For such agreements, discussing compliance in 
terms of commitment or defection is not as empirically useful as understanding how 
states have interpreted such agreements and in what way such agreements are 
operationalized in domestic law and regulatory statute.
This thesis concurs with previous research concluding that the Basel Accord is 
an example of such soft law.16 The Accord is not enforceable by law. The Accord 
does not create a discrete selection of hard and fast rules. Rather, it provides a
16 The soft law characteristics of the Accord have been investigated in studies by Alexander (2000b) 
and Ho (2002).
minimum regulatory baseline that states should follow and invites states to implement 
stricter interpretations. It is thus necessary to look at degrees of compliance with the 
Accord rather than i f  the Accord has produced commitment.
In sum, the thesis thus hopes to contribute to the corpus of empirical data 
concerning the effects of the Basel Accord and international relations theories of 
regime implementation and cross-border policy convergence and divergence. 
Specifically, the thesis endeavors to enumerate the following empirical and theoretical 
innovations to the study of banking regulation and comparative political economy:
• Present the first cross-sectional comparison of the ways that the Basel 
rules were interpreted with a quantitative measure that permits a clear 
study of areas of regulatory convergence and divergence
• Lay out the ways in which the interpretations of the Basel rules have 
changed over time with data not utilized in previous studies of the 
Basel implementation process
• Test international and comparative political economy theories of 
international regime implementation and policy convergence in an 
issue area—finance—that has not been extensively considered in 
previous academic studies
It is also necessary to enumerate what the thesis will not attempt to 
accomplish. In laying out these areas of potential empirical investigation, it should be 
made clear that it is not claimed that this study will not touch upon these areas in 
some respects. In the process of investigating the implementation of the 1988 Accord, 
these areas may well come under direct or indirect study. Yet, these areas of research
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are not involved in the central questions of interest to this thesis and no effort is made 
to thoroughly “tie up all the loose ends” as far as these areas of study are concerned.
First, the thesis will not attempt to systematically judge the effects of degrees 
of compliance on commercial bank behavior or profitability nor on systemic financial 
stability and soundness. With regards the former, some qualitative analysis will be 
provided on the effects of the Accord on internationally active banks. Yet, sorting out 
the relative importance of capital adequacy policy to the day-to-day decision-making
17of banks and their profitability is complex. Econometric studies devoted solely to 
this question have failed to produce robust results that are generalizable across time
1 ftand country. Similarly, it is difficult to measure the independent impact of the 
Accord generally (much less individual state’s interpretations) on financial stability or 
macroeconomic soundness.
Second, it will not extensively address the major amendments that have been 
made to the Accord. The Basel Committee and the European Union have issued 
numerous updates and regulatory interpretations and re-interpretations to the original 
1988 agreement. As the timeline in Figure 1.1 illustrates, three amendments were 
made from 1991 to 1996 until the Basel II negotiations commenced in 1999. The first 
two of these amendments (1991,1995) were relatively minor adjustments to the 
original Accord. They did not alter the original 1988 formulation to any great degree 
nor court political controversy. However, the 1996 decision to expand the scope the 
Accord to international banks’ market risk exposures was significant. In addition to 
incorporating a whole new area of bank activity into the Accord’s purview, this 
amendment deviated from the 1988 document by permitting some (quite 
sophisticated) banks to utilize their own risk management modelling systems to
17 Dahl and Shrieves (1990).
18 For a review of many of these studies, see Basel Committee (1999).
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establish their own, tailor made risk charges, subject to stringent regulatory
parameters.19 Despite the importance of this amendment, it will be generally ignored
for three reasons. First, some research indicates that the 1988 Accord effected a much
larger change on existing regulator and bank practice than the 1996 amendment.
In a Bank of England study entitled “Fallacies about the Effects of Market
Risk Management Systems” it is argued that the market exposure requirements did
not pose so large a challenge to bankers as it often believed.20 Second, financial
regulators and practitioners are mostly in agreement that credit risk is by far the
01largest nominal risk in banking and focusing solely on such a risk is justified.
Finally, the focus remains firm on credit risk in order tfle keep this study tractable.
The aim here is to complete a tight comparison of the effects of the 1988 Accord on 
capital adequacy policy in developed economies. This goal is facilitated by focusing 
on one international agreement over a fixed period of time. Introducing a second 
agreement with a shorter implementation time period (1996 to 2000) may confound 
the comparative tightness being sought.
1.2. Thesis Organization
The research results will be presented in a cumulative fashion. Chapter 2 will provide 
a brief history of the Basel Accord’s negotiation. The aim will not be to simply retell 
these events, but to re-cast them from a new perspective. It is argued that previous 
political science considerations of the Accord’s negotiation have, implicitly, assumed
19 For more on the 1996 amendment, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996), Lutz 
(2000), and Matten (2000).
20 Bank of England (2002).
21 Euromoney, May 1998.
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Accord to include banks’ 
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Banks can use internal 
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subject to certain 
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their market risk capital 
requirements.
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Basel II Accord to 
be implemented
1988-The Basel Accord, which 
focuses on credit risk, is approved by 
the G-10 bank governors and issued to 
banks in July. It puts in place a 
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capital adequacy 
framework to fully 
replace the 1988 Accord- 
now termed “Basel II.”
Figure 1.1. Evolution of the Basel Committee and capital adequacy regulation
(Source: Ferry (2003:S4-S5)
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that the Accord created a hard law standard. By taking account of the Accord’s soft 
law nature, a novel conclusion may be reached on the politics of the agreement’s 
negotiation. Thus, in addition to laying a historical base for the remainder of the 
research findings on implementation, Chapter 2 contributes to a more empirically 
accurate account of the agreement’s negotiation than has been presented in the 
political science literature.
Chapter 3 presents a theoretical discussion of the implementation of 
international soft law. It suggests that existing approaches to international 
cooperation are unnecessarily crude by dichotomizing the implementation process and 
a novel method of assessing degrees of compliance is proposed and illustrated with a 
graphing exercise. This method permits researchers to bring together disparate 
hypotheses of policy implementation and transnational policy convergence and 
divergence together in a single, theoretical platform. This method will then be 
employed to present a number of hypotheses concerning the implementation of the 
Basel Accord.
Chapters 4-5 will subject these hypotheses to statistical examination. Chapter 
4 will operationalize and generate descriptive statistics for quantitative measures of 
implementation with the Accord and a variety of explanatory variables that are 
suggested by the hypotheses. The descriptive statistics will be utilized in the 
univariate testing of a number of the hypotheses. Chapter 5 will provide bivariate and 
multivariate statistical tests.
Chapters 6-8 utilize the aggregate results to guide structured, focused 
comparison case studies of implementation in the United States, France, Germany, 
and Japan. Given the difficulties in determining the convergence of results from 
different research strategies in studies employing triangulation techniques, the case
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studies will not test the exact theories tested in the quantitative exercise, but will use 
the Large-A results as a guide to exploring the rich empirical detail behind 
compliance with the B^sl^ Accord. Applied in sequence, the quantitative and 
qualitative studies each contribute differing strengths to the testing of the hypotheses 
that have been laid out. The quantitative element provides a broad understanding of 
implementation and permits the forming of generalizable conclusions about the types 
and correlates of implementation that have occurred. Yet, given the crude 
operationalization of many social science variables, it is useful to have a more refined 
account of implementation in a number of states. Though conclusions made about 
each case may not necessarily be generalizable, it will be possible to elaborate on the 
quantitative tests. Also, the qualitative studies multiply the number of empirical 
testing grounds for the theoretical propositions.
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Chapter 2
The Political Economy of the Negotiation of the 1988 Basel Accord as 
a Soft Law Agreement
2.1. Introduction
The 1988 Basel Accord established an extraordinary international financial regime. 
Though negotiated by the G-10 states, and Luxembourg and Switzerland, the Accord 
had been implemented in over one hundred countries by the late 1990s.1 This 
diffusion of the Basel capital adequacy standard proceeded in developed and 
developing economies despite the absence of an enforcement mechanism or a 
systematic political effort to encourage the Accord’s wide-spread adoption. Though 
bankers and economists have criticized the Accord since its inception, it has become a 
qualitative and quantitative standard that financial services regulators worldwide want 
to be seen to be enforcing, and with which banks want to be in compliance.
Yet the creation of the Accord was an arduous seven-year process that nearly 
did not succeed. Discussions among the G-10 central bankers, meeting as the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, persisted for over a decade before the agreement 
was concluded in July 1988. A consensus was difficult to reach as the negotiating 
states maintained very distinct capital adequacy regimes with divergent definitions of 
capital, unique capital regulatory vocabularies, and diverse national goals for their 
bank regulatory policies that were difficult to reconcile. In addition to these technical
1 This statistic is cited in Basle Committee (1999).
2 To a certain degree, a systematic political effort to encourage the Accord’s negotiation emerged when 
the Basel rules were adopted as part of the Bank for International Settlement’s Core Principles for 
Banking Supervision. Though these rules have been recommended to developed economies and 
developing economies, the latter through the advice of the IMF and World Bank as well as the BIS, 
most of the world’s economies had adopted the 1988 Basel rules well before the Core Principles’ 
negotiation. See Basle Committee (1999).
3 Ward (2002) observed that the Basel Accord was heavily criticized by its supporters as by its critics in 
1988. Supporters recognized many of the agreement’s limitations, yet found it a better solution than no 
international capital adequacy agreement at all.
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impediments, the members of the Basel Committee were placed under enormous 
political pressures by their constituent commercial banks to negotiate a position 
congruent with their economic interests—in most instances, this was a path dependent 
position that would allow the maintenance of their regulatory status quo.
Political scientists’ explanations for the successful conclusion to the Basel 
negotiations have fallen into two groups. The first suggests that the Accord solved an 
international market failure resulting from the increasing internationalization of the 
banking business. By the late 1980s, it was clear that regulators were less able to 
effectively ensure the prudential security and international competitiveness of their 
domestic banks and thus needed to establish an inter-state agreement to reinforce their 
regulatory competence. This line of thought is rooted in the Institutionalist literature 
of International Relations and concludes that the Accord provided joint-gains to all G- 
10 states.4
The opposing argument suggests that the Accord resulted from the exercise of 
financial hegemony by the United States and, to a lesser degree, the United Kingdom. 
These two states grew impatient with the slow negotiation process and they gave 
dissenting states, especially France, Germany, and Japan an ultimatum in 1987: if they 
did not agree to their version of the Accord then their domestic banks may find 
themselves unable to secure or renew operating licenses in New York or London. In 
this scenario, the Accord produced wealth gains for American and British banks at the 
expense of their international competitors. Drawing from economic theories of 
“regulatory capture” this argument concludes that the Accord produced a wealth re­
distributive regime.5
4 Kapstein (1989,1991,1994) and Singer (2002).
5 Oatley and Nabors (1998).
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This chapter suggests that both of these perspectives are empirically inaccurate 
and provides a third account that is more consistent with the painstaking compromises 
that permitted the Accord’s negotiation. Following the arguments of international 
legal scholars, I show that extant political science explanations fail to consider the 
“soft law” characteristics of the Basel Accord.6 The joint-gains and wealth 
distribution arguments implicitly assume that the Accord created a discrete selection 
of rules that committing states were required to meet. In practice, the Accord only set 
out a minimum selection of baseline regulations and permitted national regulators to 
exercise wide discretion for interpretation and implementation. States had the 
possibility of “fitting” their existing regulatory structure within the Accord’s wide 
parameters and comply with the agreement without undergoing as much reform as 
some have suggested. I argue that by not considering these soft law characteristics, 
the existing approaches present a misleading picture of the Accord’s history and draw 
erroneous conclusions about the agreement’s ability to distribute symmetrical or 
asymmetrical gains. In doing so, I recommend that students of international regime 
implementation to turn their attention to the diverse “degrees of compliance” that can 
emerge from non-binding agreements.
The chapter begins by briefly describing the Accord’s negotiation process and 
enumerating the distinct negotiating positions of the Basel Committee members.
These negotiating positions, it will be shown, were highly influenced by the 
Committee member states’ desires to maintain their extant capital adequacy 
regulations and ensure that the Accord required as little domestic regulatory change as 
possible. In presenting these negotiating positions, the chapter makes the first
6 Alexander (2000b), Ho (2002).
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academic effort to systematically compare the pre-Basel Accord capital adequacy 
regulations of the G-10 economies.
Next, this chapter will challenge both extant political science explanations for 
the Accord’s negotiation. The rudiments of the joint-gains and wealth redistribution 
arguments are presented and challenged by explicitly considering the Accord’s “soft 
law” characteristics. It is suggested that by looking at the way the agreement 
structured the implementation process, it is necessary to re-cast the story of the 
Accord’s negotiation. By considering the potential for compliant states to maintain 
widely differing capital adequacy regimes, the extant theories must be qualified. This 
conclusion will be supported through the presentation of comparative legal and 
econometric studies.
2.2. Negotiation of the 1988 Basel Accord
The Basel Accord was negotiated by the G-10 central bankers and bank supervisors to 
accomplish two objectives.7 First, it endeavored to increase the stability and financial 
soundness of these country’s internationally active commercial banks. Second, it 
sought to induce inter-state regulatory convergence and moderate sources of 
competitive regulatory advantages for commercial banks. Concerns for the former 
arose from the intensification of international bank competition from the late 1970s. 
During this time, the coalescence of technological, political, and market factors 
increased the opportunity costs of providing traditional financial intermediary services 
exclusively to the domestic marketplace. Though variations persisted among 
industrialized states, large commercial banks expanded their geographical and product 
offerings. Branching extended internationally as banks followed their multinational
7 Basel Committee (1988), at §3.
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clients abroad, pursued foreign market shares, and sought to arbitrage the inter-state 
regulatory regime in search of non-market advantages. Banks diversified their 
income streams through the issue of new products, many of which did not appear on 
the balance sheet (“off-balance-sheet” business), and were consequently unaccounted 
for in many states’ regulatory exam procedures.9
The result was the increasing fragility of the G-lO’s largest banks. The 
intensification of trans-border competition squeezed profit margins (the gross margin 
between banks’ lending and borrowing rates) and pressured bank managers to seek 
out riskier investments in order to increase revenues.10 In the best of market 
environments, commercial banks seek out risky investments to remain competitive 
and solvent. As financial analyst Dominic Casserley observed:
Most businesses shun risk.. .they try and pass on their financial risk to others so that they 
can concentrate on making and selling their products. To succeed, however, financial firms 
must seek out risk. In nearly all their businesses, by being able to separate well-priced from 
underpriced risks, they can prosper. By avoiding all risk, however, they cease to be 
financial firms at all and will wither away.11
Yet the competitive environment of the late 1970s and 1980s led international 
commercial banks to engage in a wide range of, what could now be regarded as, 
poorly priced risk-taking.
In particular, this has been observed in the types and extent of loans advanced 
to lesser-developed economies during the 1970s. The recycling of OPEC’s 
petrodollars through the eurocurrency markets left G-10 banks with large loan 
exposures to LDC governments by the early 1980s. American banks generated the 
largest exposures, ranging from about 100-200 percent of their capital. British and 
Japanese banks were second and third with exposures of 80 percent and 50 percent of
8 Dale (1984:11-12).
9 Vernon, Spar, and Tobin (1991:130-136).
10 Ibid.
11 Quoted in Matten (2000:1).
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their capital, respectively.12 As Figure 2.1 shows, the most important measure of 
bank soundness, the ratio of capital-to-assets, steadily decreased in most 
industrialized states in the decade leading up to 1988. Though banks’ capital levels 
are neither an indicator of financial health nor a sufficient measure of bank stability, 
they have become the key benchmarks with which the market and regulators judge 
financial institutions’ ability to withstand adverse economic shocks and manage 
risks.13 As a result, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued a 
paper that concluded, “that in the current and prospective environment further erosion 
of capital should, on prudential grounds, be resisted and that, in the absence of 
common standards of capital adequacy, supervisors should not allow the capital 
resources of their major banks to deteriorate from their present level, whatever those 
levels may be.”14
The second objective of the Accord was to ameliorate many of the prudential 
regulatory distinctions between states. The multi-nationalization of banking 
complicated the task of prudential bank regulation. Domestic bank supervisors could 
now inspect and regulate only a limited part of an international banking network.15 
As Peter Cooke of the Bank of England observed in 1981, “supervisors were still very 
much domestically oriented within the framework of different national banking 
systems.”16 The absence of an international institution to facilitate information 
exchange between bank regulators is believed to have conferred information 
asymmetry advantages to banks. With this superior information, it is believed that
12 Oatley and Nabors (1998:46).
13 Pecchioli (1987:106).
14 Basle Committee (1983:8-15).
15 Vernon, Spars, and Tobin (1991:131).
16 Cooke (1981:238) in Dale (1984:172).
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Capital defined as common stock, disclosed reserves, and retained earnings
In addition, many G-10 regulators believed that the absence of a supranational
regulatory regime permitted states to confer regulatory advantages upon their 
domestic banks. In this view, some states’ regulators, commercial banks, and 
perhaps politicians, colluded to implement comparatively lax prudential standards 
that permitted their banks to outperform their international competitors. Though 
evidence for this position is difficult to establish, many American politicians and 
bankers believed that the Japanese and French banks were successfully leveraging 
relatively weak credit risk regulations to build positions unattainable in the US due to
17 Vernon, Spar, and Tobin (1991:131).
l8Euromoney (1998), Oatley and Nabors (1998), Reinicke (1996).
32
the more demanding solvency requirements imposed by the American regulators.
Thus in an effort to address this source of regulatory competitive disadvantage, the 
US urged the creation of a multilateral standard to create a level regulatory playing 
field.
In order to address these concerns, the G-lO’s central bankers initiated 
discussions for an international capital adequacy standard in 1981. They met, with 
representatives of Luxembourg and Switzerland, as an informal group now termed the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the Bank for International Settlements 
(BCBS) in Basel, Switzerland. This committee set to work devising a multilateral 
bank capital standard. Though capital adequacy regulation is among the most critical 
component of any state’s prudential regulatory system, there were and remain great 
distinctions in the way states implement such rules.19 Recognizing this, the BCBS 
did not attempt formal legal harmonization but “greater convergence among its 
members with regard to national definitions of bank capital for supervisory 
purposes.”20
This initiated a seven-year negotiation process. During this time, the 
Committee established numerous complex methodologies for constructing a common 
standard able to incorporate the particularities of each G-10 state’s capital adequacy 
regime into a unified framework. Establishing a “functional equivalents” scheme 
presented many technical difficulties.21 As Table 2.1 shows, there were sharp 
distinctions in the G-10 states’ definitions of capital and the way they derived capital 
regulations. The Basel Committee does not have any formal enforcement authority 
and approves of measures on the basis of unanimity and it was thus necessary to 
construct an agreement that did not diverge too significantly from any one state’s
19 Dale (1984).
20 Basel Committee (1981:7) in Norton (1992:35).
21 Basel Committee (1986:10-27) in Norton (1992:35).
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extant regime to secure approval. The result was a slow and deliberate negotiation 
process. Resolution was confounded by the technical difficulties of constructing a 
common standard and the intense political pressure that domestic banks placed on 
their regulators to adopt a standard convergent with their current practices and 
interests.
Efforts to conclude an agreement were boosted by the urgency created by the 
LDC debt crisis, beginning in August 1982. This crisis prompted much criticism of 
the BCBS for its failure to anticipate and prevent the expansion of G-10 lending that 
led to the crisis. Most importantly, the crisis was partly responsible for the US 
Congress’ decision to issue the International Lending Supervision Act in 1983 that 
demanded that its banking regulators arrange for the conclusion of the multilateral 
capital adequacy negotiations while implementing a stricter domestic capital code. 
With this new political impetus, US Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker placed 
pressure on the Committee to conclude some sort of agreement. The initial effect was 
continued delay. An October 1986 Committee paper concluded that, “[o]ver time, it
is hoped that the exercise will assist in determining the divergence between the capital
00positions of different national banking systems.” This lack of progress did not 
impress Volcker or the US Congress.
22 Basel Committee (1986:19) in Vernon, Spar, and Tobin (1991:140), emphasis added.
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Country Belgium Canada France Italy Japan
Definition of •common equity •common equity •share capital •disclosed •equity capital
capital •published and •permanent preferred •reserves reserves • reserves
hidden reserves stock •general provisions •general provisions •subordinated debt
•retained earnings •convertible preferred •unlimited for some banks
•general provisions stock subordinated debt
• limited •limited subordinated
subordinated debt
debt
Are assets yes no yes no no
risk-weighted?
Minimum varies between gross assets should 5% variety of no minimum
capital ratio 5-7.5% not exceed 30-20 different ratio
times total capital requirements
Country Luxembourg Switzerland UK US West Germany
Definition of •share capital •paid up capital •share capital •common stock •equity capital
capital •reserves •published reserves •reserves •preferred stock •retained surpluses
•retained earnings •limited subordinated •limited subordinated •profits •silent capital contributions
•general provisions debt debt •contingency •profit participation rights
•limited subordinated •general bad debt capital reserves
debt provisions •limited subordinated
Are assets debt





capital ratio Range of 3-10% varies varies 5% variety, including a 5.6% minimum
Table 2.1. Comparison of 11 States’ Pre-Basel Capital Adequacy Regulations
(Source: Derived from data in Dale (1984)
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2.2.1. The US-UKAccord
The result of the deadlock in Basel was Volcker’s decision to establish a 
bilateral capital adequacy agreement with the United Kingdom in July 1986. Volcker 
approached the Bank of England governor, Robin Leigh-Pemberton, regarding a 
bilateral accord that circumvented the Basel negotiation processes. The United 
Kingdom was in the process of overhauling their domestic capital rules to incorporate 
banks’ off-balance sheet risks and quickly agreed to establish a bilateral standard.
The process of coordinating these two states’ capital adequacy standards was 
relatively straightforward. Beyond the fact that coordinating two states’ policies is 
more easily accomplished than coordinating those of twelve, the US and UK rules 
had several common features. In particular, each state’s regulators recognized the 
need for a risk-weighted capital adequacy standard . Though the US did not have a 
risk-weighting approach in place during the Basel negotiations, such an approach had 
been utilized in the past and was under consideration after the LDC crisis.24
The remaining distinctions between the US and UK practices were dealt with 
through a mutual recognition compromise. Each state allowed its domestic banks to 
maintain some forms of capital that the other did not recognize. In particular, Table 
2.1 shows that the Bank of England included general bad debt provisions while some 
American regulators recognized almost unlimited preferred stock as regulatory 
capital. Neither regulator would expand its definition of regulatory capital to 
incorporate the other’s idiosyncrasies. A solution was found by creating a two-tier
23 A risk-weighted assets regulatory approach requires capital adequacy standards to vary with the 
contents of a bank's asset structure. Banks with lending portfolios concentrated in higher risk lending 
are required to retain more capital as insurance against counterparty default. See Matten (2000) and 
Dahl and Shrieves (1990).
24 See Kapstein (1989:338) and Norton (1992:37). In particular, Kapstein argues that the US “learned” 
the risk-weighting approach from the UK, indicating a knowledge transfer occurred between the two 
states. This may not be the case however as US regulators had experimented with risk-weighting 
approaches since the 1950s. See Federal Reserve Board (1956).
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capital measurement scale. The first tier (termed “capital included without limits”) 
included those capital elements that the US and UK agreed were of a high quality and 
thus readily available to meet bank losses. The second (“capital included with 
limits”) included capital instruments that could meet bank losses, yet not as readily as 
top-tier items. To ensure that banks’ capital bases contained more high quality 
capital, it was stipulated that tier 2 capital could not exceed 50 percent of the total 
items included in tier 1. The disputed capital instruments were, for the most part, 
allocated to the second tier and each state was free to interpret the agreement as they 
choose within the parameters, see Table 2.2. In this way, the US and UK agreed on 
a capital accord that emphasized a common and high quality definition of capital and 
yet allowed each state to included its own unique forms of capital.
Looked at strategically, the key importance of the US/UK accord was the 
political economic pressure it exerted on BCBS members to conclude a multilateral 
agreement. The announcement of the bilateral accord was described as a “bombshell” 
by one regulator.26 In particular, European Community member-states were 
concerned that the UK was circumventing parallel efforts to construct a common 
European solvency standard within the EC Banking Advisory Committee. Also, 
many Europeans resented the fact that they had been informed of the agreement only 
one day before it was made public; some even argued that Britain could be in 
violation of the 1958 Rome Treaty.27
Such fears were exacerbated when Japan initiated discussions to opt into the 
standard in late 1986. The US Congress had long expressed fears that Japan’s weak 
capital standard had facilitated their banks’ success in penetrating the US financial
25 Vernon, Spar, and Tobin (1991:144-6).
26 Ibid.
27 The fears of these European Community states may not have been unfounded. Kapstein (1992: 266) 
reports that Britain may have utilized its regulatory alliance with the United States to head off a 
‘cockeyed’ European effort at capital regulation spearheaded by the French and Germans.
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services market in the 1980s. It is not unambiguously clear that Japan’s definition of 
capital supports this view, yet their capital-to-assets ratios were among the lowest in 
the G-10. The leading Japanese banks ratios averaged just over 2 percent in the mid- 
1980s compared to a 5 percent average ratio for American banks, when these ratios 
are constructed with common definitions of capital as in Figure 2.1. Perhaps fearing 
that this US-UK agreement could result in the sanctioning of banks that did not 
comply with it, the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan sought to opt-in on the 
assumption that elements of their unique capital regulations would be incorporated 
into the two-tier structure, just as the US and UK’s rules had been fused. In 
particular, Japan sought to include its unrealized capital gains into the agreement, an 
important component of Japanese banks’ capital base. Negotiations on this point 
were prolonged as the US and UK resisted these reserves’ inclusion given the 
potential volatility of their value. Yet by September 1987, the capital regulation 
philosophies of the US, UK, and Japan converged sufficiently for them to adopt a 
single negotiating position at Basel.
2.2.2. Negotiation o f the Basel Accord
The first draft of the Basel Accord was issued three months after the 
announcement of the bilateral accord. There has been some debate on the effects of 
the bilateral (and with Japan, the trilateral) accord on the Basel process. Some argue 
that the Accord was a catalyst for the finalization of the international negotiations,28 
while others suggest that the December 1987 announcement would have been 
forthcoming without the bilateral standard and that the US/UK proposal served only
28 Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1988), Reinicke (1995), Oatley and Nabors (1998)
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to aggravate extant tension and disagreement. It may be difficult to definitively 
conclude which position is correct, yet there seems to be little doubt that the 1986 
accord significantly shaped the way that a Basel, and Brussels, solution emerged.
In particular, the Basel Accord resolved committee disagreements by adopting 
a two-tiered mutual recognition framework. The final Basel Accord was issued in 
July 1988 after several rounds of industry and inter-state consultation. The agreement 
entered a transition stage from 1988-1992 and was to be fully implemented from 1 
January 1993. The agreed definition of allowable capital, see Table 2.2, was 
bifurcated into two tiers with the same 50 percent restrictions imposed on the quantity 
of tier 2 versus tier 1 capital as the 1986 standard. The most noticeable distinction 
between the two accords is that while the two standards roughly permit the same 
number of capital instruments (about seven), most of the 1986 tier 1 items were 
relegated to tier 2 status. It is generally held that this reorganization is the result of 
the German Bundesbank’s objection that the 1986 accord permitted an excessively 
weak definition of capital. German banks were subject to a very strict definition of 
capital and German regulators worried that they would have to loosen their standards 
or be competitively disadvantaged. The compromise was to include the various 
“weaker” capital types, yet limit their use through the tier 2 classification.30
Also, I advance that this two-tiered framework permitted a resolution to be 
reached by allowing each regulator to “fit” their extant regulatory practices into the 
international code. By comparing the pre-Basel regime capital practices with the 
Basel standards, see Table 2.2, it is clear that nearly every state’s idiosyncratic capital 
definition qualified for the Basel standard. The Accord went to great lengths to bring 




incorporate the instruments of just one state’s capital regime—for example, French 
titre participatif and German Genusscheine. For the remaining capital instruments, 
states were left to include or exclude these instruments at their discretion. The 
Accord essentially produced a “mutual recognition” framework similar that produced 
by European efforts to create a Single Market; permitting states discretion for 
implementing policy tailored to their national circumstances within the confines of a 
minimalist standard, thus ensuring some degrees of transnational harmonization.
US-UK Accord_____________________________Basel Accord_______________
Capital without limits Tier 1
•Common stock •Common stock
•Retained earnings •Preferred stock
•Minority interests •Disclosed reserves
•General reserves •Retained profits
•Hidden reserves •Minority interests
Capital included with limits Tier 2
•Preferred stock •Undisclosed reserves
•Subordinated debt -Revaluation reserves
•General provisions 
•Hybrid debt capital 
•Subordinated debt
Table 2.2. Comparison of the US/UK Accord-Basel Accord Capital Regulations
Beyond capital definitions, however, it is not clear to what extent the Accord 
required significant BCBS change in other areas of capital regulation. The Accord 
required regulators to comply with three additional standards pertinent to capital 
adequacy assessment. Banks were required to maintain 4 percent of the value of their 
assets in tier 1 capital and 8 percent in total (tier 1 + tier 2) capital. Banks were 
required to multiply their assets (e.g. loans extended to counterparties) by a pre- 
established multiplier whose value corresponds to the ex ante determination of a 
counterparty’s default risk. These multipliers or “risk-weights” were set out in the
Basel Accord. Risk-weights apply for both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet 
asset classes. To determine how much capital to set aside for a particular loan (on- 
balance sheet) or letter of credit or derivatives contract (off-balance sheet) bank 
managers determine the product of an asset’s value in relation to its risk-weight. A 
£100 credit to a private sector corporation requires a 100 percent risk-weighting and a 
bank needs to hold £8 of the value of this loan as a capital adequacy cushion. The 
100 percent weight represents that the full value of the 8 percent capital requirement 
imposed. Another way of expressing this is to indicate that a corporate loan has to be 
supported by 8 percent regulatory capital. Yet if the counterparty is a bank 
domiciled in an OECD country, the £100 credit would require only £1.6 regulatory 
capital as these assets have a 20 percent risk-weighting or a 1.6 percent capital 
requirement.
Yet, like the definition of capital, some latitude for regulatory discretion was 
provided for these required ratios and risk-weightings. In particular, the Accord 
explicitly deemed a selection of asset classes subject to national discretion. Also, like 
capital definitions and minimum ratios, the Accord encouraged states to implement 
beyond minimum interpretations wherever possible.
The ability of states to arbitrage these discretionary areas and “fit” their extant 
capital adequacy regimes into these other areas of the Accord’s rules may not be as 
clear-cut as in the case of capital definitions, yet some elements of this may have 
indeed been possible. This will be discussed further in later chapters, but many states 
did not have risk-weighted capital standards before the Basel Accord, but required
31 The risk-weights have generated a great deal of criticism from regulators and banks. The 100 
percent weighting in this example would apply to any private corporation, regardless of their size, 
prestige, or access to capital resources. This means that a local, comer store and a FTSE-100 firm 
would earn identical risk-weightings. Criticisms of this broad treatment of asset classes has been a key 
argument behind the negotiation of the Basel Accord 2. See The Economist, 3-9 May 2003.
32 Matten (2000:88) indicates that practitioners would be more likely to formulate the capital 
requirement in this way.
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banks to maintain assets against a less risk sensitive measure of their balance sheets.
It is difficult to estimate the regulatory burden of generating a risk-weighting 
framework across jurisdictions. Yet, many states may not have tinkered too finely 
with their regimes as Dale’s study of 11 developed economies revealed that about half 
had implemented risk-capital standards in advance of the 1988 agreement.
2.3. Theoretical Perspectives on the Basel Accord
As the Accord was one of the first international financial regulatory agreements, it 
has attracted considerable attention in International Relations. Political scientists 
have developed two explanations to explain the successful negotiation of the Basel 
Accord. Both sets of theory argue that the Accord was successfully negotiated 
because of the exercise of American—and to a lesser extent, British—financial 
market power over other G-10 states. Yet, one standpoint argues that the Accord was 
successfully negotiated because it allowed states to share in joint gains. This 
argument posits that only an international agreement would allow regulators to meet 
their twin goals of creating a safe prudential regulatory environment without 
paralyzing the international competitiveness of their banks. Opposing this 
conclusion is Oatley and Nabor’s (1998) argument that the agreement was purely the 
result of US economic hegemony. The agreement disadvantaged the majority of the 
G-10 states and advantaged the US. The agreement did not produce joint gains.
2.3.1. Joint-Gains Theory
A common approach to explaining the successful negotiation of the Basel Accord has 
been to emphasize the mutual benefits realized by all BCBS states from the
33 Kapstein (1989,1991,1994) and Singer (2002).
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agreement. This argument draws from Institutionalist theory in International 
Relations and concludes that the Accord distributed gains for all G-10 states.34 This 
argument is grounded in the reasoning that international financial integration had both 
increased systemic financial risk and reduced the ability of domestic supervisors to 
ensure the soundness of their banking systems. The result had been the emergence of 
an international market failure evinced by the LDC debt crisis and the meltdown of 
the American commercial banking and thrift industries during the 1980s.
Moreover, financial integration increased the opportunity costs for unilateral 
prudential standard setting. Before the 1980s, cross-country differences in capital 
adequacy policy were not only justifiable given states’ unique financial histories and 
markets but of little practical relevance so long as banking remained a mostly 
domestically oriented business. Yet, the internationalization of banking may have 
caused previously benign distinctions in capital policy to become a new source of 
competitive advantage or disadvantage; this created the need for a multilateral capital 
adequacy standard.35
The only way to solve this market failure was through collective regulatory 
action that would be mutually beneficial. Structural forces in the international 
financial economy created a regulatory demand that required a collective international 
political response. As Kapstein argued, "[t]o the extent that the payments system had 
the character of a public good, it was reasonable to ask every state to contribute to its 
maintenance.
Kapstein (1989) and Singer (2002) argued that the Accord helped G-10 states 
resolve a common "regulator's dilemma." Each bank regulator must solve a policy





dilemma emerging from their conflicting twin objectives: rules must be sufficiently 
stringent to induce prudential behavior from regulated banks and yet sufficiently lax 
to prevent domestic banks from losing international competitiveness. The only way 
that a state can balance these demands is through an international agreement that sets 
a minimum level of prudential regulatory stringency. This international standard 
should protect against systemic instability while providing a minimum regulatory 
floor that permits domestic regulators to set necessary prudential standards without 
fear of creating competitive disadvantage. In this way, the Basel Accord resolved a 
mutual problem of the G-10 states and thus the agreement was pareto-optimal.
2.3.2. Redistributive Theory
A paper by Oatley and Nabors (1998) disagrees that the Accord benefited all Basel 
Committee members. They suggest that the US leveraged upon its large financial 
markets to impose the Accord on the G-10, particularly Japan and France. The US 
designed an international agreement congruent with its interests in order to support 
the competitive position of its commercial banks, at the expense of their G-10 
competitors.
Oatley and Nabors begin by observing that states may wield asymmetric 
negotiating authority in international negotiations. They concur that inter-state 
regimes can produce joint gains, yet only if two conditions hold: the agreements must 
be approved by unanimity and no state has the ability to manipulate the choice set of 
its negotiating partners. Drawing from public choice theory, they advance Mueller's 
argument that, "an individual who can control the agenda of pair-wise votes can lead 
the committee to any outcome in the issue space he desires." States propose and
37 Mueller (1989:88) in Oatley and Nabors (1998:41).
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support international agreements only if they benefit their domestic interests, in this 
way regimes produce joint gains or they do not exist. Yet if a state can successfully 
manipulate the choice set of another negotiating state, or establish a punishment 
mechanism for non-cooperation, it can force the others to join regimes contrary to its 
domestic interests. These regimes have the potential to redistribute gains from one 
state to another and are thus pareto-inoptimal for some committing states.
This logic is best explained through empirical application. Oatley and Nabors 
argue that the Accord was not in the interests of many BCBS members. To 
empirically establish this position, they conduct a comparative analysis of the pre- 
Basel capital adequacy ratios of a panel of French, Belgian, German, Italian, British, 
American, and Japanese banks from 1981-1987. It is argued that the Accord set a 
minimum ratio more in line with those of American banks than French or Japanese 
banks. In their panel, US banks have an average capital ratio of 4.31 percent, while 
French and Japanese ratios averaged 1.87 and 2.52 percent, respectively. From this, 
the authors conclude that, "[hjarmonized capital adequacy therefore represented a 
negative transfer of banking income." The empirical puzzle for these authors: how
did such a redistributive outcome emerge?
The answer is that the US successfully blackmailed France, Japan, and other 
recalcitrant G-10 states to agree to the Accord. American regulators had to solve a 
regulator's dilemma that was created by the need to implement stricter capital 
standards, after the LDC crisis, without disadvantaging the competitiveness of US 
banks. When the Basel Committee's negotiations stalled in the mid-1980s, the 
Federal Reserve responded with the formation of a regulatory cartel with the Bank of 
England by negotiating the bilateral accord. Given the importance of the New York
38Oatley and Nabors (1998:48).
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and London financial markets, this accord narrowed the choice sets of other G-10 
states so that they did not have any option but to agree to sign the Basel agreement.
If French, Japanese, and other G-10 regulators failed to acquiesce to a 
multilateral capital standard, they risked their banks’ exclusion from the British and 
American markets. Oatley and Nabors note that "[b]y concluding a stringent bilateral 
accord with Great Britain and threatening to apply the terms of this accord to foreign 
banks operating in the U.S. market, American policymakers effectively eliminated the
■JQ
regulatory status quo from G-10 policymakers' choice sets." The only choice thus 
left for the Committee was to agree to a multilateral standard that would enable them 
to moderate the terms of the US/UK standards in a way that would not entirely 
disadvantage them.
This strategy was successful. Japan was first to succumb, given their already 
rocky relations with US regulators. Shortly thereafter, the Accord was concluded as 
France, Germany, and others agreed to a compromise solution to avoid US and UK 
sanctions. The result was the creation of an international regulatory regime that 
provided asymmetric gains for a subset of the G-10 at the expense of others.
2.3.3. Basel Accord as International Soft Law
Yet, the joint gains and redistributive views of the Basel Accord both fail to take stock 
of the soft law nature of the agreement. They implicitly assume that the Accord 
established a discrete selection of "hard law" bank regulatory guidelines that 
counterparties to the agreement must implement to be in compliance. This position 
provides an inaccurate portrayal of the way the Accord was structured and the rules 
that guided its implementation. A more empirically faithful exposition of how the
39 Oatley and Nabors (1998:49).
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1Accord was negotiated must directly address its soft law qualities, particularly those 
relating to the high level of discretion permitted in the 1988 agreement. Research 
must be focused on the way the Accord was to be implemented to more fully 
appreciate its negotiation.
The failure of most political scientists to address the Accord's soft law 
characteristics may be the result of the ambiguities inherent in the soft vs. hard 
dichotomy. Generally, the term “soft” is employed to refer to those forms of domestic 
or inter-state law or simply norms that are non-binding or are not enforced with some 
form of politically imposed punishment mechanism. More simply, Alexander 
(2000b:3) observes that, “[s]oft law generally presumes consent to basic standards and 
norms of state practice, but without the opinio juris necessary to form binding 
obligations under customary international law.” Yet very often, soft law will be 
employed in tandem with "harder" or enforced norms or used as a “precursor to hard 
law or as a supplement to a hard law instrument... [s]oft law instruments often serve to 
allow treaty parties to authoritatively resolve ambiguities in the text or fill in gaps.”40 
The distinction between the two may blur in such cases. The vagueness of the term 
may be pronounced in the study of international law as the absence of a supranational 
political structure may render all agreements soft to one degree or another.41
Yet, there are some standard indicators with which to classify international 
law as possessing more “soft” versus “hard” characteristics. Alexander (2000b) 
highlights that legalization is better characterized as a multidimensional continuum 
rather than a dichotomous quality: law or non-law.42 Domestic and international legal 
standards vary from the ideal types “no law” to full “hard law.” Placement in this 
continuum, between these end points, is determined by the extent to which a law
40 Shelton (2000:10).
41 Ho (2001:648).
42 This discussion draws exclusively from Alexander (2003b:6-8).
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obligates agents to adhere to precise standards and delegates a third party authority 
(i.e. a court) to resolve disputes and issue rule interpretations. These three variables 
are maximized in full hard law, fully absent in the instance of no law, and present in 
varying degrees and combinations in softer legalization types.
By these standards, the Basel Accord represents an example of soft law. The 
Basel Committee does not possess any legal enforcement authority and states comply 
with the Accord at their own discretion. Beyond this, the Accord created, what could 
be termed, a soft law set of norms. The Accord established what a recent World Bank 
study termed a "minimum harmonization" or baseline of rules that states must adopt, 
yet provided a high degree of national discretion for interpreting these rules into their 
national banking regulations and codes.43 In this sense, the Accord achieved what 
Woolcock (1996) referred to as “constructive ambiguity” in the context of European 
Union standard setting. Like European standards permitting “subsidiarity” the 
Accord is constructive in the sense of enabling states with very different policies to 
sign up for a single unifying standard. A balance is struck between the 
harmonization and persistent competition of rules.44 As a result, the Accord is 
perhaps not only a soft law in the sense of being non-binding but a “softer” version of 
soft law for not establishing a clear criteria by which to measure implementation 45
Woolcock (1996) highlighted a number of practical advantages to such soft 
law agreements. In a discussion of the rules underpinning the European effort to 
create a Single Market, he observed that providing high levels of national discretion 
within international agreements permits a “constructive ambiguity” by allowing 
governments with very different views of the role of regulation to agree to some form 
of common framework. In some instances, this form of loose confederation of rule




making may represent a “radical, open-ended alternative to harmonization which 
allows a market for regulation to reflect divergent national (or sub-national) 
preferences for public goods” while allowing some degrees of international rule 
competition.
In addition, explicitly considering such “soft law” characteristics permits the 
advancement of a key theoretical challenge to the conclusions reached by orthodox 
political science explanations for the Accord’s negotiation. A necessary assumption 
of the regulator's dilemma model is that the Accord produced some transnational 
regulatory convergence. If this assumption is violated and states adopt widely 
distinct interpretations of the Accord's provisions, the dilemma persists. Measuring 
how much convergence is required to qualify as sufficient to affect a successful 
escape from the dilemma is probably neither possible nor necessary. The regulator's 
dilemma is more a theoretical exercise than a tool subject to empirical falsification: 
operationalizing the constituent variables such as too much regulatory stringency or 
laxity are likely impossible except through ex post empirical analyses. Therefore, it is 
not possible to conclude that persistent divergence in the Accord's application would 
exacerbate the regulator's dilemma. This would provide a key qualification to the 
joint gains argument.
Similar qualifications can be applied to the redistributive argument.
Concluding that the Accord distributed wealth from one subset of the G-10 to another 
seems to again assume that a common standard was imposed. Yet if the Accord did 
not substantially alter the risk-capital regulations of the French or Japanese 
authorities, how can this argument be justified? Moreover, the Accord did not address 
many policy elements that influence the stringency of capital adequacy regulation.
46 Woolcock (1996:296).
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Scott and Iwahara (1994) and Scott (1995) illustrate that the Accord could not create a 
level playing field as it failed to harmonize regulations concerning the way banks 
provision for doubtful loans, the accounting and tax procedures with which banks 
measure capital, the way that capital adequacy policy is enforced, and the implicit or 
explicit government bail out policy for troubled banks. They found that achieving 
convergence in the definition of capital and a common capital-to-assets policy could 
ultimately produce a more uneven regulatory playing field if these other policy areas 
were not also harmonized.
Oatley and Nabors do not support their position with detailed econometric 
models of the determinants of cross-national bank profitability under the Accord’s 
procedures. In fact, the only statistical component of their analysis is a cross-national 
comparison of the capital assets ratios of an extremely small sample of 14 G-10 
banks. The authors drew conclusions about the relative capitalization of the BCBS 
banks through the data of one French bank, three Japanese, and three American. I 
will argue later that this small sample is empirically unrepresentative and leads to the 
drawing of inaccurate inferences. Yet if persistent divergence were found, it would 
also present some severe qualifications and perhaps a theoretical challenge to the 
hegemonic argument of the Accord's negotiation.
Admittedly, stronger support for these conclusions about the influence of the 
soft law provisions would require evidence that the uneven implementation of the 
Accord independently influenced bank wealth. It would be helpful to know if there 
has been convergence and whether degrees of convergence of divergence matters for 
bank profitability. Do banks actually win or lose from the implementation of strong 
or lax capital adequacy rules?
Theoretical and empirical treatments from financial economics literature have
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concluded that capital standards can influence the profitability of banks. Llewelyn 
(1992) illustrates that one of the crucial goals of bank managers is to maximize their 
asset profitability, or return on assets. The value of this profitability may be derived 
from the expression:
P/A = P/E * E/A
where:
P = profits
A = average level of assets 
E = equity capital base
If banks are required to hold more equity per their average level of assets (E/A)--or a 
strict interpretation of a capital adequacy standard—this will require the increase in the 
retum-on-assets (with implications for product pricing) or lower the return on equity 
to the disadvantage of shareholders and the future supply of equity capital. As a 
consequence, the imposition of a stricter definition of tier 1 capital or a higher capital 
requirement can impair the profitability of banks and the smooth functioning of a 
banking system.
Econometric studies of these theoretical propositions have produced mixed
results. A Basel Committee review of six studies on the effects of the Basel Accord
on commercial banks’ stock prices indicated that about half found significant
effects.47 Yet four of these studies employed panel data of US banks only. Among
the two that incorporated banks from a variety of BCBS members, both found that
47 A review of these studies is provided in Basel Committee (1999:41-44). The studies covered include 
Eyssell and Arshadi (1990), Madura and Zarruk (1993), Cornett and Tehranian (1994), Laderman 
(1994), Cooper et al (1991), Wagster (1996).
asymmetric interpretations of the Basel rules may have produced wealth gains for 
some states.48 Wagster’s (1996) study provided the interesting conclusion that 
Japanese banks realized a cumulative wealth gain of 32 percent.
Yet there are empirical weaknesses in these economic studies. First, these 
studies only look at the implementation of the Accord up to the very early 1990s. As 
such, these studies do not address the effects of the Basel rules over the majority of 
the implementation period and do not consider the impact of reformulations of Basel 
rule interpretations over time. Also, these studies employ crude indicators of states’ 
interpretations of the Basel Accord’s provisions. The common method has been to 
rely on newspaper and financial periodicals databases to collect data on the content of 
states’ interpretations of the Basel rules. A more precise indicator is needed to more 
fully account for the various ways that regulators can interpret the Accord. Many 
elements of great importance to capital adequacy regulation are quite detailed and 
complicated and do not necessarily make for interesting reading, even in the financial 
press. From existing economic studies, we are thus unable to conclusively understand 
whether the Accord produced uneven implementation and what the impact of this may 
have been for bank profitability, and to test the veracity of political science 
explanations of the Accord's negotiation.
Still, the very concept that the Accord did not produce high levels of 
international rule convergence challenges the existing models. It may be suggested 
that the empirical results of the implementation process are not relevant so long as 
BCBS negotiators thought they were producing joint or asymmetric gains. Yet, all 
regulators were well aware of the broad boundaries set by the Accord. Comparing the 
state of the BCBS members’ pre-Basel capital adequacy rules with those of the Basel
48 Cooper, Kolari, and Wagster (1991), Wagster (1996).
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Accord suggests that all states gained from this arrangement—including the US and
its drive to have preferred stock included in the list of allowable capital. Highlighting
the soft law nature of the Accord permits the inference that the Accord was not 
j—\o
designed redistribute bank wealth. There are simply too many avenues for allegedly 
disadvantaged states (viz. France and Japan) to “fit” their existing capital practices 
into the Basel framework. Oatley and Nabors do not provide evidence suggesting that 
wealth was transferred to the US and UK, nor do they address the soft law nature of 
the Accord.
The remainder of the thesis will work towards contributing to understanding 
these questions in more detail through the close measuring of the levels of 
convergence and divergence among the G-10 states over time and weighting of the 
political and economic explanations for these rule interpretations. The joint and 
redistribution gains hypotheses will be reviewed in light of this study’s findings in 
Chapter 9. It is hoped that this study will contribute to a resolution of this debate on 
the Basel Accord and suggest fruitful avenues for future research on international 
financial regime implementation.
2.4. Conclusion
This chapter presented a review of existing research on the negotiation of the 1988 
Basel Accord. It has argued that existing political science explanations for the 
Accord’s successful negotiation have failed to come to grips with the rudiments of the 
Accord’s content. The 1988 capital adequacy agreement did establish some minimum 
guidelines for the G-10 states’ prudential regulatory practices, but it also allowed wide 
areas of discretionary policy-making in the implementation of these standards. The 
empirical veracity of existing approaches to understanding the creation of the Accord
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was called into question by their failure to endogenize these “soft law” qualities of the 
Accord.
This chapter has also justified the necessity of a new empirical and theoretical 
research program. Though economic studies have addressed the discretionary policy- 
setting nature of the Accord, they have not found good indicators of the ways that the 
Accord was implemented by industrialized states. Did states “fit” existing capital 
adequacy practices into the broad regulatory confines established in Basel? Did 
regulatory convergence or divergence emerge from the Accord? What variables 
explain these empirical patterns? Existing research cannot provide good answers to 
these questions.
The next chapter initiates this research program by considering how 
international relations theories relate to understanding the implementation of 
international financial regimes. It is suggested that most existing approaches fail to 
address the idiosyncratic empirical questions raised by “soft law” regimes and 
methods are proposed to address these theoretical lacuna.
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Chapter 3
Theorizing Degrees of Compliance with the Basel Accord
3.1. Introduction
This chapter develops a series of testable propositions about the conditions under 
which states can be expected to implement a non-compliant, minimalist, or strict 
interpretation of the 1988 Basel Accord rules. The propositions endeavor to provide 
probabilistic statements that explain why states that committed to the Accord chose to 
implement the strict or loose interpretations that they did and why, or why not, those 
interpretations may have converged or diverged over time from 1988 to 2000. In the 
context of the basic study of international relations, this chapter aims to contribute to 
a broader theoretical perspective in which to understand the effects of an international 
regime on state behavior in an issue area—financial services—that has not been 
extensively considered in previous research and in a manner—dynamically—that has 
not been generally adopted. The hypotheses derived in this chapter will receive a 
quantitative testing in Chapters 4 and 5 and will form part of the qualitative analyses 
of implementation in Part III.
By addressing the question of understanding degrees of state compliance or 
convergence with the Basel Accord, this chapter moves into a relatively unexplored 
area of international relations research. The overwhelming majority of extant 
research into the influence of internationally agreed rules on state behavior center on 
the conditions amenable to the successful implementation of regime rules into 
national law. The effects of international agreements are generally treated as a static, 
dichotomous process: the rules are implemented or not. In the study of the 
implementation of the Basel Accord this dichotomization is empirically inappropriate
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given that national policy-makers were given extensive discretionary powers for 
determining the exact manner in which the Accord was to be operationalized in their 
domestic banking rules. Attention needs to be given to the effects of the Accord on 
convergence or divergence with particular interpretations of the Basel rules. As over 
100 countries claim to be implementing the Accord, the interesting empirical and 
theoretical question is not i f  states have complied with the standard but how.
This chapter suggests ways in which to answer this question through the 
enumeration of nine hypotheses. These hypotheses seek to contribute to the 
cumulation of knowledge about the effects of international rules on state behavior by 
drawing from, and extending, existing theoretical propositions from the study of the 
international relations and comparative political economy. Yet this chapter will put a 
novel spin on these hypotheses by considering their applicability to understanding 
degrees of compliance.
Section 3.1 commences by considering the distinct methodology of 
considering a differentiated rather than dichotomous implementation process. It is 
argued that existing theoretical approaches to understanding compliance with a soft 
law regime are heuristically inappropriate. This is illustrated with a selection of 
graphing exercises. Section 3.2 defines and describes the hypotheses and indicates 
what evidence would allow for their falsification when given empirical test. Section 
3.3 concludes.
By conducting these modelling and hypotheses-generating exercises, this 
chapter seeks to make a number of innovative contributions to the understanding of 
international relations. First, as mentioned, it seeks to judge the influence of an 
international “soft law” financial regime on state behavior. Few studies have 
explicitly considered the post-negotiation phase inter-state agreements in this issue-
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area. Second, it develops hypotheses that aim to understand patterns of convergence 
and divergence of state responses to an international agreement, rather than look 
solely at a dichotomous question of regime implementation. Third, this chapter seeks 
to build-in a dynamic component to the standard static models of policy compliance 
by theorizing about the conditions under which we may expect policy convergence or 
divergence to emerge over time.
3.2. Theorizing About Degrees of Compliance
3.2.1. Existing Approaches to Implementation
The study of the impact of international regimes on state behavior has become an 
important and increasingly well-researched topic in the study of international relations 
and comparative politics. The systematization and codification of inter-state norms 
since the Second World War has naturally led to a basic and applied interest in the 
utility of international regimes to independently or indirectly explain state policies.1 
The variation of academic opinion is now quite wide.
Some Realists and rationalist Institutionalists argue that state compliance with 
international rules is dependent upon the presence of a punishment mechanism for 
defectors. This so-called Enforcement School does not consist of a homogenous body 
of theory, owing to fundamental disagreements between Realist and Institutionalist 
theorists. The general Realist position asserts that international institutions, or 
regimes, do not independently influence state behavior. If states with heterogeneous 
ex ante preferences alter their behavior in accordance to a regime this reflects the
1 This thesis treats international institutions and regimes as interchangeable terms. There are 
distinctions between the two as institutions refers to formal organizations such as the Bank for 
International Settlements, World Bank, and IMF while regimes refer to the implicit and explicit rules, 
norms, and decision-making procedures that guide state behaviors. Gilpin (2001:83) argues that these 
two terms may justifiably fu rca ted  as interchangeably as it is the regimes produced by institutions
that are important for shaping international outcomes. See Krasner (1982:186) for the classic definition 
of a regime.
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underlying power structure of the international system. Regimes reflect the interests 
of their most powerful members, or a hegemonic member. Widespread compliance 
reflects the exercise of great state power or indicates that the regime resolved a 
coordination problem in which states maintained homogenous ex ante preferences.
Conversely, Institutionalists argue that international organizations can exert 
independent influence on state behavior or act as intervening variables between power 
and state behavior. In this regard, regimes may influence state behavior by 
minimizing the transactions costs of cooperating, reducing uncertainty by providing a 
forum for future cooperation, and establish a mechanism by which information can be 
exchanged and regime defectors exposed and punished.3 Thus, despite their 
distinctions, these two system-level International Relations approaches are classified 
as a single Enforcement School as they each conclude that more enforcement is 
correlated with more compliance.
The Management School provides the chief opposition to the Enforcement 
School. This approach adopts the somewhat counterintuitive assumption that, 
“almost all nations observe all principles of international law and almost all of their 
obligations almost all of the time.”4 In this view, instances of non-compliance 
generally reflect states’ inability rather than unwillingness to comply. For example, 
states’ apparent defection may result from the ambiguity of regime rules making 
compliance difficult to judge, or a state may simply not have had enough time to fully 
implement an agreement, or a state may not possess an administrative apparatus 
capable of implementation. The solution to curbing defection is not enforcement,
2 See Mitchell (1994) for a review of the Realist position on regime enforcement.
3 See Keohane (1982, 1984), Stein (1982), Martin (1992), and Fearon (1998) for a representative 
sample of this vast Institutionalist literature.
4 Chayes and Chayes (1993:177).
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which creates prohibitively high political and economic costs, but the international 
political management of those impediments to compliance.5
A final group of theories includes the extensive range of middle range 
hypotheses and theoretical frameworks generated by comparative politics and public 
policy research. This heterogeneous body of research has developed at least since 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) and has been so extensive so as to confound easy 
summary.6 More will be said of this approach later, yet at present it is sufficient to 
highlight that this research has identified a wide array of generally domestic-level 
variables, such as political institutions, market institutions, and ideas, associated with 
compliance with inter-state regimes. Promising lines of research have been recently 
innovated in the study of the influence of democracy and diverse legal traditions,
*7 ftregional imitation effects , and the dynamic study of regime implementation change.
These three approaches constitute the core body of political economy research 
into regime implementation. Though they adopt distinct simplifying assumptions and 
thus often focus on divergent independent variables, the theories converge in their 
dichotomous conceptualization of implementation. They each treat the 
implementation dependent variable in a binary fashion in which state behavior takes 
on one of two values: states comply or defect with their international commitments. 
Whether a quantitative or qualitative research methodology is employed, the aim of 
most policy compliance research is to discern variables correlated with an 
implementation dummy variable. As Botcheva and Martin argue, “[t]his crude
5 For example, see Duffy (1988), Chayes and Chayes (1993, 1995), Arora and Cason (1995), and 
Young (1999).
6 See John (1998) for an attempt at summary.
7 Simmons (2000).
8 Baron (1995), Krueger (1996).
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dichotomization of the vast variety of state behavior has perhaps obscured as much as 
it has revealed.”9
In particular, this dichotomization abstracts away many of the nuances 
involved in the process of regime implementation. It does not allow for the 
investigation of why some states may over-comply with regime rules while others 
defect. A binary compliance variable can only record one of two possibilities: 
defection or compliance. This variable is not exhaustive enough to capture the 
empirical possibility that a state implements a regime in excess of the minimum 
requirements. To capture such a possibility requires the abandonment of the dummy 
variable concept in favor of an ordinal or interval/ratio level variable capable of 
taking on three or more values: for example, defection or compliance or over- 
compliance. Addressing over-compliance would seem to be as useful a question as 
understanding defection, especially for testing Enforcement hypotheses that seem to 
assume that states will, ceteris paribas, seek to defect from their international 
obligations. If there are empirical instance of over-compliance they could be an 
anomaly for Enforcement theory, especially if there is an enforcement mechanism that 
applies to all states equally, and it would be important to capture this empirical 
possibility.10
Also, it would be useful to categorize those states that defect substantially from 
those that fail to comply in a few minor issue areas. Understanding the degrees of 
regime defection would again be an interesting phenomenon for the Enforcement 
school to explain and perhaps a mandatory phenomenon for Managerialist studies. 
Two of the key proponents of the Managerial School, Abram Chayes and Antonia 
Handler Chayes argue that a “regime as a whole need not and should not be held to a
9 Botcheva and Martin (2001:3).
10 Botcheva and Martin (2001:3) identify that empirical studies have identified instances of over­
compliance with regime rules by states, though they did not cite any examples.
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standard of strict compliance but to a level of overall compliance that is 
‘acceptable’...” and “questions of compliance are often contestable and call for 
complex, subtle, and frequently subjective evaluation.”11 A binary understanding of 
compliance would seem ontologically incongruent with making these nuanced 
judgements about compliance and operationalizing “acceptable” compliance 
thresholds.
Further, an Institutionalist paper by Botcheva and Martin (2001), suggests that 
eschewing the binary conception allows for an assessment of the differential impact of 
regimes over time. By adopting a more nuanced understanding of compliance, it is 
possible to move beyond the general debate of international cooperation studies—Do 
Institutions Matter?—to ask more specific questions of How Do Institutions Matter? 
Although it may be possible to capture some of this How question with a binary 
variable, it is not possible to assess the conditions in which regimes will produce 
convergence, divergence, or have no impact at all. Yet by looking at cases of over­
compliance and degrees of defection from regimes it is possible to create studies in 
which we can more clearly observe the differentiated impacts of regimes and combine 
studies of regime compliance with those of transnational policy convergence and 
divergence with inter-state rules.
As illustrated from Botcheva and Martin’s example of international trade regime 
effects (see Figure 3.1) a fuller understanding of compliance permits us to judge the 
impact of a tariff reduction regime to create policy convergence or divergence. The 
solid diagonal line represents the pre-regime tariff levels of States A, B, and C with 
tariffs being measured on a multiple category ordinal scale and the solid horizontal 
line, at M, representing the minimum tariff level established by an international
11 Chayes and Chayes (1993:176,198).
12 See Coleman (1994) and Walter (2000) for examples of the vast convergence literature applied to 
banking and foreign direct investment issue areas, respectively.
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agreement. The dashed and dotted diagonals represent distinct options that the
sample states have in implementing the regime. Looking first at the dotted line, States
A and B choose to lower their tariffs in accordance with the regime while State C
maintains its pre-regime tariff levels. Though State B implements a more stringent
tariff slashing policy tha^State A, the overall regime effect is to lower tariffs and
produce convergence among the three states’ trade policies, even if State A does not
fully comply with the regime rules. If we were to derive univariate statistics for the
figure, the mean and the standard deviation of the three state’s tariff levels would
decline from the pre-regime period to the post-regime period. The dashed line, by
contrast, illustrates the decisions of States A and B to defect from the tariff regime.
Though State A defects more substantially than B, this implies that the regime
perversely produces a divergence effect. In this instance, the arithmetic mean and
11standard deviation of the three states’ tariff levels increase.
It would not be possible to draw similar conclusions from a binary compliance 
variable. This may be illustrated through a modification to the Botcheva and Martin 
graph so that a dummy variable replaces the tariff level scale as the dependent 
variable (see Figure 3.2). If the tariff level scale, along the j/-axis, is replaced with a 
binary conceptualization, each state’s response to the tariff regime is classified as 
either Compliant or Non-Compliant (Yes or No). Though this figure illustrates the 
influence of the regime on state compliance, it does not really inform on the extent of 
convergence or divergence produced by the regime. The binary conception does not 
give any indication of the way that the tariff regime actually impacts the behavior of 
sub-state actors involved in international exchange.






State A State CState B
Figure 3.1. Divergence and convergence effects
(Source: Botcheva and Martin 2001)
The solid line represents compliance by all three states and is equal to the M 
horizontal. The dotted line indicates that State A defects from the agreement while 
States B and C complies. In neither instance, however, are we informed about the 
extent of compliance. Did State A fail to comply by a small margin, did States B and 
C meet the minimum compliance standards or implement substantially more 
aggressive cuts in their tariff levels. We are informed about the behavior of states in 
response to regime rules more than about their actions in accordance with the goals of 
the trade regime. If all states substantially reduce their tariffs, along the dotted line, 
then even with State A’s defection we can conclude that the regime achieves some 
success. Measures such as the mean and deviation that conveyed useful information 









State A State B State C
Figure 3.2. Divergence and Convergence Effects with a Binary 
Compliance Variable
If the analysis of implementation is extended over a considerable period of 
time, the weaknesses of the binary approach multiply further As Figure 3.3 
illustrates, if the period of analysis includes a snap shot of the tariff levels during pre­
regime period (t -1), the initial implementation period (f), and an implementation 
period at some point in the future ( t+  1), it is possible to observe changes in the 
interpretations that states make to the way they are implementing the tariff regime. 
This form of dynamic compliance analysis will be discussed below and is becoming 
an important component of the study of international cooperation. The solid line in 
Figure 3.3 represents the pre-regime (/ -1) period while the dotted line represents the 
initial (f) period of implementation when States A and B lowered their tariffs in 
accordance with the regime. Yet the broken line now represents an extended 

















revise the way the tariff regime is implemented in its domestic political economy and 
has adopted a higher tariff level. Perhaps the initial tariff level had a deleterious 
consequence on domestic interests and a revision was made to the initial 
implementation decision or there was a change in the government that elected a 
political party supported by high tariff interests to power. Though the new tariff level 
remains in compliance with the tariff agreement, as indicated by (M) on the jy-axis, 
there is now less convergence in the extended implementation period. If we construct 
a similar dynamic analysis with a binary variable, no change is indicated from the 
initial to the extended implementation periods. State A’s tariff reformulation changes 
over time, yet it remains in compliance (below M in Figure 3.3) with the trade regime 
so no change can be recorded on the binary indicator. This seems to be a key 
theoretical weakness as the environment in which firms conduct their trade relations 
changes over time, yet the pure focus on compliance/defection does not change.
The differentiated conception of compliance thus seems to heighten the ability 
of international cooperation studies to understand the process of regime 
implementation. It should be conceded that, in many issue-areas, the binary indicator 
captures as much of the empirical reality as a more nuanced indicator. Underdal 
(1995), for example, asserts that many security pacts, such as arms agreements, may 
not allow any room for state discretionary policy-making while remaining compliant 
to a regime. If there were no room for domestic maneuver within the confines of 
regime rules, then the binary conception would seem to capture the compliance phase 
of international cooperation adequately. Even though for such regimes, a fuller 
account of the pre-regime period may seem useful. Yet, as will be discussed in the 
next section, for the study of international financial agreements the differentiated 
approach seems most appropriate as these agreements often provide wide room for
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discretionary policy by constructing international “soft law” or by prescribing a fairly 
vague collection of “best practices.”14 In these instances and for those regimes that do 
permit elements of discretionary state behavior, studying degrees of compliance, 
“directs our attention away from process tracing to consideration of variation in 
outcomes.. .[i]t allows us to specify conditional hypotheses rather than the broad and 
undifferentiated claim that ‘institutions matter.’”15 Moreover, soft law regimes 
highlight Alexander’s (2000b:7) argument that legalization is not properly captured 
by a binary conception (no law vs. law) but a multi-dimensional continuum. Our 






State A State B State C
Figure 3.3. Dynamic Divergence and Convergence Effects
3.2.2. Degrees o f  Compliance and the 1988 Basel Accord
The Basel Accord falls within the category of international regimes that would be best 
studied with a differentiated compliance indicator. As Chapter 2 discussed, the
14 A summary o f many o f these regimes is presented in Appendix 3.1
15 Botcheva and Martin (2001:4).
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Accord is widely cited as a “soft law” regime.16 The agreement is not legally binding 
on the negotiating states and responsibility for regime enforcement is delegated to 
domestic bank supervisors. Most importantly, however, the Accord provides 
domestic authorities with wide discretionary powers for determining how the Accord 
is operationalized in their own regulations and bank codes. This is accomplished by 
allowing a wide range of bank capital adequacy regulatory practice to qualify as 
“compliant” with the Accord and then allowing domestic supervisors to pick and 
choose among these practices when interpreting the rules for their own banks. The
•  17Accord creates a regulatory baseline and invites states to exceed this baseline. The 
1988 Accord provides states with a wide range of discretionary maneuver and 
represents an excellent opportunity to analyze degrees of compliance. By adopting a 
compliance measure capable of capturing the G-10 states’ various interpretations of 
the Basel rules, it is possible to address the differentiated impact of the Accord and 
measure the extent of convergence or divergence (if any) that the Accord produced.
Previous research into the Accord’s implementation confirms the importance 
of analyzing degrees of compliance with the Basel rules. In particular, Daniel Ho 
(2002) endeavored to identify variables associated with a binary indicator of Basel 
regime compliance with a logistical regression model. Drawing from a recent World 
Bank database, his study coded the capital adequacy regulations of 122 states so that
1 ftthey score a “1” if they implemented the Accord and “0” if they did not. Yet 
because about 90 percent of the sample states claimed to be in compliance with the 
Accord, Ho was left to explain defection by only nine states.
16 See Alexander (2000) and Ho (2002) for a discussion of the ways in which the Basel Accord is an 
example of a soft law regime and Shelton (2000) for a collection of  papers discussing the nature and 
ramifications of soft law.
17 See Basel Committee (1988), at §7.
18 Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a).
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There is thus very little information conveyed by viewing the implementation 
of the Basel Accord with a binary measure. If Ho’s methodology is inputted into the 
graph format utilized in the previous section, it is clear that his study does not seem to 
contribute a great deal to understanding the implementation of the Accord. Figure 3.4 
contains the implementation responses of ten states (A-J) with the solid line 
representing the pre-Basel regime compliance level (at “No” for all states since there 
was no previous international regime) and the dotted line representing the compliance 
responses of the ten states, with the minimum compliance level situated again at M. 
As 90 percent of Ho’s sample implemented the Accord, only 1 of the ten states (G) 
scores a “No.” The results indicate that the binary indicator produces a rather 
empirically asymmetric and theoretically uninteresting question for research as there 
is nearly perfect compliance and convergence. It thus seems necessary to study the 
Accord with a differentiated measure of compliance that is capable of focusing on the 
question of how the Accord was implemented. Ho acknowledges this and suggests 
that the “dependent variable may ultimately be even better captured by measuring the 
degree of convergence or divergence.”19
Yet, Ho’s study remains useful as he successfully aggregates a wide range of 
extant compliance theories into a single research design. Drawing from many of the 
international relations and comparative politics analytical frameworks and models 
discussed above, Ho tests the association of 26 independent variables with his dummy 
compliance variable. The section that follows will draw from Ho’s body of theory to 
fashion 12 hypotheses that may be reasonably argued to be associated with a 
differentiated measure of compliance. Thus, while not all of Ho’s variables are useful




explanations' utility in Chapters 4-7, this thesis will assess the ability of his theories to 
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Figure 3.4. Convergence and Divergence Effects of the 1988 Basel Accord with a
Binary Compliance Variable
Section 33. Theories of Compliance with the Basel Accord
3.3.1. Introduction
This section will indicate how a study of degrees of compliance with an international 
agreement may be employed in practice. The simple approach adopted here involves 
reinterpreting existing hypotheses that were designed to explain a binary compliance 
phenomenon in a fashion that enables us to make predictions about types of 
compliance. In practice, this section aims is to design testable, probabilistic 
propositions that explain why some states may have implemented very strict 
interpretations of the Basle rules, why some adopted a loose interpretation, and why
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there was convergence or divergence in interpretations over the 1988-2000 period.
The theoretical statements described here will be tested in subsequent chapters.
The theoretical predictions are presented in an unformalized fashion. This is 
consistent with the current “state of the art” in the application of the political economy 
approach to understanding financial regulation. Baron (1995:25) observes that such 
an approach is divergent from that of neo-classical perspective by treating, “.. .as 
endogenous both the behavior of the firm and the regulator and looks beyond the 
identification of the efficient regulatory policy to incorporate the strategies of 
interested parties that attempt to influence the choices of regulatory policies and their 
implementation.” Rather than focusing exclusively on “demand side” actions by 
regulated firms or the “supply side” of the policy equation by centering on political 
actors and institutions, the political economy-style approach adopted here attempts to 
marry the two into a more comprehensive theoretical platform. The costs of this 
approach are tractability and parsimony. This approach is currently being widely 
adopted by numerous political scientists and economists in the study of financial 
regulation, yet this has progressed as far as hypothesis testing and not into the 
development of generalizable, formal models.
Piecing together a battery of theories of implementation involves drawing 
from disparate theories that have been developed in various areas of the social 
sciences. This is a difficult task for as one study concluded, “[t]he rate of compliance 
is a function of a web of factors.. .[i]t is unlikely that a specific formula can be 
discovered for all norms that would allow one to control the rate of compliance or 
allow one to fashion all norms to optimize compliance.” The same is true for 
hypothesizing on kinds of compliance. This section thus endeavors to contribute to
20 Charaey (2000:117)
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theory building in the study of the implementation of soft law by providing a platform 
in which to bring numerous disparate approaches to implementation and convergence 
together for comparison and testing against a common empirical phenomenon.
In order to facilitate the platform for this theory testing exercise, the following 
section will rely heavily on Ho’s comparative political economic study of the 
implementation of the Basel Accord. Ho’s quantitative study successfully draws 
together a battery of hypotheses on the macroeconomic, political and economic 
institutional, and societal preferences that could be reasonably expected to explain 
why a state would implement the Accord. As the objective of this study is to 
understand distinctions in state behavior in response to a common external event, the 
Basel Accord, this comparative focus seems to be appropriate. Ho’s theory can be 
organized in four categories with each category containing a number of hypotheses to 
explain why a state would choose to implement the Accord; these hypotheses are 
presented in Appendix 3.2. Each of the categories, and thus their hypotheses, explain 
that state implementation behavior is a function of a vector of domestic attributes and 
systemic or external political and economic variables. These categories will be fully 
described in the next section, yet they include:
1. Domestic bank preferences
2. Macroeconomic environment
3. Domestic political institutions
4. International influences
In testing Ho’s hypotheses, however, several innovations are advanced. First, 
these hypotheses will be adapted in a number of ways to address variations in 
implementation rather than rates of implementation. As discussed in the previous
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section, Ho utilized a binary implementation variable and some of the hypotheses 
must be modified to take degrees of compliance into account.
Second, the hypotheses will be employed dynamically. Ho’s study explains 
why a cross-section of states implemented the Accord at one period of time, roughly 
the late 1990s. As will be explained below, this study will seek to understand changes 
in the Basel rule interpretations of a cross-section of states, over a 12-year period of 
time. Accounting for these changes will involve innovating a few new hypotheses 
that fit within Ho’s categories. Ho seemed to approve of this innovation as he 
observed that his “analysis is open to be supplemented and verified with additional 
data on the dependent variable, as well as a dynamic analysis of implementation.”
This is a key objective of this study.
Finally, not all of Ho’s hypotheses will be employed. This thesis does not 
necessarily seek to replicate Ho’s study with a new dependent variable so much as 
leverage upon Ho’s work to fashion an organizational scheme around which to 
arrange hypotheses of implementation. Though replication is an interesting by­
product of this approach and will be conducted to some extent, not all of Ho’s 
hypotheses can be reasonably presumed to be related to the differentiated compliance 
variable in the same way that they were related to Ho’s binary compliance indicator. 
Also, many of his hypotheses are geared towards understanding compliance in 
developing and emerging market economies. Only those possessing a clear 
theoretical link with degrees of compliance will be employed. The excluded variables 
are identified in Appendix 3.2.
21 Ho (2002:68).
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3.3.2. Theories o f Implementation
This section will lay out the hypotheses of implementation. Each hypothesis’ 
simplifying assumptions will be clearly identified as will its expected relationship 
(positive, negative, indeterminate) to the endogenous variable—degrees of 
compliance. By enumerating these attributes clearly, it is hoped that the internal 
consistency of the hypotheses will be assured and that it will be absolutely clear under 
what circumstances the hypotheses fail to predict the actual implementation 
outcomes.
A. Bank Preferences
This section outlines a number of hypotheses on the preference of a given sample 
state’s banks towards a lax or stringent interpretation of the Accord. As Ho observed, 
clearly such preferences do not influence policy in isolation. These preferences are 
filtered through distinct sets of domestic political institutions before public policy 
emerges. These variables will be investigated in due course. Here we lay out 
propositions regarding bank preferences with the assumption that these influence
policy. This “demand side” model of the policy-making process is rooted in the
0^Chicago view of interest group or “capture” theory. This suggests, that as the costs 
of stringent capital adequacy regulations are concentrated on domestic banks while 
the prudential benefits diffused among consumers, banking organizations have an 
incentive to lobby policy-makers for a favorable interpretation of the Accord. Studies 
of banking politics in industrialized economies have observed that the style of 
banking regulations after the Second World War (i.e. segmentation laws, credit 
ceilings, etc.) made credit policy a target to rent-seeking by banks anxious to prevent
22 Ho (2002: 655).
23 This research was initiated by Stigler (1971) and developed by Peltzman (1976), Posner (1974), and 
Becker (1983).
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the capping of their credit.24 Hence, it is reasonable to commence a discussion of 
theory with bank’s preferences.
So what may determine the preferences that banking organizations attempt to 
project into the policy process? First, Ho (2002) suggests that this depends on how 
well capitalized banks were when the Accord was adopted. Banks with relatively l^v 0 
capital-to-assets ratios may support a lax interpretation of the Accord’s rules. As 
Chapter 2 discussed, it is expensive for banks to raise capital. Doing so requires 
painful portfolio alterations that may involve raising new equity, selling off assets, or 
foreclosing particular lending projects. These actions can raise shareholder ire (in the 
case of publicly-held banks) by diluting equity and thus reducing the return on their 
shares in the bank. Foreclosing lending options may drive away relationship 
customers to other banks or other forms of funding. Selling off assets can advantage 
other, well-capitalized, banks and other financial institutions that can purchase these 
assets at attractive prices.25
Conversely, of course, well-capitalized banks may well seek a strict 
interpretation of the Accord. Banks in this position could seek to leverage a strict 
interpretation of the Accord as a form of “non-market” competitive advantage against 
poorly capitalized domestic competitors or foreign competitors subject to domestic 
practices. For example, such banks could seek to use the domestic application of the 
Accord to manipulate the domestic regulatory playing field to their advantage and 
disadvantage foreign competitors. Such banks could increase the value of their equity 
if demand is increased for banks already in compliance with the Accord and increase
24 Verdier (2002:134).
25 See De Bondt and Prast (2000) in Ho (2002:648).
26 See Baron (2000) for a textbook discussion of the definitions, sources, and consequences of non­
market based firm competition.
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their share of the domestic lending market through the acquisition of new customers 
and the purchase of assets sold by their lesser-capitalized competition.
Similarly, banks subject to relatively stringent capital adequacy regulations 
before the Accord may favor an interpretation consistent with their current practice. 
Ho (2002) does not consider this proposition, possibly owing to the absence of a 
quantitative indicator of states’ pre-Basel Accord capital adequacy standards. Yet, a 
hypothesis centering pre-Basel rules seems intuitive. Banks that were subject to 
limited definitions of capital or risk-weighted asset requirements prior to the Accord 
may well seek to gain a non-market advantage through encouraging a strict domestic, 
and likely cross-national, standard. This suggests:
Hypothesis 1. Banks with relatively lax (strict) pre-Basel capital adequacy ratios or 
subject to weak capital adequacy standards will be more likely to support a lax 
(strict) interpretation o f the Accord.
This hypothesis advances a broad “path dependence” theory of inter-state 
regime implementation. The main observable implication of the hypothesis is that the 
Basel Accord did not produce much actual change in the capital adequacy regulations 
of the states that originally agreed to the rules in 1988. This conclusion may seem 
counterintuitive in light of research suggesting that the Accord contributed to the G- 
10’s economic recession in the early 1990s and effected fundamental changes in the
97financial intermediary business. After its negotiation, the Accord was described as a 
“landmark in international supervisory cooperation” by the Governor of the Bank of
27 See Basel Committee (1999) for a summary of much of this research.
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OftEngland and a “breakthrough” by the Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank.
Yet, much regime implementation literature would emphasize the possibility that the
Accord may not have changed many elements of the G-10 state’s capital regulations.
The behavior of domestic regulators and the preferences of domestic banks could
have been heavily path dependent; their dominant preference may, ceteris paribus,
have been to minimize differences between their interpretation of the Basel rules and
extant capital adequacy rules and practices. As Morgan and Knights (1997)
00concluded, “national approaches to regulating banks are slow to change.”
The broader logic behind this hypothesis has been the subject of analyses in 
International Relations and Economics studies of regime and public policy 
implementation. Specifically, domestic-level analysts have observed that path 
dependence can be expected to characterize the response of actors to policy change. 
In the public policy literature, there has been extensive debate regarding the 
relationship between new and extant rules and regulations in policy implementation. 
A hypothesis that has been widely tested, and found some support, is that the 
probability of effective implementation is inversely related to the extent of departure 
from the status quo. At the international level, Underhill (1992) observed that the 
rules and norms prescribed by the regime enter each implementing state’s "regulatory 
space" which is occupied by historically and institutionally conditioned policy 
strategies, inter-governmental turf battles, and, "constellations of private interests 
joined in alliances with constellations of public interests."31 Likewise, economist 
David Baron argued that theories of regulation must model that, “as regulation is 
applied to on going economic activity, [the] status quo can be important to legislative
28 Financial Times (1987:1) in Tobin (1991:187).
29 Morgan and Knight (1997:233).
30 See Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981), Cerych and and Sabatier 
(1986), Downs, Rocke, and Barsoon (1996).
3‘Underhill (1992).
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choice.” Though, as indicated in Chapter 2, most states’ interpretations of the Basel 
rules occur in a more de-politicized environment in which banking regulatory 
bureaucracies are more likely to interpret the Basel rules than legislature, the same 
logic would seem to apply.
In fact, the path dependence hypothesis would seem to be especially pertinent 
when applied to the case of the Basel Accord and study of degrees of compliance, 
more generally. As Chapter 2 argued, the negotiation of the Accord was made 
possible through allowing G-10 states to “fit” elements of their own capital adequacy 
regime into the new multilateral standard. For example, French negotiators refused to 
support the Accord if the unrealized appreciation in physical assets were not 
distinguished as an allowable component of bank capital. These were allowed by 
French banks’ regulations before the Accord’s negotiations and were an important 
component of many French banks’ capital base. Though the inclusion of this capital 
instrument was opposed by Germany at the Basel Accord negotiations and the EC 
Own Funds Directive negotiations, it was ultimately allowed in both standards in
'J O
order to secure unanimous approval from the negotiating parties. Many elements of 
the Accord’s rules, especially the definitions of capital, took shape in this manner and 
thus reflected the interests of one or two negotiating states. As a result, we should 
expect that domestic regulators and banks of implementing states would have the 
opportunity to interpret the Accord so as to minimize any major disruptions to the 
regulatory status quo. A state’s extant capital adequacy rules were probably the 
product of some regulatory compromise and were designed perhaps in coordination 
with other elements of prudential regulation (such as official government bank bailout 
policies) or idiosyncrasies of the states’ financial system (e.g., costs of capital). Also,
32 Baron (1997:41).
33 Vernon, Spar, and Tobin (1991:150), Story (1997:258).
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as Simmons (2001:2) suggested, “national regulators typically prefer to avoid rules 
that raise costs for national firms or that encourage capital financial activity to migrate 
to under regulated jurisdictions.” Maintaining extant rules would thus minimize the 
costs of re-negotiating bank regulations for supervisors and banks.34
Of course, a state’s pre-Basel capital regulations could cut both ways. If the 
Accord is implemented with asymmetric stringency among industrialized states, 
banks subject to relatively strict standards may demand that their domestic 
supervisors loosen their regulations in an effort to level the playing field. Oatley and 
Nabors (1998) and others suggested that it was American bankers’ demands that 
Japanese banks be subject to stricter capital standards that led the US to fervently 
pursue the Accord’s negotiation. Elements of this counter to Hypotheses 1 will be 
further discussed later as the influence of International Factors.
One possible counter to this criticism is that banks may seek to utilize their 
capital adequacy practices as a signal of stability to the international market. Rather 
than seeking a tit-for-tat race to the lowest possible regulatory standard, banks may 
use the Accord to heighten their reputation. Ho cites a wide range of research 
concluding that “international law serves to increase the reputational harm of non- 
compliance, serving the function of a stamp of approval for the conduct of 
international business.” Complying with an international financial standard, even 
one with negative distributional costs in the short run, is thus beneficial as this 
compliance signals a state’s financial stability and competitiveness to international
o j t
investors and depositors. It thus may be possible to hypothesize that a state’s banks 
will prefer to maintain or depart from a lax status quo and demand that their
34 Scott and Iwahara (1994) and Scott (1995), and Barth, Nolle, and Rice (2000:201) suggest this point.
35 Ho (2002:654).
36 See Simmons (2001) for a discussion of the signalling effects of international regime implementation 
from an international relations perspective and Guzman (2002) for a discussion of these issues from a 
legal perspective.
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regulators implement a strict interpretation of the Basel rules as such a signal 
irrespective of their pre-regime rules. Extant research has not yet examined the 
relationship between international signalling effects and types of compliance. Is the 
mere announcement to comply with the Basel Accord sufficient to serve as a credible 
signal? Is it necessary for a state to signal a particular type of compliance for its banks 
to glean any reputational advantages (or avoid any disadvantages)? These questions 
have not been previously addressed.
I argue that banks’ perceptions of the relative reputational effects of 
compliance types will depend upon their exposure to international markets. In many 
instances, banks may be expected to lobby for a loose interpretation of the Accord, as 
the benefits of capital adequacy regulation are diffuse while the costs are heavily 
concentrated on banks’ borrowers.38 Banks that are subject to a high level of market 
or private “supervision” may be induced to follow standards that are more demanding 
than their regulators mandate, in order to earn competitive credit ratings and earn 
competitive returns in capital market issues. A 1990 Basel Committee review of the 
Accord’s effects advanced a similar point by arguing that the “market itself has 
imposed its own discipline... [bjanks have found a distinct advantage in being able to 
satisfy the rating agencies and the market generally that their capital was adequate in 
terms of the final Basle standard.” Moreover, an empirical study by the US Federal 
Reserve Bank concluded that the market had led US banks to maintain regulatory 
capital well in excess of the minimum 8 percent requirement. Thus, banks subject to 
such market pressures may want to augment their international reputation by adhering 
to strict capital adequacy standards and may thus lobby their regulators for the
37 Research has been conducted on the differential effects of degrees of deposit insurance coverage and 
bank competitiveness and financial system fragility and have found that degrees can matter. See 
Demirgtl?-Kunt and Detragiache (2000), Demirgtl9-Kunt and Huizinga (2000), and Kane (2000).
38 Walter (2002:9).
39 Basel Committee (1990) in Kapstein (1991:30).
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adoption of a relatively strict interpretation of the Basel rules or not fight the 
discretionary implementation of tough standards.
Hypothesis 2. Banks are subject to a high degree o f market supervision will favor a 
relatively strict interpretation o f the Basel Accord
Banks’ preferences could also be conditioned by their international ambitions. 
Banks with extensive international operations may need to adhere to the Accord in 
order to conduct business in other Basel complying states. For example, banks 
aiming to conduct business in the United States must provide the Federal Reserve 
with evidence of compliance with their national regulators’ interpretation of the Basel 
rules or, if they are domiciled in a non-compliant state, must provide balance sheet 
information that suggests compliance with the Accord’s provisions.40 On this basis, 
Ho concludes that banks with international ambitions will lobby their supervisors to 
implement the Accord to ease their entry into foreign markets. Though his results are 
statistically insignificant in the test of this hypothesis, it seem reasonable to advance 
that banks with extensive international ambitions may have preferences for stricter 
domestic regulations as such banks may be subject to strict market governance and to 
provide them with greater flexibility for entering foreign market places.
Hypothesis 3. Banks with large international exposure will favor a relatively strict 
interpretation o f the Accord
B. Macroeconomic Environment
In addition to the factors outlined in the previous section, the preferences of political 
economic actors are linked to the current climate of the financial and broader market
40 Misback (1993) in Ho (2002:656).
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economies in which they operate. There are a wide variety of macroeconomic 
variables that could be reasonably assumed to contribute to a state’s interpretation of 
the Basel rules. The hypotheses discussed in this section are useful as the 
macroeconomic environment conditions domestic preferences towards degrees of 
capital adequacy rule severity and are useful control variables in order to assess the 
influence of domestic bank preferences and institutions.
In particular, Ho argues that periods of economic instability and financial 
sector distress should influence a state’s decision to implement the Accord. It may 
argued that this instability conditions the preferences of regulators and commercial 
banks towards the tightening of the regulatory regime. Yet it is not equally clear what 
the causal directions of such effects are: should macroeconomic instability be 
associated with a loose or strict interpretation of the Basel rules?
Ho explicitly addresses this question and is unable to find a solution. First, Ho 
advances the argument that perhaps instability should be associated with states’ 
decision to not implement the Accord. The financial crises would make bank 
compliance with a stricter capital code more costly and perhaps exacerbate the effects 
of the crises on domestic banks. His regression analyses finds that instability is 
negatively correlated with implementation and statistically significant in one of the 
two models in which the variable is employed.41 This same logic would seem to hold 
for looking at degrees of compliance with the Accord. A state would probably seek to 
implement a fairly minimal interpretation of the Basel rules to allow domestic banks 
to take advantage of a wide range of capital instruments in order to combat the effects 
of the crisis on their balance sheets.
41 Ho (2002:674).
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Alternatively, an equally logical argument may be advanced to predict a 
tightening of a state’s capital adequacy guidelines. Ho argues that perhaps the 
macroeconomic instability could be endogenized into the argument so that we are left 
with the proposition that regulators would implement the Accord because of 
macroeconomic instability. Equally, regulators may choose to tighten solvency ratio 
standards in reaction to instability. This hypothesis would seem to be consistent with 
Andrew Walter’s (2002) observations that financial reform in the US during the 1980s 
and in East Asia during the 1990s followed rather than preceded the onset of banking 
crises in these regions.42
A final way of conceptualizing the importance of this variable is generated 
from the regulator’s dilemma model, discussed in Chapter 2. Kapstein (1989,1991, 
1994) and Singer (2002) argue that macroeconomic instability or microeconomic 
distress in the banking sector contributes to the decision-making processes of 
regulatory authorities. Their model assumes that the onset of economic instability 
may require the intervention of political authorities. While seeking to maximize 
votes, politicians will seek to shift blame to market actors’ irresponsible behavior or 
imprudent regulatory oversight. In both events, regulatory authorities may experience 
a loss of autonomy, prestige, and budget. As a result, we may expect that economic 
crisis will be strongly associated with a tightening of regulatory policy.
In associating economic instability to a degrees of compliance variable, the 
theoretical literature does not provide a clear guide to predicting outcomes. The 
literature is sufficiently robust however to advance that the variable does seem 
important.
42 Walter (2002:7).
43 This argument is grounded in the neo-classical economics assumption that regulators are analogous 
to firms and seek to maximize profits. As regulators pay may be performance related and contingent 
on repulsing hostile takeover bids (from politicians) then regulators, as bureaucratic actors, will seek 
autonomy. See Niskanen(1973) in Dunleavy (1991: 154).
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Hypothesis 4. The presence o f economic instability will be systematically associated 
with a state ’s decisions to implement a strict or lax interpretation o f the Basel rules
C. Political Institutions Theory
Studies of policy implementation have universally acknowledged the importance of 
domestic political institutions to determine the likelihood of compliance with public 
policy. If the macroeconomic environment conditions bank and regulators’ 
preferences, the political institutional environment structures the way these 
preferences interact with one another in the production of policy. Ho’s study of the 
determinants of state commitments with the Basel Accord found considerable support 
for hypotheses gauging that the likelihood of compliance covaried with distinct 
configurations of domestic political regimes and practices.44 In particular, his logit 
regression analysis found robust statistical association between the likelihood of 
compliance and:
1. Fragmentation in the political decision making regime
2. Degree of respect for the rule of law, the level of corruption, and the 
presence of democracy
When indicators of this phenomenon were added to strict macroeconomic 
explanations of implementation, the number of correctly predicted cases of 
implementation increased from 87.72 percent to 96.97 percent45
In applying Ho’s hypotheses to this study, it seems that only the first requires 
explicit enumeration here. The second, concerning the rule of law and democracy, is 
controlled for in the quantitative and qualitative analyses here as our sample includes 
only OECD states that exhibit high degrees of convergence in measures of corruption
44 Ho (2002: 659-664).
45 Compare the results of models (1) and (2) in Ho (2002: 673).
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and democracy. If we measure the democracy scores of our sample with the 10-point 
scale, from Polity III data, that Ho utilizes we derive a standard deviation of 0.476,
The first of Ho’s hypotheses, that the likelihood of implementation can be 
expected to decrease as the fragmentation of a sample state’s political institutions
fragmentation was measured as federalism, bicameralism, or a strong opposition party 
or parties, to the executive, in parliamentary government. Though the latter of these 
is not strictly an institutional variable, these features constrain the ability of a small 
number of actors (the cabinet, for example) from wielding unchecked power through 
the multiplication of the veto players in the policy-making process and provide a role 
for particularistic interests to influence the policy-making process. Ho noted that, 
“[a]s such constraints increase, politicians are more likely to face opposition from 
regional and local governments, and more likely to satisfy concentrated banking 
groups that may be negatively affected by the Basle Accord.”48
Though Ho intended this hypothesis to explain a dichotomous implementation 
process, it would seem to be of equal expository utility when looking at degrees of 
compliance. As Coleman (1996: 67) noted, “financial institutions’ capacity to 
constrain policy outcomes or command outcomes.. .depends on the political 
institutional context in which they function.” If we first assume that domestic banks
46 For Ho’s sample of over 100 states, a comparative measure of democracy is appropriate. The 
standard deviation of his sample, for the Polity III scale, is 3.841, thus indicating a great deal more 
variation in the democratic standards of his sample than the one collected here.
47 There are numerous variants of the theory that political fragmentation influences commitment with 
international regimes. Some have argued, especially in the context of developing states, that insulated 
political decision-making processes are correlated with higher growth rates, see Haggard (1990), Evans 
(1995). Other have argued that maintaining a separation of powers and a republican constitution 
increase the likelihood that a state will credibly commit to international standards, see North and 
Weingast (1989). These two arguments clearly address distinct empirical problems and Ho’s (2002)
fragmentation theory should be seen as contributing to this larger network of theory.
with only two states failing to achieve the maximum score of 10 46
increases, seems highly applicable to this study 47 In this instance, political
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will seek to influence their domestic regulators to adopt a relatively lax interpretation 
of the Accord that is consistent with their pre-Basel rules, then their ability to affect 
this policy outcome will depend upon the institutional structuring of the supply-side 
of the regulatory equation. As Ho argued, this leads to the proposition that:
Hypothesis 5. States will he more likely to adopt a lax interpretation when their 
political system is fragmented
A second political institutional variable concerns the impact of government 
ownership of the banking sector. Though addressed in Ho’s study, he labels this a 
“macroeconomic variable.” This variable is a blend of many elements of the 
organizing theoretical labels utilized here, yet it will be dealt with as a political 
institutional variable.
A state’s preferences for a regulatory policy mix may be deduced from the 
level of government ownership of the banking market. A high level of state ownership 
infers that the state would have to bear part of all of the costs for the implementation 
of the Accord. If banks’ capital were derived from state funding, then public coffers 
would need to contribute to capital injections necessary to raise capital adequacy 
ratios above the Basel Accord’s minima. Moreover, Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2001c) find that greater government ownership is associated with less efficient and 
profitable banking systems. It thus seems unlikely that the government would, ceteris 
paribus, opt to implement a Basel interpretation stricter than their current regime and 
would implement a relatively weak implementation of the Basel rules.
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Hypothesis 6. States with a high level ofgovernment ownership o f domestic banks will 
implement a relatively weak interpretation o f the Basel Accord.
D. International Influences
Ho identifies two key international influences on states’ implementation decisions. 
First, he judges the influence of international development institutions policy 
prescriptions. In particular, Ho addresses the relationship between the level of IMF 
credit distributions to a state and the likelihood of Basel implementation. This theory 
is not appropriate for this study given the focus on the developed economies that 
implemented the Accord in the late 1980s. The second influence, the existence of a 
regional norm, does seem pertinent. Ho argues “[b]anks and regulators within a 
region may have similar management philosophies, similar attitudes towards risk, and 
face similar competitive environments (i.e. shareholder expectations), leading to 
similar preferences towards the Basle Accord.”49 In constructing this argument, Ho 
follows the results of Beth Simmons’ (2000) finding that states are more likely to 
comply with international monetary “soft law” if states in their region comply. 
Simmons argues that states voluntarily comply with unenforced norms to realize the 
signalling and reputational effects discussed earlier. Such effects, she advances, will 
be stronger in the event that other states in the region comply with a monetary 
standard. The same could well be advanced for degrees of compliance with the 1988 
Accord.
Hypothesis 7. States will be more likely to adopt a strict (weak) interpretation o f the 
Basel Accord i f  states in their region adopt a strict (weak) interpretation
49 Ho (2002:665).
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In a separate study, Simmons (2001) tests another international influence that 
may affect patterns of compliance. In a study of the negotiation of international 
financial regulation, Simmons suggests that the US wields hegemonic power in the 
negotiation of financial standards due to the size and importance of its capital 
markets. In fact, she argues that the US has a “first mover” advantage as other states 
are subject to market pressures to emulate American regulatory innovations—perhaps 
even in the absence of a multilateral agreement. In other words, “there are strong 
incentives to emulate a U.S. regulatory innovation involving capital adequacy 
standards... there is very little incentive to reduce standards and risk developing a 
reputation as ‘poorly regulated.’”50
Though Simmons’ study is a work of comparative political economy, these 
arguments seem to resonate in Realist International Relations approaches. Recalling 
earlier sections of this chapter, Realists conclude that it is powerful states, not 
international regimes, which influence compliance. If regimes produce convergence 
among states with heterogeneous ex ante preferences, powerful states’ punishment 
mechanisms were effectively exercised. Part of this punishment could evolve through 
the Federal Reserve’s requirement that foreign banks adhere to American solvency 
standards and some through the market’s punishment of banks not adhering to the US 
guidelines. According to this point of view, there should be convergence on the Basel 
interpretation adopted by the US.
Hypothesis 8. States will be more likely to adopt a strict (lax) interpretation o f the 




This chapter aimed to accomplish two tasks. First, it set out to justify why studies of 
international cooperation need to amend the way they model the process of regime 
implementation. It was shown that, for the majority of international agreements, 
conceptualizing compliance as a dichotomous process produces empirically 
unsatisfying results. A great deal of rich empirical detail concerning instances of 
over-compliance and degrees of undercompliance are obscured. A solution was 
presented that suggested the adoption of a more differentiated implementation 
variable capable of capturing degrees of compliance. It was suggested that this was 
an especially necessary theoretical asset for analyzing compliance with the Basel 
Accord.
Second, this chapter presented eight hypotheses explaining why states might 
implement one of several various degrees of compliance with the 1988 Accord. A 
key component of all of these hypotheses is that states would, ceteris paribus, resolve 
to adopt a roughly path dependent interpretation of the Basel rules. Other hypotheses 
release the restrictive ceteris paribus assumption to investigate what political and 
economic variables may condition this direct relationship between path dependence 
and Basel interpretations. These hypotheses suggest that different variables may 
condition the implementation process at different points of time. These hypotheses 
are summarized below in Table 3.1. The expected relationship of this variable on 
severity of implementation with the Accord is also indicated.
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No. Description Abbrevation Predicted Sign
1 Pre-Basel Regime PREBASEL +
3 Market Supervision MARKET +
4 International Exposure EXPOSURE +
5 Economic Instability STABILITY Indeterminate
6 Political Fragmentation FRAGMENT -
7 Government Ownership GOV -
8 Regional Influences REGION +
9 Hegemonic Influences HEGEMON +
Table 3.1. Hypotheses on the Implementation of the Basel Accord






Measuring Implementation and Explanatory Variables
4.1. Introduction
The preceding chapters explained that the Basel Accord provided the G-10 states with 
fairly wide discretionary powers for determining how the agreement was 
operationalized in their banking laws and regulatory codes. Though the Accord’s text 
expressed the hope that the credit risk rules, “be applied as uniformly as possible at 
the national level” the responsibility for interpreting and enforcing the agreement was 
delegated to the national-level policy makers.1 Chapter 3 presented a variety of 
theoretical propositions regarding the conditions in which we would expect states to 
implement strict or lax interpretations of the Basel rules and thus effect transnational 
capital adequacy rule convergence or divergence.
The present chapter advances this line of discussion by operationalizing the
explanatory variables discussed in Chapter 3 and developing a measure of
implementation. This chapter also presents descriptive statistics for these variables,
using data from cases of Basel Accord implementation for 1988 and around 2000. In
chapter 5, these quantitative measures of implementation are utilized in bivariate and
multivariate statistical tests of explanations for why we observe particular patterns of
compliance and convergence with the baseline Basel rules. Yet even before the
statistical measures are applied, these descriptive statistics provide some insight into
the empirical side of the Basel Accord’s implementation in around 20 countries.
Previous research on the Accord has, in nearly all cases, utilized very small samples
of countries in their analyses and not presented much data on its implementation.
This has led to the formation of a form of conventional wisdom about the Accord
1 Basel Committee (1988), at §3.
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based on limited or incomplete data. One theory permeating the International 
Relations literature is that the Accord resulted from the exercise of US-UK financial 
market hegemony in order to eliminate regulatory advantages created by Japanese, 
and to a lesser degree French, regulators at the expense of American and British 
banks. Yet the descriptive data demonstrate that it is the US and UK that, among 
these four states, have adopted the strictest forms of implementation. This leads to the 
question of how the Basel implementation-stage contributed to the US-UK goals if 
these states continued to have much stricter capital regulatory standards after 1988? 
Did their goals change from the negotiation to the implementation of the Accord? Is 
it possible that IR theory has misunderstood the US-UK goals in the first place?
Also, the descriptive statistics allow for a quantitative measurement of 
convergence with Basel rules over time. There has not yet been a study that 
investigates the transition of capital adequacy rules over time, though the financial 
press has continually discussed alterations in risk capital rules since 1988. This 
expository lacuna may be partly justified by the dearth of an easily assessable or 
centralized source for capital adequacy regulatory data. This chapter builds a 
quantitative indicator that does endeavor to capture change in Basel rule 
interpretations over time through the deductive coding of the credit risk regulations of 
a large sample of states.
These data will also be utilized in a univariate statistical assessment of three of 
the hypotheses discussed in the previous chapter. By illustrating the degrees of 
capital adequacy rule convergence and divergence among industrialized states from 
1988 to 2000, it will be possible to test the hegemonic and regional effects 
hypotheses. These predict that we will see states’ interpretations of the Accord
2 Oatley and Nabors (1998)
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converge to those of the US or regional partners’ definitions. It is concluded that 
these hypotheses are of limited use in understanding patterns of strict and lax 
compliance. The operationalization of the capital adequacy regulatory variables also 
permits an assessment of the “path dependence” hypothesis through a comparison of 
the severity of states’ pre and post-Basel capital practices. This comparison provides 
some support for this hypothesis, though further statistical testing is administered in 
future chapters.
Section 4.2 begins by describing the methodology employed to create the 
quantitative measures of Basel rule implementation. It will then proceed to provide 
univariate statistical analyses for the statistical indicators. Section 4.3 will 
operationalize the independent variables. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2. Measurement and Description: Implementation
The extensive research on the Basel Accord that has progressed over the last decade 
lacks attempts to operationalize its implementation in such a way that we can measure 
it and test explanatory hypotheses across a wide range of cases. Though nearly all 
academic studies of the Basel Accord and all guidelines releases by the Basel 
Committee emphasize the importance of the way it is implemented as a major element 
in its success in creating a level regulatory playing field and prudential safety net, 
there has been no rigorous effort to analyze and explain degrees of implementation 
with a large population sample. The majority of implementation studies involving the
3 Early examples of such works include Kapstein (1991) and Basel Committee (1988; 1991) and Basel 
Committee (2000) emphasizes the importance of implementation to the Basel Accord 2 currently being 
negotiated.
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Accord have been exercises in comparative financial law, generally involving 
comparisons of two or three states’ interpretation of the 1988 Basel rules.4
The two major exceptions to this trend are 1991 research projects by Murray- 
Jones and Gamble and Price Waterhouse.5 These studies were conducted 
independently of one another yet both rigorously compare about 20 states’ domestic 
interpretations of the Basel and European Community capital adequacy regulations. 
Much of these data are useful in assessing the extent of rule compliance during the 
first year of the Accord’s implementation phase. Yet they do not include data after 
1990 and do not seek to code their samples’ capital regulations so that they may be 
easily comparable across cases. Moreover, they do not advance or test political 
economic explanations for understanding observed levels of compliance.
The correlation and regression analyses in Chapter 5 will rely on five new 
measures of implementation that aim to fill these theoretical and empirical lacunae by 
providing generalizable indicators to measure implementation across a large sample 
of states and facilitate statistical analysis. Given the difficulties of effectively 
measuring implementation in unambiguous fashion, it is necessary to utilize multiple 
indicators of the implementation phenomenon when judging degrees of compliance.6 
The implementation process with the 1988 Accord is highly complex and measuring a 
state’s implementation of the 1988 standard requires some subjective judgements and 
interpretations by the researcher.
This subjectivity is exacerbated by two factors. The absence of a central 
repository for collecting states’ capital adequacy requirements means that researchers 
must collect data from each state’s regulator on a case-by-case basis. This has the
4 See Hall (1993), Scott and Iwarahara (1994), and Scott (1995) for studies in comparative financial 
law and Basel Committee (1999) for a review of financial economic studies of implementation with the 
Accord.
5 Murray-Jones and Gamble (1991) and Price Waterhouse (1991)
61 thank an official at the UK’s Financial Services Authority for impressing this on me.
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effect of making it arduous to collect data for an extremely large sample of states and, 
second, introducing elements of error in the process of quantitatively encoding states’ 
regulations. Though the Accord sought to link the disparate G-10 capital adequacy 
guidelines by providing a common regulatory language, many states continue to 
utilize distinct, national terms for banking assets and credits. That many of these 
terms do not translate very efficiently into the English language (assuming that 
English translations are available), without some critical loss of information, further 
frustrates cross-sectional comparisons. As a result, utilizing multiple methods of 
measurement is necessary to ensure the content validity of our dependent variable.7
4.2.1. Methods o f Construction
The dependent variable is an index of implementation severity that attempts to capture 
the extent to which any given state has adopted a strict, lax, or non-compliant 
interpretation of the 1988 Basel Accord rules. Measurements are made in each of the 
six capital adequacy policy areas addressed by the Accord. These six capital 
adequacy policy elements have been identified as the primary areas of discretionary 
policy setting by previous studies of the Accord’s implementation and are thus a
A
logical starting point for developing this variable. These policy areas were discussed 
in some detail in Chapter 2, yet Table 4.1 provides a brief review of each policy and, 
in parentheses, presents the quantitative code term that will be utilized to abbreviate 
each area in the quantitative analyses.
7 Franfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000: 149-150) define content validity as meaning that a 
“measuring instrument covers all the attributes of the concept you are trying to measure—that nothing 
relevant to the phenomenon under investigation is left out.”
8 See Murray-Jones and Gamble (1991), Price Waterhouse (1991), and Hall (1993).
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• Definition of allowable tier 1 or primary capital elements, within 
established parameters (TIER1)
• Definition of allowable tier 2 or supplementary capital elements, within 
established parameters (TIER2)
• Specification of deductions to be made from either tier 1 or tier 2 capital 
elements before their inclusion in the regulatory-defined capital base 
(DEDUCT)
• Required minimum percentage of risk-weighted tier 1 and tier 2 assets 
divided by total capital, with the minima set at 4 percent of tier 1 and 8 
percent of total capital (RATIO)
• Assignment of credit risk weights to on-balance sheet assets (RW)
• Assignment of credit-risk weight conversion factors to off-balance sheet 
assets (OBS)
Table 4.1. Areas of Permitted Discretionaiy Implementation with the
_____________________ 1988 Basel Accord_____________________
A 1-4 ordinal scale was constructed for each of these six indicators, with 
higher values indicating greater regulatory stringency. The scale aims to capture the 
degree to which a sample state’s implementation of the Basel Accord was a below- 
minimum interpretation (score = 1), a minimum interpretation (score = 2), a 
reasonably strict interpretation (score = 3), or a highly strict interpretation (score = 4). 
Based on these categories, a state’s interpretation for each of the six policy areas was 
scored from 1 (below-minimum) to 4 (highly strict interpretation). European Union 
member-states’ definitions of implementation are matched against EU, not Basel, 
regulations to the small extent that they diverge (see Appendix 4.1 for a comparison 
of the two regimes).
To aid statistical testing, these six variables are agglomerated into an index. 
The index of capital regulation (CREG) was simply constructed by summing the 
values of the six policy area values, with each composite variable receiving equal
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weight. The index thus ranges from 1-24, with higher values indicating greater 
stringency.
Three measures were taken to ensure the reliability of the CREG index and its 
constituent variables.9 First, to ensure the mutual exclusivity of each of the ordinal 
coding categories, a detailed mapping scheme was constructed (see Appendix 4.3).10 
The origins of the mapping procedure are derived from the Basel implementation 
coding categories in Murray-Jones and Gamble (1991), Price Waterhouse (1991), and 
Hall (1993). These three studies largely agree on the policy areas that should be 
addressed when assessing sample state’s levels of compliance with the Accord. The 
Price Waterhouse study, in particular, was especially useful in the engineering of the 
mapping scheme as the authors created a table that listed the sample state’s 
implementation methods that were divergent from the Basel baseline rules.
The second reliability measure employed was a test-retest method for each of 
the three capital adequacy policy variables. This method involves applying the 
measuring instrument to the sample population at different times and then computing 
the correlation between the two sets of observations, to obtain a reliability estimate. 
This method indicated that the measuring instrument provides high degree of 
reliability as a robust correlation was achieved in the two measurements and no major 
distinctions emerged between the two applications of the coding procedures.
9 Reliability concerns the degree with which a measuring instrument contains variable errors or, in 
other words, the consistency of die instrument when measuring different observations of die same 
empirical phenomenon. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000:154) cite that an example of an 
unreliable measurement instrument would be of a ruler that yields different measurements of a desk 
each time its length is taken. In social science, it is notoriously more difficult to achieve reliability than 
in the physical sciences. Given the absence of a single repository for capital adequacy regulations, the 
need to establish the reliability of the CREG measure is thus especially important.
10 To ensure that an ordinal scale’s coding categories are mutually exclusive, they must be engineered 
so that each case or unit of analysis can be coded (or classified) into one and only one category. It 
should be explicitly clear under what circumstances, for example, a sample state’s TIER1 regulations 
qualify for a “2” or a “3” ranking.
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Finally, the constituents of the CREG index were subjected to a Cronbach 
alpha examination. This reliability test measures how well a set of variables measure 
a single, unidimensional latent construct. The alpha score can range from 0.0 to 1.0 
with higher values indicating that the constituent variables of an agglomerated index 
measure a consistent construct. The CREG index alpha score was 0.35, which 
indicates that the constituent variables are not highly correlated with one another and 
do not measure a unified construct very consistently. It will thus be useful to 
disaggregate the index at periods in order to assess how individual variables 
perform.11
The data for these variables were obtained from a variety of sources at two 
points of time. First, data was obtained for the original counterparties to the 1988 
Accord and ten states that signalled their intention to implement the Accord from 
1988. This yields a sample size of 18 states that includes members of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision and members of the European Community. Data 
for these states’ original interpretations of the Basel rules were obtained from Price 
Waterhouse (1991) and Murray-Jones and Gamble (1991), who obtained their data 
from national regulatory authorities directly and financial law attorneys practicing in 
the sample states. These two sources independently report identical results 
concerning the sample states’ interpretations to the Accord, thereby contributing to 
the reliability of the coding process. These data indicate capital adequacy practices 
from around 1988-90 for each sample state. I label the variables constructed from this 
data as “First Period Implementation” measures.
Next, the most recent capital adequacy regulations were obtained for this same 
sample of states. Capital adequacy regulations seem to be constantly re-evaluated by
11 See Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) for information on how to construct and interpret 
Cronbach alpha exams.
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states and thus it is necessary to directly measure these changes rather than 
extrapolate from 1991 data in determining current standards. Unfortunately, data 
limitations make it presently impossible to conduct year-by-year comparisons of 
states’ capital practices across a large sample. This study attempts to obtain the next 
best objective by measuring states’ most recently published capital adequacy 
practices, which are here labelled “Second Period Implementation” measures. These 
standards were obtained from bank supervisor websites, publications, and by direct 
interviews. For replication purposes, details of the documents from which these data 
were obtained are listed in Appendix 4.6.
One of the key weaknesses of this variable comes from this manual data 
collection method. Having to collect data for each sample state individually makes it 
difficult to find data for a larger sample of states. Ultimately, it would be optimal to 
locate capital adequacy regulatory data changes, for each sample state, for each year 
from 1988 to 2003 and conduct a dynamic analysis of the determinants of capital 
adequacy regulatory stringency. Unfortunately, the data for such a project is lacking. 
A year-by-year study of regulatory changes will, however, be made for a much 
reduced sample of states in the case study analyses in Part III—thus partly justifying 
the coordination of a qualitative addition to a quantitative study of implementation.
4.2.2. First Period o f Implementation
The descriptive statistics for the CREG index are presented in Table 4.2. As 
mentioned, the descriptives present the index scores for two points of time: the late 
1980s (/) and the most recent regulations (t + 1). The table also derives the degree of 
regulatory change that occurred in the sample states between the two points of 
observation through ( / + ! ) -  ft). Finally, the table (in bold) presents generally
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utilized measures of central tendency (arithmetic mean) and dispersion (standard 
deviation).
In looking at the sample states’ initial interpretations of the Accord (/) for 
which data is available, it seems the Accord may have successfully established a 
regulatory floor. Most states implemented a well above minimum interpretation of 
the Basel rules during the late 1980s. If one takes, as a benchmark, the view that a 
pure minimal interpretation of each dimension of the Accord would result in an index 
score of 12 (2 * 6 policy areas), it is striking to observe that every state, save for one 
(Finland), earned a score between 13-18. More striking still, is that the mean for late 
1980s data (14.5) indicates that the average state implemented the Accord with 
considerable stringency above the minima.
Examining the regulatory stringency of the composite variables of the CREG 
index in Table 4.3 supports this conclusion. Looking at the marginals of Table 4.3, 
the arithmetic mean for five of the six policy areas is above 2.00 (the baseline 
minimum). Each sample state, again save for Finland, implemented a stricter than 
minimum, or "superequivalent", interpretation in at least one policy area while half of 
the sample adopted a very strict interpretation (coded as 4) in at least one dimension 
of the Basel rules. There were, however, several areas in which the sample states 
failed to comply with the Basel minima (coded as 1). Yet, even among this group of 
non-complying states (Finland, Japan, Spain, and the United States), three 
implemented superequivalent interpretations in at least two policy-areas while the 
regulators of one (United States) implemented superequivalent interpretations in 
three policy areas and received the third highest CREG score of the sample.
Looking more closely at the degrees of compliance in individual policy-areas, 
it is interesting to observe that the strictest interpretations were clearly in the defining
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t t+1 Change*
Australia 15 16 +1
Austria 14 13 -1
Belgium 14 14 0
Canada 15 17 +2
Denmark 15 15 0
Finland 11 13 +2
France 13 13 0
Germany 17 15 -2
Ireland 15 12 -3
Japan 13 14 +1
Luxembourg 14 15 +1
New Zealand 16 16 0
Netherlands 13 13 0
Spain 14 15 +1
Sweden 14 14 0
Switzerland 18 16 -2
United Kingdom 14 16 +2
United States 16 15 -1
N 18 18 18
Mean 14.50 14.50 -0.05
Standard Dev 1.61 1.38 1.48
Table 4.2. Comparative Descriptive Statistics for CREG Indexes
Source: Murray-Jones and Gamble (1991), Price Waterhouse (1991), and regulatory authorities listed in
Appendix 4.3.
of Tier 2 capital. The mean for supplementary capital (3.00) was noticeably higher 
than other areas of the Accord and five states adopted a very narrow definition of 
supplementary capital so as to earn a 4 in the Tier 2 category (Germany, Luxembourg, 
Spain, Switzerland, and the United States).
As was discussed in Chapter 2, Tier 2 or supplementary capital essentially 
includes a variety of accounting reserves that are not as permanent or available to 
meet losses as equity, yet provide some protection in the event of counterparty 
default. The Basel Accord allowed five items to be included in Tier 2 capital for all 
G-10 states, yet as with other items of the Accord, invited states to exceed the
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minimum requirements. For Tier 2 capital, interpretations are stricter as fewer capital 
instruments of Tier 2 capital are included in the tally of allowable, or regulatory, 
capital so that banks are required to hold more of the safer Tier 1 capital to satisfy the 
Basel capital requirements.
The severity of the sample states’ interpretation of the Basel Accord is not 
surprising as a one of the key purposes behind the decision to construct a Tier 2 
capital measurement was to provide counterparty states with a wide open category of 
capital within which they could include numerous forms of capital, sometimes of 
questionable quality, that had been a traditional component of their banking 
regulations. The objective in doing so was to ensure the Accord’s acceptance by 
regulators who were under severe domestic pressures to defend their idiosyncratic 
practices at the Basel Committee negotiations. The tier thus includes numerous capital 
instruments (such as revaluation reserves and general loan loss provisions) that were 
not legally allowed in many of the negotiating states but were a key component of the 
capital regulations of other states. Thus the decision to exclude these instruments in 
many states may well reflect a sample state’s pre-Basel status quo rather than a strict 
interpretation per se. This status quo, or path dependency, hypothesis will be 
investigated in subsequent chapters.
At this stage, however, analyzing the raw data used to construct the Tier 2 
variable can develop useful insights. If we chisel the Tier 2 indicator down into the 
individual response frequencies (see Table 4.4) it is interesting to note that general 
provisions or general loan loss reserves were restricted or excluded (as indicated by
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Tier 1 Tier 2 Deduct RW Ratio OBS Total(CREG)
Australia 2 3 2 4 2 2 15
Austria 3 3 2 2 2 2 14
Belgium 2 3 3 2 2 2 14
Canada 2 3 3 3 2 2 15
Denmark 3 3 2 2 3 2 15
Finland 1 2 2 2 2 2 11
France 2 3 2 2 2 2 13
Germany 4 4 2 3 2 2 17
Ireland 2 2 2 4 3 2 15
Japan 2 3 1 3 2 2 13
Luxembourg 2 4 2 2 2 2 14
New Zealand 3 2 4 3 2 2 16
Netherlands 3 2 2 2 2 2 13
Spain 2 4 2 3 2 1 14
Sweden 3 3 2 2 2 2 14
Switzerland 2 4 3 4 2 3 18
UK 2 2 2 4 2 2 14
USA 1 4 3 4 2 2 16
Mean 2.28 3.00 2.28 2.83 2.11 2.00 14.65
Std Dev 0.751 0.767 0.660 0.857 0.323 0.343 1.631
Table 4.3. Comparative Descriptive Statistics for CREG Index Components (/)
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an “X”) by more states than they were permitted as only five states allowed their 
inclusion (as indicated by a “*”) without significant limitations being imposed on 
their use. Conversely, subordinated debt was widely permitted without restriction as 
only two states (Australia and Germany) limited their inclusion in permitted capital 
while only four states prohibited the use of undisclosed reserves, and five prohibited 
hybrid capital instruments (which includes cumulative preferred stock).
Yet, while the strict interpretation of Tier 2 capital is not altogether surprising, 
the narrowness with which the counterparty states interpreted Tier 1 (or primary) 
capital is not as expected. This tier of capital is considered to be the highest grade 
“cushion” against bank insolvency in the face of credit risks. Thus while Tier 2 
capital was designed to be broad, to placate competing demands by negotiators, the 
Tier 1 capital definition was made intentionally narrow. The instruments permitted in 
this tier, by the Accord, must be permanently and quickly available for banks to draw 
upon in the face of financial difficulties. As a result, this is the most expensive capital 
for banks to maintain and we would thus expect banks to lobby for a fairly broad 
definition of tier 1 capital so as to maintain international competitiveness vis-a-vis 
their international competitors.
Looking at the index marginals, in Table 4.3, however it seems that domestic 
policy-makers held a relatively strict line on the Tier 1 definition. The mean (2.28) is 
the third highest of the policy-area variables and six states (Austria, Denmark, 
Germany, New Zealand, Netherlands, and Sweden) implemented superequivalent 
interpretations of Tier 1 capital while one (Germany) implemented a very strict 
definition in the late 1980s. Looking at the disaggregated data in Table 4.5 it is 
interesting to note that the vast majority of the restricted interpretations concerned the
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inclusion of current year profits and funds for general banking risks in regulatory 
capital. Regarding the former, five states opted to exclude or heavily restrict the 
inclusion of current year profits. Keep in mind, that the EC Own Funds Directive 
forced all European member-states to adhere to a stricter interpretation than that 
enumerated in the Basel Accord by requiring all current year profits to be certified by 
an external auditor. Beyond this, five EU member-states went even further by 
excluding profits entirely from regulatory capital.
It is also important to observe, however, that two states defected from their 
commitments to comply with the Tier 1 requirements. In particular, Finland adopted 
an especially broad definition of primary capital that permitted banks to include fifty 
percent of the value of trading assets and investments, a capital item that should 
probably fall under the category of a revaluation reserve and be classified as 
supplementary capital. More surprisingly, however, the United States diluted the 
stringency of its primary capital requirements by permitting bank holding companies 
to tally cumulative preferred stock in their Tier 1 capital base. This practice is 
expressly forbidden by the Accord as these instruments, unlike non-cumulative 
preferred equity, do not allow banks to omit dividend payments, but simply forego the 
dividend whose value cumulates into a future payment. As a result of the fixed costs 
that these cumulative instruments carry, the Accord relegates them to Tier 2 status.
Beyond the definition of supplementary capital, it is interesting to observe that 
the specification of risk-weight categories was also subject to a strict interpretation by 
the sample. The risk weights category, in Table 4.3, indicates that the mean index 
score was 2.83, and five states implemented an extremely limiting risk-weighting 
regime and earned a 4. This is an intriguing result, given that the risk-weighted assets 












Australia * X X * X
Austria * * X * *
Belgium * ♦ X * *
Canada * X X * *
Denmark * * X * *
Finland * ♦ * * ♦
France * X * * *
Germany X X X X X
Ireland * * * * *
Japan ♦ X * * *
Luxembourg * X X X *
New Zealand * * ♦ ♦ *
Netherlands * ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Spain X ♦ X X *
Sweden ♦ X X ♦ *
Switzerland * ♦ * ♦ *
UK * ♦ * * *
USA X X X * *
N(*) 15 10 8 15 15
N(X) 3 8 10 3 2









Australia * * * * —
Austria * * * X *
Belgium * * * * *
Canada * * * ♦ —
Denmark ♦ * * X X
Finland * * * * *
France * ♦ * ★ *
Germany X ♦ X X *
Ireland ♦ * ♦ * X
Japan ♦ * * ♦ “
Luxembourg * * * * +
New Zealand * * * X —
Netherlands * * * * X
Spain * * * ♦ *
Sweden * X ♦ X *
Switzerland * * * * —
UK * * ♦ ♦ X
USA * * * * —
N(*) 17 17 17 13 8
N(X) 1 1 1 5 4
Table 4.5. Tier 1 Capital Definitions (/)
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4.2.3. Second Implementation Period
The univariate statistics for the second period (/ + 1) in Figure 4.2 illustrate that some 
significant degrees of change occurred to these initial Basel rule interpretations over a 
roughly ten-year period of time. First, Table 4.2 illustrates that the capital adequacy 
regulatory stringency of the entire sample remained largely constant over time. The 
sample mean remained 14.5 for the (/) and (t +1) periods. More telling, however, is 
that the standard deviation decreased from 1.61 to 1.38. The standard deviation is the 
customary metric utilized for measuring policy convergence and divergence in Large
I
N  studies. The decrease in this measure, over time, suggests that the sample states’ 
capital adequacy regulations converged between our two sampling periods.
The data contained in the Change column illustrates that this greater 
convergence was created through twelve states’ revisions of their credit risk 
regulations. Thus over half the sample modified their capital adequacy regulations in 
a way that affected a change in their CREG scores.13 Of the twelve CREG scores that 
changed, five weakened their interpretations over time while seven increased the 
severity of their Basel interpretations.
Looking first at cases of weakening, Table 4.2 reveals that Austria, Germany, 
Ireland, Switzerland, and the United States each reduced their capital adequacy rule
12 The standard deviation has been utilized in numerous studies of policy convergence and divergence, 
see especially Goudswaard (2001) and Botcheva and Martin (2001). The metric is determined by 
squaring and summing the deviations in a sample’s observations, dividing the sum by the total number 
of observations and then taking the square root. More simply:
Where X=  each individual observation 
X  -  the arithmetic mean 
N=  total number of observations 
13 This, of course, does not necessarily imply that no alterations were made in the credit risk rules 




severity in ways measured by the index. Of these, Ireland affected the most dramatic 
loosening of their capital regulations over the sample period as their CREG score 
dropped from 15 to 12. This reduction was, as indicated in Figure 4.6, mostly the 
product of the Irish regulator’s decision to significantly water down their risk- 
weighting framework to the minimum standards set out in the European Own Funds 
Directive. Ireland initially required some bank credits to domestic government and 
public sector entities to carry much higher capital asset charges than those set out in 
the Basel and European accords. For example, fixed rate Irish government stock, with 
a maturity of 1-5 years, and domestic public sector entities were assigned a 10 percent 
risk-weighting as opposed to the 0 percent set out in the Basel/EC rules. The Irish 
regulators also required their domestically domiciled banks to maintain a capital-to- 
risk assets ratio of greater than 8 percent. Yet, by the late 1990s, these strict standards 
had been brought in line with the Basel minima and the Irish CREG score dropped 
from 15 to 12.
More surprising than the magnitude of the Irish CREG score decrease, 
however, is the large reduction created by the German bank supervisors during the 
sample period. As Chapter 2 discussed, Germany’s bank regulators, and their 
domestic banks, were highly critical of the capital adequacy negotiations in Basel for 
producing multilateral standards that were too lax and, in particular, permitted too 
many instruments to qualify as regulatory capital that were not permanently available 
to meet bank funding needs. Germany’s initial implementation of the Accord (t) was 
congruent with their criticisms of Basel and excluded most capital instruments, save 
for common equity and some current-year profits. Yet, by the late 1990s, Germany’s 
CREG score of 15 puts its capital adequacy standards more on par with states that 
criticized the severity of the Accord’s standards, especially France and Japan. More
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unexpected still, is that Table 4.6 reveals that the reduction of Germany’s CREG 
score was almost entirely the product of an expanded definition of Tier 1 and Tier 2 
capital from the highly restrictive definition that German negotiators had fought for in 
Basel.
Though not as surprising in the context of the Basel negotiations, the 
American’s regulatory loosening is noteworthy. The index score for the US in the 
second time period was the result of a loosening of the state’s highly restrictive risk- 
weighting framework. The US constructed, perhaps, the most punishing risk- 
weighting scheme for its internationally active banks in the months following the 
Accord’s negotiation. The US rules required a 10 percent charge for claims 
collateralized by cash or OECD securities (Basel minimum: 0 percent), a 50 percent 
charge for domestic bonds (Basel minimum: 0 percent), and a 100 percent charge for 
home mortgage loans (Basel minimum: 50 percent). Yet, like Ireland, by the end of 
the 1990s, all of these superequivalent interpretations had been reversed and US rules 
were at the Basel minima.
What did not change, over time, however was America’s non-compliance with 
the Basel Tier 1 capital requirements. As discussed above, the US regulators agreed 
to permit bank holding companies to hold cumulative preferred stock as primary 
capital. Though this practice attracted severe criticism by its Basel Committee peers, 
the practice continues to be maintained.14
Looking now at those states that strengthened the severity of their capital 
adequacy regulations over time, several interesting cases stand out. On the whole, 
seven states increased the stringency of Basel rule interpretations from the (t) to (t+1) 
periods. Two of these states (Australia and Canada) initially implemented capital
14 Rehm and Duffy (1987).
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Tier 1 Tier 2 Deduct RW Ratio OBS Total(CREG)
Australia 2 3 3 4 2 2 16
Austria 2 3 2 2 2 2 13
Belgium 2 3 3 2 2 2 14
Canada 2 3 3 3 4 2 17
Denmark 3 3 2 2 3 2 15
Finland 2 2 2 2 3 2 13
France 2 3 2 2 2 2 13
Germany 3 3 2 3 2 2 15
Ireland 2 2 2 2 2 2 12
Japan 2 3 2 3 2 2 14
Luxembourg 3 4 2 2 2 2 15
New Zealand 3 2 4 3 2 2 16
Netherlands 3 2 2 2 2 2 13
Spain 2 3 4 3 2 1 15
Sweden 3 3 2 2 2 2 14
Switzerland 2 2 3 4 2 3 16
UK 2 3 4 3 2 2 16
USA 1 4 3 2 3 2 15
Mean 2.22 2.78 2.72 2.56 2.22 2.00 14.50
Std Dev 0.548 0.647 0.752 0.705 0.548 0.343 1.383
Table 4.6. Comparative Descriptive Statistics for CREG Index Components
(t + 1)
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regimes that were well above the CREG sample mean and tightened relatively strict 
regimes even further. The remaining five (Finland, Luxembourg, Japan, Spain,
United Kingdom) tightened Basel interpretations that were at, or just below, the 
sample mean.
Of these five, Canada and Finland stand out as the only states to tighten their 
minimum capital-to-asset ratio requirements. Though the ratio requirement is the most 
easily measured of the Basel policy areas, and has thus received the bulk of attention 
in studies of the Accord,15 only Canada and Finland absolutely require their domestic 
banks to maintain overall ratios greater than 8 percent. Though I classified five states 
as either 3 or 4 on the Ratio scale, three of these assignments were made because of 
the nature of the restrictions placed on the ratio requirements, rather than a hard and 
fast rule that ratios must exceed the 4 percent and 8 percent minima (see Tables 
(Figures-Components t and t +1)). For example, Denmark requires a 10 percent ratio 
if banks hold subordinated debt as Tier 2 capital. The supervisors of Finland and 
Canada, however, have established trigger ratios above 8 percent and will take action 
against those banks whose ratios, in the case of Finland, fall to 8 percent and, for 
Canada, fall below 10 percent.
The regulatory changes of the United Kingdom also stand out, though not only 
because of the increases in regulatory stringency that were made. The UK’s CREG 
score increased fairly significantly from 14 to 16. This increase was affected through 
Britain’s decision to exclude undisclosed reserves from regulatory capital and the 
adoption of a long list of deductions to be made from regulatory capital. Yet, what 
the aggregate CREG score hides, is that the UK loosened their restrictive risk-weight
15 Ho (2002) focuses almost exclusively on the capital-to-assets ratio requirement in his determination 
of whether a state has or has not implemented the 1988 Accord.
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framework during the ten-year period and had a reduction of their Risk-Weight 
ranking from 4 to 3. Like the United States, a large part of this reduction was the 
result of the Bank of England’s decision to move mortgage loans from the 100 percent 
to 50 percent risk bucket. The reasons for this are not indicated in these data, of 
course, yet the vast reductions evinced in the risk-weighting schemes of the sample 
states—even those that strengthen their overall capital adequacy regime over time—is 
clearly in need of investigation in the chapters to follow.
4.2.3.1. Testing Hegemony and Regional Imitation Hypotheses 
The data presented above permit the testing of two of the hypotheses laid out in 
Chapter 3. In particular, the predictions of convergence among regional partners and 
with the American interpretations may be assessed with descriptive statistics. A 
cursory glance at Table 4.6 suggests that little hegemonic or regional imitation effect 
were in operation. Yet it is necessary to subject these hypotheses to more rigorous 
univariate statistical tests.
Support for the hegemonic hypothesis is to be found if non-US CREG scores 
converge with the US score for either time period. Given the predicted effect of path 
dependence, we may expect to find increased convergence with the American rules 
from the first to the second period, yet any evidence of convergence with US rules 
will provide grounds to reject the hegemonic null-hypothesis.
Testing the hypothesis involves a comparison of the mean CREG scores of 
non-US CREG scores with the US score for both periods. The results are presented in 
Table 4.7. Little support is found for the hegemonic hypothesis in either time period. 
The arithmetic mean for non-US CREG scores in the first sample period was 14.41 
while the US score was considerably higher at 16. Considerable CREG score
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convergence emerged in the second sample time period, yet in the opposite direction 
to that predicted by the hypothesis. The non-US CREG (t + 1) score remained 
constant while the US score decreased to 15. This result suggests support for the null- 
hypothesis: it was the US that converged with other states’ interpretations rather than 
the opposite effect predicted by the Hegemonic hypothesis.
Period Sample Group N Arithmetic Mean
t US CREG 1 16
Non-US CREG 17 14.41
t + 1 US CREG 1 15
Non-US CREG 17 14.52
Table 4.7. Univariate Test of Hegemonic Hypothesis
A more extensive test is required to assess the hypothesis that industrialized 
states’ interpretations converged on a regional basis. Support for this hypothesis 
would be provided if the variance in states’ CREG scores were less within their region 
than with states outside of their region. Relying on standard classifications, the 18 
sample states may be divided into three regions:
• Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK)
• Asia Pacific (Australia, New Zealand, Japan)
• North America (Canada, US)
Comparative tests of variation normally rely on the standard deviation.16 Yet given 
that most of the sample is weighted towards one region, it may be necessary to 
standardize the analysis to look at relative variations within each region. This is 
accomplished by determining each region’s coefficient of variation, which is defined 
as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of each region sample’s distribution,
16 See note 19 above.
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expressed as a percentage.17 By utilizing this measure, we may have greater 
confidence in the comparison of samples with asymmetric magnitudes.
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 4.8. The results provide 
mixed support for the regional effects hypothesis. In the first time period, the two 
states of North America and three of Asia adopt interpretations more convergent with 
one another than with those in other regions. European states were less likely to 
experience convergence among one another as Europe’s coefficient of variation 
(“Coefficient of Var”) was 0.12, compared with 0.08 for other regions. In the second 
time period, the opposite effect emerged as Europe was the only one of three regions 
to feature greater relative convergence.
These results do not suggest that regional effects were unimportant. Regional 
imitation effects may have been important for Asian and North American states in the 
two time periods. In particular, Canada and the US experienced much greater 
convergence with one another’s interpretations in the first period than non-North 
American states. Though not part of the hypothesis test, it also interesting to note that 
these two states’ mean CREG scores were considerably higher than the rest of the 
samples in the two periods.
17 See Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000). The coefficient of variation is obtained with the
• v  s  expression: V = —
X
where V = the coefficient of variation 
s = the standard deviation
X  = the arithmetic mean
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Period Sample Group N Mean CoeffofVar (%)
t Europe 13 14.31 0.12
non-Europe 5 15.00 0.08
t North America 2 15.50 0.04
non-North America 16 14.38 0.12
t Asia Pacific 3 14.67 0.10
non-Asia Pacific 15 14.47 0.12
t+1 Europe 13 14.15 0.09
non-Europe 5 15.6 0.07
t+1 North America 2 16.00 0.08
non-North America 16 14.38 0.12
t+1 Asia 3 15.33 0.08
non-Asia 15 14.40 0.10
Table 4.8. Univariate Test of Regional Effects Hypothesis
Though not an explicit part of the regional hypothesis, Table 4.9 assesses 
whether European Union states experienced greater convergence among one another 
than non-EU states. Though EU states were permitted to apply subsidiarity principles 
in their interpretation of the Own Funds and Solvency Ratio Directives, we might 
expect that the institutional networks binding European states and the drive towards a 
Single European Market might affect greater convergence. Given the elements of the 
set of “Europe” states above, assessing this hypothesis involves calculating a Europe 
vs. non-Europe variance examination with Switzerland moved out of the European 
category.
The results of this variance exam indicate that little EU convergence effects 
emerged. In the first period, the variance of EU states’ CREG scores was equal to 
that of non-EU states. Over time, EU states’ scores converged yet not as closely as
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that of the non-EU. Moreover, in both sample periods, EU states’ interpretations were 
considerably looser than those outside the organization.
Period Sample Group N Mean CoeffofVar (%)
t European Union 12 14.00 0.10
non-EU 6 15.50 0.10
t+1 European Union 12 14.00 0.08
non-EU 6 15.67 0.07
Table 4.9. Variance of CREG scores: EU vs. Non-EU
4.3. Measurement and Description: Explanatory Variables
This section details methods of empirically measuring the explanatory variables that 
were discussed in previous chapters. Chapter 3 described five possible categories of 
variables that could be expected to have an impact on the implementation of the Basel 





I utilize a number of well-tried and tested and new measures as quantitative proxies of 
the theoretical propositions corresponding to these four categories. The one exception 
is International Influences. Given the relatively weak hegemonic and regional 
imitation effects detected in the previous section, these variables will not receive 
further quantitative examination. These hypotheses will return for full consideration 
in the qualitative studies in Part III. The sub-sections below present the empirical
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operationalization of the hypotheses under review. The descriptive statistics for these 
variables are exhibited in Tables 4.10-11.
4.3.1. Bank Preferences
The bank preference “path dependence” hypothesis suggested that the content of 
states’ pre-Basel Accord rules influenced how the Accord was implemented.
Deriving cross-sectional data for a large sample of states’ pre-Basel capital adequacy 
standards is challenging given the low level of regulatory disclosure in many states 
before the creation of the Accord. Also, comparison is confounded by the vast 
diversity of capital regulation terminology and practice before the Accord. For 
example, many states required banks to ensure that capital was a minimum multiple of 
assets (i.e. capital must be 5 times greater than assets) rather than a percentage of 
assets (i.e. the Basel 8 percent minimum). It may be impossible to reliably convert 
such multiple requirements into a percentage requirement across a range of unique 
banking systems. A key purpose of the 1988 agreement was to provide a common 
regulatory vocabulary and framework, thus indicating the difficulties of pre-Basel 
comparisons.
It is thus necessary to rely on fairly crude indicators of pre-Basel rules. Four 
measures are constructed and presented in a disaggregate or country-by-country basis 
in Table 4.10. Relying on Dale (1984) and Pecchioli’s (1987) comparative analyses 
of capital adequacy regulation in OECD economies, a pre-Basel capital definition is 
measured. Utilizing the sample coding procedure as for the CREG index (see 
Appendix 4.2), two variables measuring the severity of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital 
definitions were constructed. Though many states did not employ a two-tier capital 
structure before the Accord, it is possible to separate the pre-Basel regulatory capital
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elements into two tiers and determine what elements allowed in the Accord were 
included or excluded from the definition of regulatory capital. The coding of pre- 
Basel Tier 1 produces the PREBASEL(l) measure while Tier 2 produces 
PREBASEL(2).
Second, I measure whether each state’s pre-Basel capital adequacy standards 
required the risk weighting of assets (PREBASEL(RW)). This is measured with a 
dummy variable scored as unity in those instances in which a risk-weighting system 
was in place prior to the Accord and “0” otherwise.
Finally, I seek to measure the relative severity of pre-Basel minimum capital- 
to-assets ratios by measuring each state’s average level of capitalization prior to the 
Accord. The variable (PBRATIO) is constructed by taking the average, unweighted 
capital-to-assets ratio for each sample state’s leading ten banks for the five years 
leading up to the Accord (1983-1987). A full decade is sampled to ensure that the 
variable measures the average capitalization levels of a state—if one really exists— 
rather than ratios influenced by short-term macroeconomic concerns. These data were 
taken from The Banker's Top 500 and Top 1000 global bank reviews over the sample 
period as this publication measures capital adequacy levels with identical definitions 
of capital across states. The definition is more limited that that permitted by most 
regulators and by the Accord and includes: common stock, disclosed reserves, and 
retained earning. Measuring states with this uniform, though limited, definition of 
capital and the use of unweighted ratios permits comparisons of capitalization while 
controlling for the effects of distinct capital definitions and risk-weighting 
approaches.
These four indicators are summed into a composite index of pre-Basel capital 
severity. The index (PREBASEL) is constructed by summing the constituent
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variables. Table 4.10 presents the results of this variable’s construction in comparison
with the CREG results presented above. Unfortunately, detailed pre-Basel data
PBTIER1 PBTIER2 PBRW PBRATIO (%) PREBASEL
Belgium 2(2) 3(3) 1(2) 2.83 8.83 (14)
Canada 4(2) 4(3) 0(3) 5.00 13.00 (14)
France 2(2) 3(3) 1(2) 2.60 8.60 (13)
Germany 4(4) 4(4) 0(3) 2.81 10.81 (17)
Japan 2(2) 3(3) 0(3) 2.37 7.37(13)
Luxembourg 2(2) 3(4) 0(2) 3.48 8.48 (14)
Netherlands 2(3) 3(2) 1(2) 3.76 9.76(13)
Switzerland 2(2) 4(4) 1(4) 5.24 12.24(18)
UK 2(2) 3(2) 1(4) 6.17 12.17(14)
USA 2(1) 4(4) 0(4) 4.92 10.92 (16)
Mean 2.4 (2.3) 3.4 (3.0) 0.5 (2.8) 3.92 10.2 (14.5)
Std Dev 0.84 (0.77) 0.52 (0.82) 0.53 (0.83) 1.42 1.90 (1.71)
Table 4.10. Pre-Basel Capital Regulatory Index
Corresponding CREG (t) policy values in parentheses for comparison
were only available for 10 sample states. Yet, among these states, a strong 
comparison may be drawn among definitions of capital and total index scores from 
the pre to post-Basel implementation phases. The means for the Tier 1 and Tier 2 
definitions of capital are striking similar. Interestingly, however, the standard 
deviation for the Tier 2 definition is considerably larger in the post-Basel 
implementation phase. This suggests that possibility that states’ definitions of 
secondary capital were more similar before the Accord than afterwards. This will 
serve as an interesting avenue of research in the chapters ahead.
The influence of private market governance on bankers’ preferences (Hypothesis
2) is measured with the Private Monitoring Index from Barth, Caprio, and Levine
(2001). This index is constructed through the summation of the results of seven 
questions distributed directly to the banking supervisors of over 100 states:
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1. Are certified audits of banks required?
2. What percentage of banks are rated by international credit ratings agencies?
3. Does the income statement include accrued or unpaid interest or principal on 
non-performing loans; are banks required to produce consolidated financial 
statements?
4. Is there an explicit deposit insurance regime?
5. Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to the public?
6. Is subordinated debt an allowable (required) part of regulatory capital?
7. Must banks disclose their risk management procedures to the public?
The index (PRIVATE) varies from 0-7 with each question being scored a “1” if yes is 
the supplied answer. Question (2) is scored as unity if 100 percent of banks are rated. 
Higher values of the index indicate more private monitoring. The aggregate results of 
this variable’s construction—and the variables discussed below—are presented in 
Table 4.11.
It was also expected that bankers’ preferences would be robust to their 
domestic financial systems over level of international financial exposure (Hypothesis
3). This variable is drawn from the World Development Indicators (2001) and 
measures the total import value of the insurance and financial services. The measure 
takes the average of this data for 1985 to 1988.
4.3.2. Macroeconomic Environment
One macroeconomic variable was predicted to influence implementation: the presence 
of a major episode of instability or crisis in the banking market. Instability is 
operationalized as the incidence of severe banking crisis. This phenomenon is
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measured by two dummy variables constructed from data provided by Caprio and 
Klingebiel (1995). The first variable (STABILITY1) is scored “1” if a state 
experienced a major systemic bank insolvency from 1985 to 1988 and zero otherwise. 
The second (STABILITY2) is scored the same way for banking crises occurring from 
1989 to 1995. Unfortunately, these data are limited to a 1995 endpoint. I am not 
aware of an aggregate indicator that measures banking crises beyond this date.
4.3.3. Political Institutions
Two hypotheses suggested that implementation varied by different elements of the 
political institutional environment. The first suggested that political fragmentation 
would influence implementation outcomes. A key element of this hypothesis was that 
fragmentation would permit commercial banks to exercise greater political power. Ho
(2002) suggests a quantitative measure of overall “bank power” that combines the 
number of veto points or political institutional constraints of a state’s political system 
and relative economic strength of the domestic banking sector. The first of these 
phenomenon is measured with Henisz’s (2000) well-known veto points metric. The 
second with a measure of bank concentration from Demirgu9-Kunt and Levine 
(2001). This measures the percentage of national deposits held by the three largest 
banks. These two measures are multiplied together, thus permitting the construction 
of an index of regulatory capture potential (CAPTURE). The value of constructing 
this index is that it permits the simultaneous measurement of these two variables’ 
influence on implementation, which increases the theoretical leverage of these course 
proxies for a complex concept.
Second, it was predicted the level of state ownership of the banking sector 
would influence that implementation. The level of a government’s ownership is
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measured as the fraction of a state’s banking assets that are fifty percent or more 
government owned. These data are taken from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2000a).
Variable Mean StdDev N
PRIVATE 7.29 1.16 17
EXPOSURE 7.00E+10 8.23E+11 18
STABILITY 1 0.278 0.461 18
STABILITY2 0.444 0.511 18
FRAGMENT 0.485 0.160 17
GOV 6.33 11.799 15
Table 4.11. Descriptive Statistics: Explanatory Variables
4.4. Conclusion
This chapter has taken the first empirical cut at understanding the implementation of 
the 1988 Basel Accord and its credit risk related amendments. It presented a method 
for coding the way the 1988 Basel Accord was implemented across a range of states.
It applied this method to a sample of 18 industrialized economies for two periods of 
time: 1988 and around 2000. The results suggested that the Accord might have 
successfully established a regulatory floor that few states violated. Yet, numerous 
distinctions remained in these states’ capital adequacy practices after 1988, though 
some level of regulatory convergence emerged from 1988 to 2000.
Second, this chapter conducted an empirical examination of the viability of the 
two International Influences hypotheses enumerated in Chapter 4. It found little 
support for either the hegemonic or regional imitation explanations. These 
hypotheses will not be given further quantitative testing, though will be discussed in 
the qualitative studies in Part III.
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Finally, the chapter presented the descriptive statistics for the explanatory 
variables. Aggregate descriptive statistics were presented for the variables whose 
coding procedures were drawn from existing research. More extensive descriptive 
statistics were presented for the pre-Basel Accord capital regulatory index 
(PREBASEL) constructed here. The results of comparing this index’s results with the 
post-Basel Accord capital regulatory index (CREG) indicated that “path dependency” 
might be a viable explanation of observed degrees of compliance with the Accord. 






This chapter takes the first cut at testing a selection of hypotheses that explain uneven 
degrees of compliance with the baseline rules of the 1988 Basel Accord. To this 
point, I have presented measures of the degrees of compliance with the soft law rules 
of the Accord and some of the variables that might be used to explain why some states 
adopted strict interpretations of the baseline rules while others adopted lax or non- 
compliant interpretations. In this chapter, I subject these explanations to a series of 
bivariate and multivariate statistical examinations.
The measure of compliance operationalized in Chapter 4 indicated that 
states made asymmetrical interpretations of the Basel rules in measurable ways. The 
Capital Regulatory Index (CREG) indicated that convergence appeared in some of the 
credit risk regulations addressed by the Accord, and that some convergence emerged 
as the implementation period extended into the 1990s. Yet the overall picture was one 
of some persistent divergence in the world’s capital adequacy practices. This measure 
will serve as the dependent variable in this chapter.
The factors, or explanatory variables, that should influence the observed levels 
of differentiated compliance fall along five dimensions: the severity of a state’s pre- 
Basel Accord capital regime; the preferences of a state’s commercial banks; a state’s 
macroeconomic environment; the organization of a state’s political system; and 
international influences. This chapter will seek to corroborate, or falsify, each of 
these explanatory variables. The one exception will be the exclusion of international 
pressure, which received little univariate statistical support in Chapter 4.
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Section 5.2 presents the statistical results for the first implementation period of 
Chapter 4. These results contribute to an understanding of the influences on states’ 
initial interpretations of the Basel rules. The results from this section suggest that 
path dependence and the incidence of banking crises were important contributors to 
implementation decisions made during this time period. The influence of private 
market governance is also found to have some influence.
Section 5.3 presents results for the second implementation period in order to 
understand inter-temporal changes in Basel rule interpretations. Similar to the results 
from the first period, the path dependency argument is found to maintain some 
support. Yet, this section also reveals that private market governance was also 
important to implementation decision-making from about 1991 to 2000.
The results from this quantitative study provide the framework for the case 
studies that follow in Part III. Although aggregate tests are useful for determining the 
patterns that occur across a relatively large sample of cases, they are less able to 
explain why these patterns occur. In addition, the quantitative studies produce a few 
results that are difficult to interpret with the political economic theories of 
implementation laid out in Chapter 3. A key task of the structured, comparison case 
studies that follow will be to address these anomalies to our theories’ expectations.
In all cases, these quantitative results should be interpreted with caution. The 
sample sizes employed are extremely small; they never exceed 18 and drop down to 
as low as 8. I attempt to mitigate the methodological problems inherent in such small 
sample sizes by relying on small-A friendly statistical techniques. I rely more heavily 
on bivariate correlational studies than is common in the quantitative literature in 
International Relations at present. Also, I follow Verdier’s (2002) lead in utilizing a 
bootstrapping technique when conducting regression analyses. Yet, there are limits to
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drawing firm conclusions from statistical methods with sample sizes as small those 
employed here.
5.2. First Period: Analysis of Implementation
This section will formally test competing explanations for a sample of industrialized 
states’ initial interpretations of the 1988 Basel Accord rules. The dependent variable 
is the initial period (t) of the Credit Regulation Index discussed in Chapter 4. The 
independent variables are the initial period compliance hypotheses discussed in 
Chapter 3 and operationalized in Chapter 4. Testing these hypotheses contributes to 
an understanding of why the industrialized states interpreted the Basel Accord the 
way they did during the late 1980s. As the “soft law” provisions of the Accord 
provided these states with pockets of discretionary rule making within the Basel 
convergence framework, it is expected that this section will reveal a strong path 
dependence tendency for most states’ initial implementation of the Accord. In other 
words, it is reasonable to argue that states will interpret the Basel rules in a manner 
consistent with their pre-Basel capital adequacy regime. Yet, there are a wide variety 
of political economic variables that could well condition or intervene between a 
state’s extant rules and its interpretations of the Accord.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to utilize the more sophisticated tools of 
multivariate statistical analysis with our data. With a dataset of 18 states, there are too 
few observations to conduct multivariate analysis with the frill battery of explanatory 
variables listed in Chapter 4. This is especially the case since limits in data 
availability for several of the explanatory variables will push the sample size down to 
well below 18. It is necessary to rely on bivariate correlational analyses to assess the 
feasibility of hypothesis before conducting multivariate analyses. First, bivariate
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correlational analyses are conducted between the independent variable indicators and 
the CREG index. Correlational results will also be presented for the CREG index’s 
component variables. These component results are presented to elaborate on the 
CREG results so that it is possible to judge if the independent variables are able to 
explain implementation decisions made in some Basel-related policy areas but not 
others. Second, multiple regression models will be estimated with select independent 
variables to discern whether the correlational associations are altered when controlling 
for the effects of one or more other explanatory variables.
5.2.1. Bivariate Correlations
The correlational results are presented in Tables 5.1-3. These results are generated as 
Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficients (r). This is the standard method 
utilized to measure bivariate statistical relationships and hence its interpretation is 
well known: coefficients vary between -1.0 and 1.0, inclusive. Given the size of the 
data set and the concern that some of the independent variables are measured as 
ordinal scales or binary variables, the correlations were reproduced with Spearman’s 
Rho and Kendall’s Tau methods. These results are not reported as they were nearly 
identical to the results presented below.
The first table (5.1) presents the correlation coefficients between the six 
independent variables. The results presented in this matrix indicate that no 
statistically significant results were found among these explanatory variables. In fact, 
the p-values presented in the table are relatively high with the lowest emerging in the 
correlation between INSTABILITY and CAPTURE (p = 0.18) This suggests the 
possibility that multicollinearity will not be of concern in multivariate statistical 
examination.
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Table 5.2 shows the correlations between the independent variables and the 
CREG index. The results suggest a high level of support for the “path dependence” 
hypothesis. The index of states’ previous Basel rules (PREBASEL) is positively 
correlated with the CREG index and significant at the 5 percent level. The CREG 
components matrix in Table 5.3 illustrates further details of this relationship. This 
table breaks down the CREG and PREBASEL measures into their constituent 
variables. The results reveal that all of the statistically significant component 
coefficients were in the same direction as the CREG results, including the Pre-Basel 
rule indicators. The measure of states’ pre-Basel core capital definitions (PBTIERl) 
is positively correlated with the TIER1 indicator, though the relationship is not 
statistically significant. The coefficients between the pre-Basel secondary capital 
definition (PBTIER2) and TIER2 and pre-Basel capital levels (PBRATIO) and 
RATIO are both robust and significant. Interestingly, the correlation between 
maintaining a pre-Basel risk-weighting system and RW is negative and non­
significant. On the whole, though, the pattern that emerges from the correlations is a 
positive relationship between the severity of states’ pre-existing capital adequacy 
regimes and their Basel Accord interpretations.
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PREBASEL STABILITY PRIVATE EXPOSURE CAPTURE GOV
STABILITY 0.39 1 0.29 0.13 -0.34 0.13
(0.26) (0.26) (0.60) (0.18) (0.65)
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Table 5.1. Correlation Coefficients (Pearson’s r): Independent Variables 
p-values in parjfhHieses, number of cases in brackets (r
Correlate: CREG Coefficient p-value N
PREBASEL 0.629 0.050** 10
STABILITY 0.434 0.070* 18
PRIVATE -0.086 0.743 17
EXPOSURE -0.009 0.972 18
GOV 0.197 0.482 15
CAPTURE -0.064 0.808 17
Table 5.2. Correlation Coefficients (Pearson’s r): CREG (t)
*, ** indicate significance levels at 10 and 5 percent, respectively
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Support was also found for the hypothesis that economic instability influenced the 
implementation process. As Chapter 3 discussed, there was no clear theoretical 
reason to suppose that the presence, or absence, of economic instability would lead to 
the adoption of a strict or lax interpretation of the Basel rules. It is thus interesting to 
note that the coefficient of the instability indicator (STABILITY) is positive and 
significant at the 10 percent level (p = 0.07). It is also interesting to observe that this 
variable, among the disaggregated elements of the CREG index, was significantly 
correlated only with on-balance sheet risk-weighting frameworks. The variable is 
actually negatively correlated with ratio requirements, though not statistically 
significant. .
Perhaps as interesting as the statistically significant results are the non-results 
that contradict prior expectations and theory. Surprisingly, no support is found for the 
relationship for the political institutional variables. The agglomerated measure of the 
ability of banks to “capture” the policy-making process (CAPTURE) yielded a very 
weak, though non-significant, correlation in the predicted direction (r = -0.064).
The support for this variable's null hypothesis suggests that banks’ political 
power potential did not play a key role in the implementation of the Accord—at least, 
not during the initial implementation stage.
Also surprisingly, the measure of market governance (PRIVATE) yielded unexpected 
results. The bivariate relationship between this measure and CREG was weak and 
non-significant. Table 5.3 indicates that PRIVATE did yield two significant results, 
yet these were in different directions.
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PBRATIO -0.28 -0.24 0.11 0.39 -0.03 0.47
(0.27) (0.34) (0.65) (0.10)* (0.92) (0.05)




























EXPOSURE 0.02 0.14 0.02 -0.07 -0.01 -0.26
(0.95) (0.57) (0.93) (0.77) (0.96) (0.30)
[18] [18] [18] [18] [18] [18]
CAPTURE 0.20 -0.38 0.15 -0.30 0.31 0.20
(0.44) (0.14) (0.56) (0.24) (0.23) (0.44)
[17] [17] [17] [17] [17] [17]
GOV 0.30 0.21 -0.10 -0.07 0.24 -0.15
(0.28) (0.45) (0.73) (0.81) (0.39) (0.60)
[15] [15] [15] [15] [15] [15]
Table 53. Correlation coeffients (Pearson’s r): CREG Components
Statistically significant results presented in bold 
p-values in pjtrfcheneses, number of cases in brackets 
— indicates that a correlation could ncVbe determined because one of the variable’s standard deviation
equalled zero
____________________**, * indicates significance at 5 and 10 percent levels____________________
132
The correlation between the definition of primary capital—TIER1—was negative (r = 
-0.59) and significant at the 5 percent level. This result is unexpected as it was 
hypothesized that the market might enforce a strict interpretation of the Basel rules, 
particularly the definition of Tier 1 capital that is so critical to the safety and 
soundness of banks. Curiously, the private market hypothesis was supported for the 
risk-weighting framework as RW was positively and significantly correlated with 
PRIVATE (r =0.41; p  =0.10). These divergent results are difficult to reconcile with 
extant theory and these relationships will be closely investigated in the qualitative 
analyses.
5.2.2. Multivariate Analysis
The bivariate correlations are useful for discerning the statistical association between 
two variables, yet this is not a sufficient basis for inferring that the two are causally 
related. The method does not permit the conclusion that other variables intervene in 
the relationship and it is thus not possible to conclude that a spurious relationship has 
been uncovered. It is necessary to employ multivariate statistical applications in order 
to rule out the largest possible number of variables that might conceivably explain the 
original association.
The general method for conducting such control exercises is multiple 
regression model estimation. The results presented here were derived by estimating 
regression expressions with ordinary least squares (OLS). Generally, OLS regression 
models are appropriate for cardinal, rather than ordinal dependent variables. The 
method is employed here as there are too many values (0-24) of the CREG index to 
use a model for categorical data.1 Moreover, Table 5.4 indicates that the CREG
1 Justification for this argument is provided in Quinn and Incl&n (1997).
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variable may approximate a normal distribution. The relatively high /7-levels of the 
three measures of normality presented in this table indicate that CREG is normally 
distributed, despite its small sampling size. This is important as OLS regression 
models assume such a normal distribution. Nevertheless, the difficulties of employing 
regression analysis with small samples and with combinations of variables not 





D’Agostino Skewness 0.370 0.328
D’Agostino Kurtosis 0.979 0.328
Table 5.4. Tests of Normality: CREG (f)
Initially, four models are estimated and the results of their fitting presented in 
Table 5.5. Each cell reports values of observed coefficients, and standard and 
bootstrapped p-values. The bootstrap method is employed as some researchers have 
found that it provides more accurate measures of statistical significance when it is 
carried out over at least 1000 iterations in sample sizes less than 30. Though the state 
of knowledge about the correct applications of bootstrapping in political science are 
still rudimentary, it is employed here as a further measure to circumvent many of the
2 The bootstrap method involves generating pseudoreplicate datasets by randomly sampling the original 
dataset a specified number of iterations. The method permits the estimation of confidence intervals 
without the distributional assumptions of parametric methods. See Efron and Tibshirani (1993), 
Mooney and Duval (1993) and Mooney (1996). She Verdier (2002) for an example of a study that 
applies a bootstrapping method to derive standard errors in a comparative political economy study.
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problems introduced by small sample biases in regression studies. Yet, the 
interpretation of the bootstrapped confidence intervals must also be treated with some 
caution.
Turning now to the regression results, each of the four models presented in 
Table 5.5 regress the CREG index on the PREBASEL and STABILITY indicators. 
These variables were found to be statistically significant in the bivariate correlational 
results and these models estimate these variables’ importance while controlling for the 
effects of the other explanatory variables. The chief disadvantage of this selection of 
models is that the inclusion of the PREBASEL variable reduces the sample size to a 
maximum of 10.
The first model includes the PREBASEL and STABILITY variables in 
isolation in order to control for their effects on one another’s relationship with CREG. 
The results indicate that while the path dependency index and the economic instability 
indicator retain their predicted signs, only the path dependency measure remains 
statistically significant. The PREBASEL index is significant at the 10 percent level 
according to the standard /7-value presented in parentheses and at the 1 percent level 
according to the bootstrapped /7-value included in brackets.
3 Some researchers have expressed reservations about the way that the bootstrapping method has been 
applied in social science. Some have suggested that it is still not clear whether the technique should be 
utilized to generate measures of association (For example, Pearson’s r) or confidence intervals. Some 
researchers have also suggested that the method is ill suited to application to small samples. See 
Davison and Hinkley (1997).
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Dependent Variable: CREG (t) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 9.117 7.037 9.057 8.915
(0.01)*** (0.40) (0.05)** (0.06)*
PREBASEL 0.530 0.603 0.507 0.495
(0.10)* (0.26) (0.17) (0.32)
[0.01]*** [0.23] [0.04]** [0.04]**
STABILITY 0.562 0.474 -0.125 0.836
(0.64) (0.77) (0.92) (0.66)













R2 0.41 0.43 0.62 0.42
Adj.R2 0.25 0.14 0.34 0.07
Standard Error 1.53 2.00 1.51 1.79
N 10 9 8 9
Table 5.5. OLS Regression Results: CREG (/)
Ordinary least squares with p-values presented in parentheses and bias-corrected /(-values calculated on
1000 bootstraps in brackets.
*, **, *** indicates significance levels at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively
Models 2-4 add the other explanatory variables to this regression result. 
Model 2 incorporates the bank preference variables while Models 3 and 4 incorporate 
the political institutions and government ownership indicators, respectively. 
Confidence may be given to the result that path dependence influences 
implementation as PREBASEL is in the predicted direction in all three of these
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models and significant in two according to the bootstrapped /7-values. The 
STABILITY measure’s relationship with CREG varies to some degree across the 
models as it takes on a negative sign in Model 3, though it remains statistically 
insignificant in all of the models. The other explanatory variables remain 
insignificant according to the standard measures of statistical significance for 
hypothesis testing. In fact, only Model 3 has an R2 larger than that achieved Model 1, 
thus indicating that the explanatory variables introduced in Models 2-4 are not critical 
to understanding variations in CREG when compared with path dependency and 
economic instability concerns.
A chief caveat of these regression results is that they do simply lower the 
sample size too far. Though there is precedent for conducting OLS regressions with 
sample sizes as low as 8 when aided with a bootstrap technique, the sample size is 
critically low.4 Also, the weak coefficient of the instability measure in the regression 
studies when compared with the bivariate correlations may be the results of the steep 
lowering of the N  that occurs when PREBASEL is introduced. Table 5.6 corrects for 
this possibility by running the regression models presented above without the 
PREBASEL measure, thus increasing the A to as high as 17. In all three models, 
STABILITY is in the predicted direction and is now statistically significant according 
to the bootstrapped p-values. As before, the other explanatory variables remain 
statistically insignificant, with the exception of the private market governance variable 
(PRIVATE) which is now significant at the 5 percent level in the absence of the 
PREBASEL measure in Model 1. These results seem to suggest that economic crises 
are indeed an important predictor of capital adequacy policy during the late 1990s, at 
least when the “path dependency” concerns are not endogenized. Yet, also observe
4 Verdier (2002).
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that the R for these models remain much lower than those in which PREBASEL was 
included in Table 5.5. This may suggest that the path dependency variable remains a 
critical contributor to understanding variations in implementation.
Dependent Variable: CREG (t)
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 16.440 13.980 13.586















R2 0.23 0.20 0.19
Adj.R2 0.05 0.06 0.08
Standard Error 0.31 0.26 0.23
N 17 15 17
Table 5.6. OLS Regression Results: CREG (PREBASEL EXCLUDED)
Ordinary least squares with p-values presented in parentheses and bias-corrected p-values calculated on
1000 bootstraps in brackets.
*, **, *** indicates significance levels at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively
Yet, the results presented in Table 5.6 make it difficult to discern the relative 
importance of path dependency and economic instability on interpretations of the 
Accord’s rules during this first time period. Ideally, it is necessary to compare the
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relative importance of PREBASEL and STABILITY for the full 18-country sample. 
Yet the limited amounts of PREBASEL data make this comparison impossible. A 
second best solution is to conduct the multivariate analyses with a proxy indicator of 
the path dependency measure that is available for all 18 countries. Table 5.7 aims to 
conduct such an analysis by utilizing the measure of states’ pre-Basel capital-to-assets 
ratios (PBRATIO) in place of the PREBASEL index. This ratio variable is highly 
correlated with the PREBASEL index (r = 0.84; p  = 0.00) and available for all 18 
states. Before utilizing this variable as a proxy, however, it is important to remember 
that in Table 5.3, PBRATIO was only significantly correlated with RATIO and RW 
and was actually negatively correlated with the definitions of capital indicators 
(TIER1 and TIER2). Hence, this variable will serve as a very rough proxy variable at 
best.
The regression results with this proxy are presented in Table 5.7. This table 
presents two models, with each featuring explanatory variables that were found to 
statistically significant in at least one model in Tables 5.5 or 5.6. The results of 
Model 1 indicate that while both the pre-Basel proxy (PBRATIO) and economic 
instability measures are in the predicted directions, only the latter is statistically 
significant. Model 2 indicates that this variable and the private market governance 
variable are in directions consistent with previous statistical findings and significant, 
though the PRIVATE indicator remains in an unpredicted direction. It is useful to 
note that the R for both models remain quite low relative those obtained with the 
PREBASEL measure in Table 5.5. In sum, however, these results suggest the 
possibility that economic instability—and perhaps private market governance—were 
more important predictors of capital adequacy policy than extant rules. Yet again, 
such results must be taken with a great deal of caution given the rough design of the
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PREBASEL proxy and, again, the relatively low R2 results in the results in Table 5.7 
when compared with those obtained with the full PREBASEL index in Table 5.5.














Standard Error 0.19 0.28
N 18 17
Table 5.7. OLS Regression Results: CREG (PBRATIO PROXY)
Ordinary least squares with /?-values presented in parentheses and bias-corrected /?-values calculated on
1000 bootstraps in brackets.
*, **, *** indicates significance levels at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively
5.2.3. Sensitivity Exams
The findings are robust to a number of sensitivity checks. First, a probit regression 
model was utilized with the explanatory variables outlined. To make the dependent 
variable amenable to a model for ordinal data, CREG was recoded into a 0-6 variable. 
This involved converting each of the six composite policy variables in dummies 
taking the value of unity if an above minimum interpretation was adopted and “0” 
otherwise. The conclusions reached with the OLS model remain broadly unchanged 
with these modifications. Also, the OLS regressions were run after recoding
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MARKET into a dummy variable. This variable is an ordinal scale measuring 0-6. 
The OLS procedure assumes that the exogenous variables are measured on at least the 
interval level and the MARKET variable is recoded to take the value of unity if a 
state’s score is above the sample mean on this variable’s score. As King (1985) 
predicts, incorporating an ordinal level variable into an OLS regression seldom 
produces distinct results from a dummy recording and the results do not change 
significantly after this modification.
5.3. Second Period: Analysis of Implementation
This section conducts statistical tests for theoretical propositions explaining why 
states amended or maintained their initial interpretations of the Accord rules. The 
previous section suggested that path dependency, instances of banking crisis, and 
perhaps private market governance influenced state’s initial interpretations of the 
rules. As the political and economic consequences of these initial interpretations 
became clear, however, it is possible that states may have amended their 
interpretations to bolster their banks’ competitiveness or solvency in reaction to 
changes in the financial environment that may, or may not, have been a consequence 
of the Accord. It is equally plausible that states would have maintained their initial 
interpretations throughout the 1990s in the absence of any political economic impetus 
for change. Studies looking at the evolution of public policy over time have 
concurred with Anne Krueger’s observation that, “with regulations there is not a once 
and for all moment.. .[o]ften regulators impose regulations with a naivete as to 
ramifications and then the market reacts to minimize the costs of the 
control...[government actors then find the market’s response unacceptable and have
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to alter the control.. .”5 In this way, public policies travel through an iterated cycle in 
which regulators refine their policies in response to their actual and perceived impacts 
on target actors. This section will take a statistical cut at these dynamic possibilities 
for the implementation of the Accord.
The form of analysis will follow the same pattern as the tests in the first time 
period. First, the bivariate relationships between the explanatory variables with the 
dependent variable will be presented with a multivariate analysis to follow. Yet, the 
dependent variable here will not only be the raw CREG index scores, but measures of 
changes in the CREG scores from the initial time period to the most recent credit risk 
regulations available (generally from 1999 or 2000). This dependent variable was 
operationalized in Chapter 4 and is utilized here in order to isolate correlates of 
change in capital adequacy ratios over time. As before, the objective of these 
statistical analyses is to not only to test for the veracity of each null hypothesis, but 
also to set up avenues for enquiry in the qualitative studies that arise from the 
inevitable ambiguities of aggregated research.
5.3.1. Bivariate Correlations
First, the correlation between the indicator of economic stability and the five other 
independent variables is presented in Table 5.8. Only the STABILITY indicator 
exhibits inter-temporal variations while the others remain stationary over time.
Again, the dependent variables do not exhibit a statistically significant relationship 
with another.
5 Krueger (1996:172). See Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981) and Baron (1997) for further examples of 
dynamic theories of regulation.
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Table 5.8. Correlation Coefficients (Pearson’s r): 
STABILITY 1989-1995
The correlation matrix for the second period of the CREG index is presented 
in Table 5.9. Again, these results are derived from the Pearson’s r method and 
unreported applications of other correlational methods did not contradict these results 
to any important degree. The correlation matrix indicates that three variables exhibit 
a statistically significant relationship with the second period CREG index. First, the 
two variables that represent lagged values of the CREG (t +1) index—CREG (t) and 
PREBASEL—are positively correlated and significant at least the 5 percent threshold. 
Interestingly, the path dependency measure utilized in the first period analysis 
(PREBASEL) is more robustly correlated with the second period index than the first. 
This suggests the possibility that states realigned their initial interpretations of the 
Accord back towards their pre-Accord standards during the late 1990s. Perhaps states 
judged their initial interpretations too harsh or inappropriate and reverted back to their 
old regimes before the Accord was negotiated. This conclusion cannot be made 
through correlational exercises and will be an interesting topic for investigation in the 
qualitative investigations. Yet, the correlational results also indicate that high levels 
of private market governance (PRIVATE) may have also influenced implementation
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decisions during the late 1990s. The sign of the private governance variable is the 
theorized direction and significant at the 10 percent level.
Correlate: CREG (t + 1) Coefficient p-value N
CREG (t) 0.553 0.017** 18
PREBASEL 0.798 0.006*** 10
STABILITY -0.037 0.884 18
PRIVATE 0.393 0.090* 17
EXPOSURE -0.117 0.645 18
GOV -0.181 0.518 15
CAPTURE -0.119 0.650 17
Table 5.9. Correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r): CREG (t +1)
*, **and *** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively
The remaining explanatory variables did not produce robust or significant 
associations with the second period interpretations. Most interestingly, economic 
stability was not associated with rule interpretations in the second period. This 
variable exerted a positive correlation with the first period index, yet it is weakly 
correlated with CREG (t +1) in a negative direction.
Correlates of changes in the CREG index between the two periods are 
presented in Table 5.10. This table produces the results of searching for correlates 
with sample states’ decision to strengthen or weaken their Basel rules interpretations 
over time. The CREG (t + 1) variable is utilized to create two dummy variables that 
measure if a state increased the severity of Basel rule interpretations (ACREG+) or 
loosened them over time (ACREG -). For each state that experienced a change in 
their CREG interpretations between the first and second periods, these variables take 
the value of “1” if a state
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ACREG (+) ACREG (-)
CREG (t) 0 .1 5 - 0 .1 1
PREBASEL 0 .0 8 0 .1 3
CAPTURE 0 .1 1 - 0 .0 5
EXPOSURE -0 .0 3 0 .1 9
PRIVATE 0  4 0 * * * - 0 .0 9
GOV - 0 .2 4 0 .1 8
STABILITY 0 .0 4 - 0 .1 1
Table 5.10. Correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r): ACREG
*** indicate significance at the 1 percent level
experienced an increase or decrease in their CREG index score from the first to 
second period, respectively, and “0” otherwise. In total, 12 states experienced a 
change over time (7 increased and 5 decreased). Including these variables allows us 
to analyze correlates of particular directions of change with greater rigor.
Yet, only the level of private market governance produces a statistically 
significant result with either of these two variables. States subject to high degrees of 
market governance may have tended to strengthen the severity of their interpretations. 
The association between PRIVATE and ACHANGE+ is comparatively robust and 
significant at the 1 percent level. Other explanatory variables produce rather weak 
correlations with the two change measures.
Finally, Table 5.11 drills down the correlational analyses by disaggregating 
the CREG (t +1) index into its constituent variables. The matrix shows some rather 
surprising results. First, the private market governance variable exhibited mixed signs 
in a manner identical to the correlational results presented with the first period CREG 
index in Table 5.3. The PRIVATE index is found to be negatively correlated with the 
TIER1 indicator though positively correlated with the risk-weights interpretation 
(RW); both correlations were found to be significant at the 5 percent level. There is
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PBRATIO 0.00 -0.26 0.31 0.17 -0.03 0.35
(0.99) (0.30) (0.22) (0.50) (0.92) (0.15)
[18] [18] [18] [18] [18] [18]
STABILITY -0.16 -0.04 0.19 0.09 -0.34 -0.16
(0.52) (0.88) (0.46) (0.72) (0.17) (0.52)
















EXPOSURE -0.29 0.36 -0.10 -0.06 -0.01 -0.27
(0.24) (0.14) (0.68) (0.82) (0.96) (0.29)
[18] [18] [18] [18] [18] [18]
CAPTURE 0.44 -0.72 -0.07 -0.05 0.31 0.21
(0.08)* (0.00)*** (0.78) (0.86) (0.23) (0.42)
[17] [17] [17] [17] [17] [17]
GOV 0.23 -0.17 -0.44 0.08 0.24 -0.03
(0.41) (0.55) (0.10)* (0.77) (0.39) (0.90)
[15] [15] [15] [15] [15] [15]
Table 5.11. Correlation coeffients (Pearson’s r): CREG (t +1) Components
Statistically significant results presented in bold 
p-values in partheneses, number of cases in brackets 
— indicates that a correlation could not be determined because one of the variable’s standard deviation
equalled zero
______________________**, * indicates significance at 5 and 10 percent______________________
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no clear theoretical explanation for this mixed performance of the PRIVATE variable. 
As stated before, given the importance of Tier 1 as an indicator of bank strength, it 
would seem likely that higher levels of private market governance might be correlated 
with more limited definitions of this capital class. One ex ante possibility is that 
regulators might have felt at leisure to permit a wide range of items to qualify as Tier 
1 capital if they were confident that the market aided in the supervision of their 
domestic banks. As before, verification of this working hypothesis requires 
qualitative input.
Secondly, these bivariate results suggest that banks’ potential to “capture” the 
policy making process might have been of some importance. The CAPTURE 
indicator was significantly correlated with definitions of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, 
though in opposing directions. It is not necessarily clear why this variable was so 
robustly correlated with TIER1 in a positive direction and negatively correlated with 
TIER2. These relationships require further analysis through in a multivariate study to 
ensure that a spurious effect has been observed.
5.3.2. Multivariate Analysis
Multiple regression model estimation results for the second period are shown in Table 
5.12. Five models are estimated in the first instance. All five include the two 
variables that produced significant results in the bivariate correlations (PREBASEL 
and PRIVATE). The second model includes one bank preference measure 
(EXPOSURE), the third includes the macroeconomic indicator (STABILITY), the 
fourth adds the GOV measure, and the fifth considers the political institutions variable 
(CAPTURE).
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Dependent Variable: CREG (t+1) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.523 4.837 5.346 4.534 5.549


































R2 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.80 0.85
Adj.R2 0.80 0.77 0.76 0.61 0.77
Standard Error 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.02
F Ratio 16.6 9.74 9.32 4.10 9.72
N 9 9 9 6 9
Table 5.12. OLS Regression Results: CREG (t + 1)
Ordinary least squares with p-values presented in parentheses and bias-corrected p-values calculated on
1000 bootstraps in brackets.
*, **, and *** indicates significance levels at 10,5, and 1 percent, respectively
The most striking feature of these regression analyses is the extremely high R 
produced by the five models. Though King (1985) warns against drawing firm 
conclusions from R data, it is a reasonable measure of these models’ “goodness-of-
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fit” as identical dependent variables are being utilized across the models.6 In this 
regard, the high R do suggest that the variables utilized in these models—particularly 
PREBASEL and PRIVATE—were important predictors of implementation in this 
second time period.
In addition, it is interesting to observe the consistently significant results 
produced by the path dependence and market governance variables. The coefficients 
of PREBASEL are in the predicted direction and statistically significant (generally at 
the 1 percent level) in all five models. The private market indicator retains the 
predicted sign in all five models and remains significant in two, falling just sort of 
obtaining a significant result at the 10 percent level in the bootstrapped /^-values for 
Models 4 and 5. Controlling for the effects of other explanatory variables does not 
modify the coefficients of these variables to any great degree. In particular, it is 
interesting to observe that the inclusion of the CAPTURE indicator in Model 5 does 
not reduce the relationship of the PREBASEL or PRIVATE variables with CREG, nor 
is this measure significantly related to CREG.
In order to further examine the contours of the relationship between the 
CAPTURE variable and implementation uncovered in the correlational analyses in 
Table 5.11, two ordered probit models were estimated. These probit regression 
models situate the TIER1 and TIER2 components of the CREG (t+1) index as the 
dependent variables as these two variables were found to have a statistically 
significant bivariate relationship with the CAPTURE variable. The independent 
variables chosen are CAPTURE and the other two variables found to be significantly 
correlated with CREG: PBWEIGHT and PRIVATE, respectively. The ordered probit
6 King (1985:10-11).
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regression method is selected for this test as the dependent variables are limited 
response variables that take the values of 1-4.









Log likelihood -5.67 -1.12
N 17 9
Table 5.13. Probit Regression Results: CREG (M~l) Component Results
p-values in parentheses 
** and * indicate significance 5 and 10 percent, respectively
The results of the two probit models indicate the possibility that CAPTURE’S 
bivariate relationship with the CREG components was spurious. The CAPTURE 
measure does not retain the same direction of relationship with the TIER1 and TIER2 
measures in the probit models as those uncovered in the bivariate correlations. In 
fact, the directions of effect are actually reversed. Also, CAPTURE is not statistically 
significant in either model estimated. Conversely, the PRIVATE and PBWEIGHT 
measures retain the same sign in the probit model and remain statistically significant. 
These results provide further support for the importance of the path dependence and 
market governance hypotheses of implementation during this second period and raise
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doubts regarding the viability of the importance of banks’ political power 
explanations.
In sum, these second period results provide a great deal of confidence in two 
conclusions regarding the implementation of the Accord. First, the G-10 states’ 
capital adequacy regulations continued to be path dependent well into the 1990s. 
Though more than half of the original implementing states amended their initial 
interpretations from 1988 to 2000, these changes did not significantly depart from 
their original pre-Basel rules or involve recalibrating their interpretations of the 
Accord back to their pre-Basel shape. Second, some evidence suggests that states 
subject to a high degree of private market governance were more likely to strengthen 
their capital adequacy rule interpretations over time. This suggests that market actors 
may have increasingly demanded more high quality capital adequacy procedures from 
banks than was required by their regulators in exchange for competitive credit ratings. 
This may have had the effect of leading banks to prefer or be ambivalent towards the 
tightening of their domestic solvency standards. This opens up the interesting 
possibility that markets do influence the bank policy-making process and have a hand 
in effecting trans-national rule isomorphism as many globalizatibn theories suggest. 
Yet again, the negative relationship between the definitions of Tier 1 capital and 
private market governance indicates that this relationship is nuanced and not clear-cut.
5.3.3. Sensitivity Analysis
As with the First Period analysis, the results in this section were robust to a number of 
sensitivity analyses. First, the CHANGE variable was treated as a dependent variable 
in the estimation of a multiple linear regression with a combination of the explanatory 
variables. The measures of the private market governance remained statistically
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significant and in the expected direction during this exercise while other explanatory 
variables remained statistically insignificant at the usual confidence intervals.
Second, the multiple regression analysis with the CREG (/ + 1) measure 
(Table 5.12) was run with the explanatory variable transformations presented in the 
First Period sensitivity examination (section 5.2.3). As with the First Period analysis, 
the transformations did not produce any substantive alterations to the results presented 
with the original operationalizations.
5.4. Summary and Conclusions
The quantitative tests provided support for three of the hypotheses advanced in 
Chapter 3. First, an interesting mix of support was found for the path dependency 
hypotheses. The first, regarding the relationship between a state’s initial 
interpretations and their pre-Basel rules, found some support. Yet, most robust 
support for this hypothesis was found in the second period analysis.
Second, mixed support was also found for the market supervision hypothesis. 
The level of private market governance was not found to be an important explanation 
for states' initial interpretations of the Basel rules, yet its importance increased over 
time. It may be the case that market actors did not have a preference towards 
disparate interpretations of the Accord until the political and economic ramifications 
of the initial interpretations became evident. Perhaps only after several years into the 
Accord’s implementation did market actors arrive at clear preferences regarding the 
Accord.
Next, tests of the key macroeconomic indicator—the presence of economic 
stability—was also mixed. This variable was operationalized as the presence of bank 
crises and was found to be important during the early implementation period, but less
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important through the latter part of the 1990s. This may seem curious, as there were 
only three bank crises from 1985-1987, yet five from 1988-1996. There is no ex ante 
theoretical explanation for this anomaly and it will be an interesting topic to pursue in 
the qualitative studies to follow.
Finally, little support was found for the remaining hypotheses. The inabilities 
of the regional imitation and hegemonic arguments to explain variations in 
implementation were discussed at some length in Chapter 4. Among the remaining 
hypotheses, it is most interesting that little empirical support was found for the 
regulatory capture argument. The comparative political power positions of 
commercial banks did not seem to have been a major factor in implementation 
decision-making. This is a curious result that contradicts much economic theorizing 
over the ability of regulated firms to sharply influence the rules that govern them.
Part of the lack of quantitative support for the CAPTURE variable may be due to its 
crude specification. Though it has been theorized that more highly concentrated 
banks are capable are wielding comparative large quantities of political power, 
especially in a fragmented political system, these proxies for bank power may simply 
be too crude. Better measures of bank power may be the level of horizontal or 
vertical integration in bank’s associational systems or the extent to which a corporatist 
style system binds banking groups and regulators together in the policy-making 
process. Unfortunately, quantitative indicators of these phenomenons are not available 
across a large sample of cases. Investigating this variable with the case study method 
will be instructive of both the influence of the political power of banks on the 
implementation of the Accord and of the relative strengths of quantitative and 
qualitative research.
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Again, consideration must be given to the limits of quantitative analyses with 
relatively small sample sizes. As has been indicated, provisions have been taken to 
ensure that correct inferences were drawn from the twenty cases examined here. Yet 
these results should still be approached with some caution. Thus a key purpose of 
jointly employing the case method is to provide another empirical testing ground for 
these hypotheses in order to add confidence to the tests conducted in this chapter. 
More will follow in the next chapter on the combination of these quantitative tests and 
the system of focused, case comparison.
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Part III Case Studies
1. Introduction
This component of the thesis presents a series of case studies investigating the 
implementation of the 1988 Basel Accord in a cross-section of four states over a 
twelve-year time span, 1988-2000. Chapters 4 and 5 addressed what implementation 
looked like in a sample of 18 countries and with searching for general patterns of 
explanation for the observed uneven levels of compliance with the Basel rules at two 
points of time. To augment and further interpret these aggregated results, chapters 6, 
7, and 8 present structured, focused comparison case studies of four of the most 
important players in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: the United States, 
France, Germany, and Japan.
Before turning to the case study analyses, this short prelude to Part III will, 
first, consider the goals of the cases and how, it is hoped, they will corroborate and 
elaborate upon the quantitative exercises of Part II. Second, this section will lay out 
the case study methodology to be employed.
2. Goals of the Qualitative Research
There are a large number of advantages to utilizing comparison case studies in 
conjunction with a quantitative approach. This is not a novel methodological tool in 
political science: Alexander George (1979) observed that, “controlled comparison is 
neither competitive with or a substitute for quantitative analysis...[the] approaches are 
complementary.”1 More recently King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) stressed that case 
studies can comfortably sit alongside aggregated approaches for the purpose of
1 George (1979: 62).
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increasing descriptive and causal inferences in social science research. Part of the 
justification for this multi-method research is that while the quantitative approach is 
useful for building frequency distributions, making observations, and testing 
generalizable hypotheses across a wide range of cases, the results of such work, 
perhaps especially in social science, are often vague and inferences are often deduced 
with crude proxy indicators. As a result, case study work is indispensable in filling- 
out the results of correlational and regression analyses.
Supporting this general point, Rossman and Wilson (1985) observed that 
multi-method research has three purposes: corroboration, elaboration, and initiation. 
The first, corroboration, argues that case studies can augment and add confidence (or 
uncertainty) to quantitative results by providing another empirical testing ground, one 
based on a different data collection technique, for explanatory variables. By 
extending the gamut for hypothesis falsification, corroboration increases the validity 
of quantitative results and can potentially support the reliability of quantitative 
indicators. Beyond this, case studies can operate as an elaborative device by filling- 
out the necessarily simplified modelling approach adopted for aggregated research. 
The rich empirical fabric of case study work can, in this instance, serve not only as a 
check on quantitative results but extend and further them by viewing an empirical 
problem from a different angle. The effects of these collaborative and elaborative 
mechanisms, according to Rossman and Wilson, could be the initiation of wholly new 
interpretations of the quantitative results and the reformulation of the initial research 
problem, thus opening avenues for future research.4
2 King (1994:21).
3 Rossman and Wilson (1985) in Blaikie (1998:267).
4 This paragraph paraphrases the general points covered by Blaikie (1998: 267).
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Following the lead of Rossman and Wilson, as well as those who have applied 
multi-method research techniques to problems of international relations5, the case 
studies contained in chapters 6-8 endeavor to corroborate and elaborate upon the 
quantitative results presented in Chapters 4 and 5. This is especially important as the 
parameters of the quantitative dataset were not amenable to more powerful 
multivariate statistical methods. Given the dataset’s limited size, it was not possible 
to effectively control for the effects of all of the explanatory variables and conclusions 
were drawn largely from bivariate correlational investigations. The qualitative 
analyses address this lacuna by permitting the investigation of interactive effects 
among the independent variables.
The case work uses the quantitative results as a form of “sign post” to help 
guide the cases and the search for causal influences in the morass of detail that 
characterizes the implementation of the Basel Accord. Each hypothesis will be put to 
a sort of qualitative test to determine if further detail or divergent results can be 
gleaned by switching the methodology through which the hypotheses are tested. It is 
entirely possible, for example, that a hypothesis could be confirmed or rejected for a 
dyad-year in the quantitative sample, yet not for any individual country in a given 
year when the data is disaggregated into a case study. In this sense, the case study 
data will be viewed as un-coded quantitative data to accomplish identical theoretical 
aims.6
Admittedly, there are some well-documented difficulties in implementing the 
multi-method research program to effectively achieve these corroborative goals. A 
critical caveat is that the results of mixing methods may measure differences in
5 See Martin (1992), Simmons (1994).
6 This observation is made by Blaikie (1998:268).
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methodologies (quantitative vs. qualitative) rather than differences within the data or, 
citing Mathison (1988), “different methods may tap different ways of knowing.”7
To minimize this risk, I standardize the ontological assumptions made across 
the two parts of the research project. That is, I will adopt a deductive research 
strategy for the qualitative tests, just as was the case for quantitative analysis. It is 
hoped that this consistent application of a deductivist approach will cancel out any 
stochastic processes introduced into the analysis through multi-method comparisons. 
This deductivist approach will also be applied in the qualitative elaboration of the 
quantitative results. In some instances, these hypotheses represent new variables not 
considered in chapter 4 and in others they test for modified or extended versions of 
previously considered hypotheses. For example, in the testing of the bank preferences 
hypotheses, the cases will consider a vector of qualitative indicators that were 
untestable in an aggregated format. In this way, I can unpack banks’ utility functions 
by attempting to determine whether fiscal policies substituted or complemented bank 
preferences for a specific Basel rule interpretation. In addition, the casework can 
attempt to understand why some quantitative hypotheses produced mixed or 
unanticipated results across different dependent variable indicators. Were these an 
inconsistency introduced from a variable specification error or did banks have 
different preferences for Tier 1 capital policies versus the capital ratios policy?
Lastly, the casework elaborates on the quantitative analysis through 
considering each hypothesis in a dynamic fashion by analyzing each major country 
case from 1988-2002. The cases will measure changes in banks’ preferences and 
regulators’ policies over the same 12-year time span. As each of these case countries 
implemented the Basel Accord in the same year, it will be possible to hold a variety of
7 Mathison (1988:14) cited in Blaikie (1998: 267).
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variables constant which could confound the analysis of uneven implementation over 
divergent periods of time. As the severity of implementation in a given year may be 
serially correlated with that in a previous year, it is important to hold time constant for 
the major cases under study. In addition, the qualitative studies are more amenable to 
studying the role of ideas in explaining departures from extant capital adequacy 
standards in the first period or changes in Basel rule interpretations over time.
Chapter 3 discussed the importance of ideas about risk management and role of the 
state in governing bank capital, yet such variables are difficult to operationalize in a 
way convenient for statistical examination. Such ideas will be investigated here.
3. Case Study Methodology
The structured, focused comparison methodology will be employed. This method, 
prominently detailed by George (1979; 1985), requires the systematic collection of the 
same information (variables) across selected units. Using this method, the researcher, 
“defines and standardizes the data requirements of the case studies by formulating
a
theoretically relevant general questions to guide the examination of each case.” This 
use of standardized sets of questions is necessary to assure the acquisition of 
comparable data for the case studies.9
This standardization will be assured in two prominent ways. First, the same 
series of questions will be addressed in each case study. These questions are 
represented by the hypotheses that have been detailed. Second, a standardized 
method will be utilized to bring empirical data to bear on each of these questions for 
each case study. That is, each case will follow a standard template that identifies the 





The actors systematically analyzed in each case, as identified in the 
hypotheses, will include, for each country: (1) the commercial banks required to 
implement the Basel Accord and their industry associations; (2) the domestic banking 
regulator(s) responsible for implementing the Basel Accord in their domestic banking 
space; (3) the executive and legislative branches responsible for supervising the 
banking regulator(s). The relationships between these actors will be accessed in more 
detail here than was possible with the quantitative format. In particular, the complex 
and often unobservable links between commercial banks and their regulators was 
crudely represented by multiplying each state’s 3-bank concentration ratio with a 
cardinal measure of political veto points. The qualitative studies will allow for the 
better specification of this regulatory relationship and the extent to which bank- 
regulator interactions over the Accord’s implementation were structured by 
historically conditioned circumstances and political institutions. In addition, two 
additional actors will be scrutinized on an ad-hoc basis, depending on the qualities of 
the case country’s banking regime. In the testing of the hypothesis about bank 
preferences, the interests of credit ratings agencies will be analyzed and the 
importance of international institutions will be considered in testing the hypothesis 
specifically focusing on such institutions.
For each case, the empirical details will be consistently presented in a 
chronological time order. The body of each case study will be divided into three 
sections, see Table 1 below:
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Years Description
Up to 1988 Background Each case country’s preferences and role in the 
negotiation of the Basel Accord. Also considered will be the nature of 
each case country’s credit risk regulations before the Basel 
negotiations.
1988-92 First Period Implementation The earliest stages of the 
implementation of the Basel Accord, including each case country’s 
transitional arrangements until full implementation in 1992. Also 
considered will be the domestic and international politics leading to the 
1992 amendment to the Basel Accord.
1993-2000 Second Period Implementation The continued interactions between 
various domestic and international actors regarding the appropriateness 
of particular elements of implementation in light of numerous years of 
application of the Basel rules; also the politics of the major 1996 Basel 
Accord amendment for market risk.
Table 1: Chronological Ordering of Comparison Case Studies
This historical division is arbitrary, yet it does serve several heuristic functions. The 
first time period (1985-8) allows us to focus specifically on the pre-Basel Accord 
capital adequacy regimes of each state, details of which will be critical for addressing 
the relationship between a state’s pre-Basel rules, macroeconomic climate, and Basel 
Accord negotiating position. The second period (1988-1992) corresponds to the first 
period of the quantitative dataset and initial period hypotheses. The third (1993-2000) 
corresponds to the second period dataset. By dividing the qualitative analyses in this 
way it will be possible to compare the qualitative case results to the quantitative 
results for the first and second periods.
In order to ensure that a tight comparison is drawn between the hypotheses— 
acting here as “sign posts”—and the rich, empirical data, each of the two 
implementation periods will be followed by a Hypothesis Review section. These 
sections endeavor to indicate if and how the theoretical statements developed in 
Chapter 3 can help explain implementation outcomes. Attention will also be given to
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highlighting any explanatory variables that are inductively uncovered for each case 
but were not considered in Chapter 3. Also, these sections aim to highlight the 
weaknesses of a qualitative versus a quantitative approach for analyzing uncovered 
implementation outcomes when appropriate.
4. Aggregate Introduction to the Cases
As the cases were chosen to corroborate and extend on some of the key quantitative 
findings contained in Chapters 3 and 4, a major criterion was to choose cases that 
provide variance on the explanatory and dependent variables. With regards the latter, 
and as illustrated in Table 2, France and Japan implemented credit-risk standards in 
1988 that approximated the minimum baseline requirements set out in the Accord and 
largely maintained these interpretations over time, though Japan did strengthen their 
standards in one respect after 1992. The United States and Germany, by contrast, 
initially implemented much stricter regulations than required, though each gradually 
relaxed their rigorous regulations in the early 1990s. Thus, by 1992, the three 
countries experienced risk-capital regime convergence. The variance in these states’ 
rules—as measured by the standard deviation statistic in Table 2—fell from 2.06 to 
0.96 between the two periods. There is thus fairly wide variation in implementation 
results among the four case countries.
These cases also provide variance on the explanatory variables that have been 
tested. First, the three had widely varying pre-Basel capital adequacy standards.
Table 3 presents the PREBASEL index broken into four component indices. 
Remember from Chapter 4  that the index measures definitions of primary 
(PREBASEL t i e r i )  and secondary capital (PREBASEL t ie r 2)  with 1 -4  scales with 
greater values indicating greater stringency. The maintenance of a risk-weighting
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assets framework (PREBASEL r w )  was a dummy variable scored as “1” if such a 
system were implemented prior the Accord. The second pre-Basel capitalization 
measure (PREBASEL c a r s)  is these states’ largest banks’ capital adequacy ratios from 
1985 to 1988. As Table 3 suggests, Germany easily had the most limiting definitions 
of bank capital, scoring a maximum “4” for the pre-Basel measures of tiers 1 and 2 
capital. By contrast, France and Japan had the weakest definitions of capital but 
France was the only state to have a risk-capital weighting system in place. The US 
rules fall between France/Japan and Germany’s for severity, yet American banks were 
better capitalized than their European competitors. The average capital to (non-risk 
weighted) assets ratios for leading American banks from 1985 to 1987 was well over 
200 basis points higher than French and German banks during the period.10 The four 
countries thus started from widely varying positions when implementing the Basel 
standard.
USA France Germany Japan
CREG (t) 16 13 17 13
CREG (t +1) 15 13 15 14
Std Dev (t) =
Std Dev (t + 1) =
2.06
0.96
Table 2. Comparison of CREG index scores for case study countries
10 The term “basis points” will be utilized extensively to describe bank capital adequacy ratios. A basis 
point equals one-hundredth of a percentage point and its utility is the easier and more meaningful 
comparison of smaller percentages.
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Similar disparities are found on the other explanatory variables for each state. 
First, the dense institutional linkages between German regulators and their 
internationally active banks are generally believed to confer a great deal of political 
power to these states’ banks. Table 4 shows that German banks scored highest on the 
CAPTURE indicator with France not far behind in part because of the heavy 
concentration of the French banking system. By contrast, the highly fragmented and 
decentralized US and Japanese financial regimes are believed to weaken the power of 
banks to influence policy setting.11
Second, each country experienced a bout of banking market instability during 
the sample time periods. The US experienced a major banking crisis during the late 
1980s and a supply side credit crunch with accompanying banking market fragility 
during the early 1990s. Germany experienced macroeconomic problems after 
reunification that influenced bank profitability. France witnessed major bank 
insolvency in 1994 with the economic problems at Credit Lyonnais. Finally, the 
Japanese economy and financial system entered a decade long downturn, beginning 
with the collapse of the asset bubble around 1990. A problem with the quantitative 
indicators for economic instability is that they fail to capture degrees of crisis by 
adopting a binary fashion. It will be useful to approach the influences of these bouts 
of economic instability with a more differentiated perspective provided in the case 
studies.
Finally, some variance is witnessed in indicators of financial exposure and 
government ownership. The latter is presented in the form of “high” or “low” in
3Table ^  with these designations referring to whether the sample state scored above or 
below the mean financial exposure score for the 18 country dataset. According to
11 See Coleman (1996) for an account of the power position of banks in France, Germany, and the US 
and Hall (1993) for a discussion of Japan.
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these date, exposure was high for three of these states and low only for France. For 
government ownership, the German government exerts a much greater ownership 
stake than the US and Japan. Unfortunately, the government ownership date in the 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a) did not cover France, as French authorities did not 
provide answers to these researchers questionnaire on the topic. Yet, as the case study 
date suggest, France plays an important ownership role in their domestic banking 
system.
USA France Germany Japan
PREBASEL t i e r i 2 2 4 2
PREBASEL t i e r 2 4 3 4 3
PREBASEL r w 0 1 0 0
PREBASEL c a r s 4.9% 2.6% 2.8% 2.37%
MARKET 8 6 6 8
EXPOSURE High Low High High
INSTABILITY Yes No Yes No
INSTABILITYt+i Yes Yes No Yes
CAPTURE 0.16 0.31 0.37 0.18
GOV 0% n/a 42% 1%
Table 3. Comparison of explanatory variable values for case study countries
n/a = Data Not Available
Moreover, these cases were chosen for the ex ante importance that previous 
academic studies of the Accord have placed on these four countries. Apart from any 
variance on the explanatory and dependent variables of interest, the US, France, 
Germany, and Japan are the key political economic players in the Basel regime. As is
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well reported, much research into the Accord’s negotiation observed that the 
agreement was designed to benefit US banks at the expense of their French and 
Japanese competitors. Oatley and Nabors (1998) argued that the Accord was weapon 
designed by the United States to redistribute wealth from the relatively under­
capitalized French and Japanese banks to the Americans. Norton (1992) reported that 
Germany was not really involved in this redistribution as it was internationally 
isolated by being the one BCBS member to object to the Accord because it did not 
establish a strict enough international code. Thus by focusing on these four countries, 
it is possible to test the political and economic veracity of these well worn claims and, 
indeed, it seems that by looking at the implementation of the standards some doubt 
can be cast on these arguments.
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Chapter 6
Implementation of the Basel Accord in the United States
6.1. Introduction
In order to corroborate and elaborate upon the hypotheses of implementation 
identified in previous chapters, it is necessary to study cases in which we observe 
strict and liberal interpretations of the Basel Accord. In studying these varying 
degrees of Basel compliance with the case study method, I will look not only at a 
static measure of implementation severity, but observe how implementation has 
changed over time (1988-2002) and how the explanatory variables fare in explaining 
such change. The selection of the cases was thus made with the aim of maximizing 
the variation on the dependent variables, namely, the severity of the sample states’ 
interpretation of the Basel rules, as well as variation on driver variables that may be 
associated with differentiated state responses to the 1988 Accord.
In looking at the United States, this chapter focuses on a sample state that 
initially implemented a highly strict interpretation of the baseline Basel Accord rules 
in 1988. In fact, the quantitative index, presented in Chapter 4, indicated that the 
three federal American regulators—the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC)—collectively adopted the third most limited interpretation of the Basel rules in 
the G-10, save for Switzerland and Germany. Yet within months, the US bank 
supervisors began to publicly re-examine and then amend their initial interpretations. 
These revisions were dramatic and brought the United States into conflict with fellow 
Basel Committee members who objected to the Federal Reserve Board’s increasingly 
liberal interpretations of regulatory capital, which violated the Basel rules. This turn
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of events itself is instructive given the orthodox view that the Basel Accord was, in 
part, an American “hegemonic” effort to force fellow G-10 members to adopt stricter 
bank capital regulations.1
A key goal of this chapter will thus be to understand why the US exhibited 
such volatility in its capital adequacy regulations over a relatively short period of 
time. The chapter will advance two key arguments. First, the United States’ decision 
to implement a highly restrictive definition of capital and risk-weighting categories in 
1988 was the result of the crippling funding crisis that engulfed much of the US 
financial services marketplace in the mid to late 1980s. American politicians 
demanded that the federal banking supervisors end years of inter-agency dispute over 
capital adequacy regulation and adopt a stricter regulatory code that ensured the 
soundness and stability of the country’s banks. Though the large money center banks 
of New York, Chicago, and San Francisco argued that such regulations would 
threaten their internationally competitive positions, their influence over the policy­
making process, never strong, was further weakened by the political perception that 
their reckless behavior has created the banking crisis. As a result, the US departed 
from previous regulatory practice to adopt a very strict capital standard.
Second, the gradual loosening of America’s rules resulted, initially, from the 
perceived impact of these restrictive capital standards. By the early 1990s, the US 
entered a recession that some blamed on a supply-side credit crunch created by the 
Basel Accord. This resulted in the widening of the domestic political economy’s 
interest in the Basel standards from the relatively narrow confines of the financial 
services policy network to a broad spectrum of business and consumer interests that 
relied on bank credits for their core funding. Politicians that had once mandated that
1 Most accounts of the Basel Accord’s negotiation adopt this position either explicitly or implicitly. 
The most rigorous elaboration of these arguments is advanced in Oatley and Nabors (1998).
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the federal regulators negotiate the Basel Accord and adopt a strict domestic code 
now argued that forbearance be practiced and the rules loosened. The balance sheets 
of the largest commercial banks were now in a stronger position than in 1988 and they 
were emboldened to lobby for changes in the capital regime. These interests were 
successful in effecting regulatory change and these changes went largely 
unchallenged through 2000.
The US case study lends a great deal of empirical support to the economic 
stability hypothesis. Yet the two periods of economic instability produced distinct 
results on the behavior of the US banking supervisors. The distinction may be 
explained by a feedback process in the bank regulatory regime that allowed some 
degree of regulatory learning about the impact of capital standards by the financial 
services policy network from 1988 to the early 1990s. In the initial implementation 
period, the bank crisis led to a departure from the extant US regulatory practice—path 
dependence was not a political option in 1988. Yet, the onset of a second period of 
financial instability led to a return to some elements of the pre-1988 capital regime.
The investigation of these events will begin, in Section 6.2, with a review of 
the US bank regulatory regime and a history of America’s capital adequacy regulatory 
policy until the completion of the Basel Accord negotiations in July 1988. This 
historical sketch is longer than those presented in the other case studies and stretches 
back about fifty years. This seems justified in order to investigate whether the capital 
adequacy policy volatility witnessed from 1988 emerged only after the creation of the 
Accord or reflects a more general pattern of prudential regulatory policy. Only a 
longitundal study with several decades of data can facilitate this investigation.
Section 6.3 will then provide a detailed analysis of the shape of America’s initial 
interpretation of the Basel rules from 1988-1992, what was termed the “first
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implementation period” in previous chapters. The section will question why the US 
adopted such a strict interpretation of the Basel rules, and attempt to elaborate upon 
and falsify the implementation hypotheses introduced in Chapter 3. Section 6.4 will 
conduct a similar exercise for the second implementation period, 1993-2000, and seek 
to adopt a fuller empirical and theoretical understanding of the evolution of America’s 
capital regime during this twelve-year period of time. Each of the two sections 
investigating implementation will conclude with “Hypothesis Review” sections that 
summarize how the presented qualitative evidence supports or refutes the hypotheses 
discussed in previous chapters. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2. Background
By some accounts, the United States exercised market power in order to coerce the G- 
10 countries’ acquiescence to the Basel Accord. Such views conclude that the, “US 
proposal for capital adequacy regulations was not motivated by concern about 
international financial stability, but by a need to satisfy competing [domestic] interest 
group and voter pressures...” and thus, “linkages between joint gains and the Basle 
Accord are tenuous at best.” Econometric research has been mixed when testing the 
latter point on the distributions of the Accord’s wealth gains and losses, yet political 
scientists have provided overwhelming support for the former argument on the 
formative influence of US market power in the Accord’s formation.
As described in Chapter 2, this argument posits that the Federal Reserve 
employed the assistance of the Bank of England to coerce Japan and then the entire 
Basel Committee to adopt an agreement demanded by the American Congress and 
banking industry. The interests of the US in shaping this international effort reflected
2 Oatley and Nabors (1998:36), bracketed commented added to original text.
3 For an extensive review of the economics research into the affects of the Basel Accord on bank 
profitability see Basel Committee (1999).
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domestic concerns over inadequate banking regulations amid the savings and loan and 
LDC debt crises of the early 1980s. Members of Congress required the three federal 
bank supervisors to adopt stricter domestic regulations to ensure electoral support 
from constituencies inundated with media reports of the government’s bailout of 
reckless banks. While politicians wanted to be perceived to be doing something about 
the crises by their constituents, the banks themselves argued that the unilateral 
tightening of regulations would further depress their international competitiveness. 
The solution to these concerns was America’s determination to secure an inter-state 
capital adequacy standard.
6.2.1. History o f Capital Adequacy Regulation
The link between bank solvency crisis and the drive for regulatory reformulation is 
not unique in the American banking policy community. Financial services policy 
change, in general, tends to be sluggish given the pluralistic nature of American 
public policy making and regulatory learning often seems to emerge only in response 
to immediate political or economic crisis. This is especially the case in banking 
regulation. Policy-making authority is divided between the two houses of the federal 
Congress, three federal regulators, fifty state-level legislatures and banking 
commissions, the judiciary, and the executive office of the President.4 Many banks 
are subject to more than one regulatory regime. The commercial banking marketplace 
is also highly fractured between state and a wide variety of nationally licensed banks.5 
These banks do not have a common associational or peak organization and their 
interests are thus separately represented at the various levels of the federal policy­
making structure. This state and firm level fracturing, “produce a rather reactive,
4 Coleman (1996:154-5).
5 National banks can be further sub-divided into money center banks, super-regional banks, and trust 
and custody banks. See “26 Big Banks Need to Raise Equity,” American Banker, 11 December 1987.
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slow-moving policy process where narrow coalitions of interests and legislators can 
impede policy change”6 until crisis makes change unavoidably necessary.
This can be observed through a brief history of capital adequacy regulation in 
the United States. Before the 1980s crises, US capital regulations were largely 
informal and, perhaps, minimally enforced. Though the twentieth century has been a 
historical period of declining capital ratios for banking institutions, as illustrated (with 
a very limited capital definition) in Figure 6.1. US banks have only been subjected to 
explicit, operational capital requirements since 1981. Norton (1992:14) notes that 
before the 1980s, the, “decline in bank capital levels and the bank collapses endemic 
to the depression (and for that matter, to bank failures since then) give no indication 
that capital levels were critical: loss of public confidence leading to illiquidity, 
mismanagement and fraud have been and remain the primary culprits.” Formal 
capital regulations were quite minimal and were static measures prescribing levels of 
capital necessary for bank formation. Capital standards for the counterparty risks of 
banks already in operation were, “largely internalized in non-rule oriented exam and 
supervisory practices”8 and varied a great deal across different federal and state bank 
regulators.9 It is also possible that these informal rules were minimally enforced; 
prior to 1983 US federal regulators did not possess the legal authority to issue capital 
directives.
6 Coleman (1996:154).
7 Calomiris (2000:54), provides evidence suggesting that capital requirements may have also been 
utilized in the 19th century for a variety of other aims. One example was to encourage the opening of 
banks in underserved rural areas where there was little incentive for banks to operate. In such areas, 
capital requirements were lowered, especially by state regulators, to encourage bank expansion to these 
areas. Thus there may have been a variety of uses for capital adequacy regulation in the 19* and, 
perhaps, early 20th centuries which had little to do with managing banking risks.
S Norton (1992:14).
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Figure 6.1.
Capital Ratios for Leading 10 US Banks: 1900-1980
Capital defined as common stock, disclosed reserves, and retained earnings 
(Source: American Banker, various issues)
Yet after the Depression and before the Basel Accord, US regulators 
experimented with a variety of new regulatory measures of risk-based capital to 
address the post-war slump in ratios. The preferences that the US took into the Basel 
negotiations, and even into the early stages of implementation were the product of a 
30-year long debate among federal bank regulators over the concept of a risk- 
weighted capital regulation. The first shot of this bureaucratic debate was fired in the 
1950s when the Federal Reserve Board adopted, for internal exam purposes, a 
simplistic capital-to-risk-adjusted-assets approach that loosely identified a broad 
category of risk assets through the deduction, from the total assets base, of relatively 
low risk instruments (e.g., government securities).10 Although Kapstein (1989) argues 
that the US learned the risk-weighted assets (RWA) approach from Britain during the 
1980s11, this 1950s regulation represented the first attempt by an American regulator
10 See Federal Reserve Board Form FR 363 (1956).
11 See Kapstein (1989:338). 1 would not necessarily disagree that US regulators, especially the Fed, 
consulted with the Bank o f England about RWA regulation in the 1980s, yet Kapstein argues that the 
RWA nature of the US-UK bilateral accord and the Basel Accord demonstrate a tempering of US 
power with knowledge. He argues that if  the US had wanted to impose its standard on the world in 
1988 it would have been through a non-RWA approach that had characterized US regulations prior to 
the Accord. Yet the exchange o f learning between the US and UK during the 1980s led the US to 
adopt another country’s capital regulation system— thus, he argues, demonstrating the limits o f a
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to adopt a Basel Accord-style approach.
Yet this regulatory innovation effected little actual change on banks’ balance 
sheet management. The OCC, the leading bank regulator during the 1950s, discarded 
the method and adopted a non-risk sensitive capital-to-assets approach. The OCC 
was able to dominate the federal regulatory agenda during this period as it was 
charged with the oversight of all national banks not organized in a bank holding 
company network.12 With this authority and with little legislative input, the OCC 
pushed the Fed and FDIC to adopt its non-risk-weighted capital method, culminating 
in the adoption of the Uniform Interagency Bank Rating System in 1978, which
1 'Xostensibly created a unified federal capital standard based on the OCC system. It is 
not clear that much real regulatory convergence actually occurred and evidence 
suggests that the Fed persistently adopted a stricter capital standard that lead scores of 
banks, in the 1970s, to arbitrage the fragmented regulatory structure by exiting the 
Fed system to take advantage of the looser regulations of the OCC/FDIC.14
The most significant departure from the unified standard, and the most 
pertinent to future Basel negotiations was the FDIC’s 1981 decision to significantly 
tighten its capital standards and officially defect from the interagency standard. By 
1981, the FDIC had grown in relative bureaucratic influence to the OCC/Fed,15 and 
set out a highly original capital assessment scheme that included a threshold level of 
adjusted equity capital at 6 percent of total assets and emphasized a narrow, equity-
power-centered explanation for the Accord. This does not seem to be exactly the case as the Fed 
experimented with the RWA procedure from 1950 until the Accord. Although an RWA approach was 
not consistently applied by the Fed, Norton (1992) argues that it was well considered by the Fed, OCC, 
and FDIC well before the 1980s.
^Responsibility for bank holding companies was given to the Federal Reserve Board after the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956.
13 Ibid.
14 Mayne (1972).
15 This can be most easily operationalized by looking at the number and size of banks regulated by the 
FDIC. By the December 1982, the FDIC supervised 8632 commercial banks (60 percent of the US 
total) representing 22 percent of total bank assets. See Norton (1992:20).
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centered, definition of regulatory capital that included: common stock, perpetual 
preferred stock, capital surplus, retained profits, contingency reserves, mandatory 
convertible debt instruments, and loan loss reserves.16 As presented in Table 6.1, this 
capital definition largely mirrored that adopted as Tier 1 in the Basel Accord with the 
main exceptions being the inclusion of debt and loan loss reserves in the FDIC
definition.
1981 FDIC Capital Regulation 1988 Basel Accord
•Common stock •Common stock
•Preferred stock •Preferred stock
•Capital surplus •Disclosed reservesI  Tier 1
•Retained profits •Retained profits
•Contingency reserves •Minority interests
•Mandatory convertible debt instruments •Undisclosed reserves




MINIMUM RATIO: 6 percent MINIMUM RATIO: 4/8 percent
Table 6.1. Comparison of FDIC-Basel Accord Capital Definitions
The severity of this definition brought the FDIC into conflict with the 
OCC/Fed and a “regulatory dialectic of sorts was being joined in 1981 among the 
bank regulators regarding the formulation of capital adequacy standards...”17 In 
opposition to the FDIC approach, the Fed and the OCC, after intense lobbying by 
their constituent banks, adopted a two-tier capital framework which portended the 
bifurcated Basel model and included limited-life preferred stock, subordinated notes,
1 o
and a 5 percent trigger ratio, as indicated in Table 6.2.
This early 1980s regulatory conflict produced two long-term consequences. 
First, the resulting twin level capital structure adopted by the Fed/OCC, in opposition




to the FDIC, lead to considerable capital financing innovation by banking institutions. 
The various qualifications applied to instruments qualifying as Tier 2 capital led
banks to engineer numerous innovative variations of these capital species. In fact, so
1982 FDIC 1982 Fed/OCC 1988 Basel
•Common stock •Common stock •Common stock
•Preferred stock •Preferred stock •Preferred stock
•Capital surplus •Capital surplus •Disclosed reserves
•Retained profits •Retained profits •Retained profits
•Contingency reserves •Contingency reserves •Minority interests
•Convertible debt •Convertible debt •Undisclosed reserves
•Loan loss reserves •Loan loss reserves •Revaluation reserves
•Limited life preferred stock •General provisions
•Subordinated debt •Hybrid debt capital 
•Subordinated debt
MIN RATIO: 6 percent MIN RATIO: 5 percent MIN RATIO: 4/8 percent
Table 6.2. Comparison of 1982 FDIC-Fed/OCC Capital Definitions
________ (Bold indicates the designation of Tier 1 capital)________
much capital structure innovation was being exercised that the Fed and the 
Comptroller found it desirable, in 1982, to issue a joint statement providing more 
specific criteria as to whether a particular types of bank security qualified as Tier l .19 
This early example of capital regulatory arbitrage foreshadowed the short term nature 
of Basel capital standard setting as banks will continually seek to engineer 
instruments to circumvent existing regulations requiring regulators to continually re­
set the regulatory bar in order to adjust to changing market realities at a velocity 
seldom seen in other areas of economic regulation. As a result of the arbitrage 
incentives established by the two-tier framework, the Fed/OCC standard may have 
created a preference by US banks for such a two-level structure at the international 
level, helping explain the content of the 1988 Accord as well as some of the dynamics
19 Norton (1992:21).
20 Kane (1991) discusses this concept in terms of a Hegelian dialectic between regulators and banks. 
New forms of regulation (synthesis) lead to attempts by banks to circumvent the rules (antithesis) 
requiring regulators to adjust in order to produce another regulation (re-synthesis) in an infinitely 
iterated game. Reinicke (1995) applies this logic to the understanding of capital adequacy regulation in 
the United States during die 1980s and 1990s.
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01 « of its implementation in the US. Second, this federal regulatory battle made it
increasingly clear that the US required a clear-cut single capital standard; as Norton
(1996) observed as “the more substantive or procedural differences in regulatory
approaches surfaced, the argument for achieving uniformity as to definition and to
application of capital adequacy standards became more compelling.” In the early
1980s, this became increasingly more compelling at the political level and contributed
to the American push for the Basel Accord.
6.2.2. Negotiation o f the Basel Accord
This politicization of bank capital regulation emerged in the early 1980s as 
Congress was forced to respond to the increasing economic weakness of America’s 
most critical lending institutions. During the 1980s, the commercial banking and
9^savings and loans industries suffered their worst performances since the 1930s. By 
the middle part of the decade, macroeconomic conditions and unsound mortgage 
lending practices combined to render two-thirds of the nation’s thrifts insolvent. The 
result was a USD 100 billion deficit at the taxpayer-funded Federal Savings & Loan 
Corporation and Congress’ nationalization of more than 400 thrifts, constituting 
USD175 billion of assets. The entire thrift regulatory regime was reorganized through 
the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989 and the lead thrift regulator, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, was 
dissolved.24 America’s commercial banks fared only slightly better as more banks 
became insolvent (1037) in the 1980s than at any decade outside the 1930s. By the 
mid-1980s, aggregate bank retum-on-assets hit its lowest level in thirty years; retum-
21 Kelley (1983).
22 Norton (1992:20).
23 Savings and Loan institutions are also commonly referred to as S&L’s and thrifts in the United States 
or building societies in the United Kingdom.
24 Kaufinan (1992:95).
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on-equity fell to it lowest mark in twenty five years; as illustrated in Figure 6.1, bank 
capital-to-assets ratios fell to their lowest point in history.25
The commercial bank solvency crisis is generally linked to imprudent 
domestic and international loan decisions taken during the 1970s and early 1980s. 
American-led bank syndications accumulated, on a global basis, the largest exposure 
to lesser-developed countries’ debt with such loans totaling 93-199 percent of 
commercial banks’ capitalization.26 By 1982, Mexican debtors alone owed US banks
7 7
USD23 billion or 46 percent of the top seventeen American banks’ capitalization. 
Without a RWA capital standard in place, large commercial banks’ incentives were to 
quickly build-up capital through the building of large risky, though potentially 
profitable, positions in the banking book. Many of these loans were channeled into 
the booming housing market through real-estate investment trusts (REITS) to 
disastrous results as the third quarter 1992 problem real estate loan chart, in Table 6.3,
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mdicates. The largest, money center, banks fared the worst with bank asset size 
being highly correlated with the mean percentage of real estate loan problems.
Asset size of bank
Loan category under $100m $100-$lb $lb-$10b Over $10b
All real estate 1.64 2.18 4.05 7.07
Construction 2.76 5.62 12.65 21.96
Commercial 2.10 3.01 5.33 10.84
1-4 Family Home 1.21 1.23 1.50 1.76
7Q
Table 63. Percentage of problem real estate loans by bank size (1992, Q3)
(Source: Boyd and Gertler 1993)
23 Rogers (1993:14).
26 Data presented in DeCamoy (1990) though obtained in Oatley and Nabors (1998). This figure 
compares to 27-82 percent for the UK and less than 55 percent for Japan at the same period of time.
27 Oatley and Nabors (1998:42).
28 Rogers (1993:13).
29 Percentage of loans overdue by more than 90 days, by type of loan.
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In light of these crises, Congress was forced to adopt an increasingly proactive 
regulatory agenda that centered on bank capital guidelines. Evidence suggests that by 
the mid-1980s, members of Congress were placed under enormous pressure by their 
domestic constituencies to ensure that taxpayer funds were not utilized in the bailout 
of what were perceived to be reckless commercial banks. A 1983 Reagan 
administration plan to “transfer ownership of a portion of developing country debt 
from commercial banks to the public sector”30 by increasing America’s contribution 
to the IMF by USD8.4 billion to would be dispensed to heavily indebted LDCs, was 
not well-received by Congress. Illustrative of this are comments from Ferdinand St. 
Germain, then chairman of the House of Representatives Banking Committee that, “at 
a time when millions stand in unemployment lines and thousands of small businesses 
are filing bankruptcy petitions, the idea of an international bailout for adventurous US 
bankers may not be the most popular idea on the legislative agenda.”
The ultimate product of the banking crisis was the creation of the 1983 
International Lending Supervision Act (ILSA). This conferred capital directive 
enforcement powers to federal bank regulators and demanded that they seek to 
provide a unified capital regulatory regime, both among themselves and among their 
international peers. Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker objected to Congress’ 
input into what had largely been an apolitical region of regulatory policy-making and 
supported the soundness of the 1982 Fed/OCC rules. Yet, driven by political 
imperatives in response to a systemic financial crisis, Congress overruled Volcker’s
30 Oatley and Nabors (1998:43).
31 US House 1982,2, from Oatley and Nabors (1998:43).
32 This was important in light of the OCC v. Federal National Bank o f Bellaire, Texas (1983) decision 
in which the New Orleans Court of Appeals ruled that Bank of Bellaire was not required to comply 
with an OCC capital guideline, thus bringing into question the legal ability of federal regulators to issue 
enforceable capital regulations. Congress aimed to address this issue by specifically providing the 
legal basis by which enforceable capital directive could be issued.
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position.33
The immediate result of ILSA was the intensification of the debate among the 
Fed, OCC, and FDIC over the form and content of capital regulations. Under the 
pressure of Congress and the new leadership of the Fed, however, considerable 
convergence was quickly achieved. By mid-1984, the three agencies separately 
published new capital guidelines that resembled the 1982 Fed/OCC procedures in 
most respects (see Table 6.2). This level of cooperation escalated after the May 1984 
failure of Continental Illinois, the eighth-largest bank in the US. In response, the Fed 
re-initiated its interest in a capital-to-risk-weighted assets approach. Unlike the 
1950s, when the Fed’s RWA program was largely vetoed by the OCC, the RWA 
approach was the centerpiece of another joint proposal issued in January 1986.34 The 
Fed was able to dominate regulatory policy-making during this period, thus 
supplanting the OCC, as its primary constituent banks, bank holding companies, 
exploded in size from just 53 in 1956 to roughly 5,400 in 1983 and included the 
money center banks of New York and California.35
With this newly found bureaucratic strength, no doubt reinforced by Congress’ 
demands for a strong regulatory response to 1980s crises, the Fed was able to 
dominate the OCC/FDIC in the negotiation of the Basel Accord and largely presented 
the US position in Basel. The Fed successfully initiated the US-UK capital adequacy 
accord in July 1986, as has been detailed in Chapter 2, and pushed its agenda to 
include loan-loss reserves, a critical component in BHC capital in 1987, in the 
bilateral accord’s definition of primary capital and over the opposition of the 
OCC/FDIC. As Vernon et al (1991) describe, “[t]he Federal Reserve presented its 
position [on loan loss reserves] to the OCC as an issue on which the Bank of England
33 Oatley and Nabors (1998:44).
34 Vernon, Spar, and Tobin (1991:141).
35 Norton (1992:15).
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would not budge. But when the OCC raised the issue with the Bank of England, the 
OCC discovered that the Bank supported its position, not the position of the Federal 
Reserve.”36
Yet, without the political and economic imperatives generated by the 1980s 
bank crises, it seems likely that Congress’ efforts to enforce a uniform regulatory 
response at the federal level would have failed as they did in the past. In this 
instance, the Basel Accord may not have been created without a strong US 
determination. Yet, driven by political imperatives in response to a systemic financial 
crisis, Congress overruled the regulators’ position, and the US actively pursued the 
creation of the Basel Accord. Money center banks were resigned to the fact that 
Congress would need to be seen enforcing new punishing standards on them and 
supported the creation of the Accord so as to avoid the asymmetric application of new 
capital rules to just the United States.38 This convergence of legislative, regulatory, 
and bank action did not persist beyond the negotiation of the Accord, however, and a 
new policy battlefield was joined during the agreement’s implementation in 1988.
6.3. First Period Implementation of the Basel Accord (1988-1992)
The first shot of the implementation battle originated from the regulators’ individual 
interpretations of the Basel Accord’s rules into their bank exam procedures. Like 
many of their G-10 peers, the Fed, OCC, and FDIC did not require enabling 
legislation from the legislature to convert the Basel standards into their own 
administrative guidelines.39 Through ILSA, Congress could continue to exert 
pressure on the supervisors to harmonize their standards, yet it was these supervisory
36 Vemon, Spar, and Tobin (1991:144).
37 Norton (1992) covers this history in extensive detail.
38 Oatley and Nabors (1998:44).
39 The relevant rules are set out in 1 and 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 3 (relating to the 
OCC), Part 325 (FDIC), and Parts 208 (relating to the Fed).
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bodies themselves that determined the severity of the rules adopted in the first 
instance. The result was, initially, a strict interpretation by all three federal regulators. 
These interpretations were made in 1987-90 and were due for implementation at the 
end of the transition period at the end of 1992.
The US adopted a strict interpretation in each area of discretionary policy, 
save for one area of policy defection from the FDIC. The converging effects of ILSA 
were clearly still important when the implementation phase commenced as the three 
main federal regulators adopted nearly identically strict interpretations, despite the 
objections of their constituent banks. These interpretations incorporated the baselines 
created in the Accord in all instances and went well beyond the minima in several 
broad areas:
• First, the US regulators determined that the Accord would form part of the 
standard exam procedures for every bank domiciled in the country. Though 
the Accord required only the G-lO’s international banks’ compliance, US 
regulators applied the agreement to all state and national banks and bank 
holding companies, regardless of their international ambitions so as to affect a 
level domestic regulatory regime.40
• Second, banks were subjected to rigorous capital adequacy ratio requirements. 
In order to achieve the highest regulatory exam scores, banks would have to 
maintain capital adequacy ratios in excess of the 4 percent (tier 1 capital) and 
8 percent (total capital) levels 41
• Third, a 100 percent risk-weight was assigned for mortgage loans. The US 
regulators had fought the European negotiators about the mortgage risk-weight 




as a concession. Back in the domestic policy arena, the US authorities 
imposed their original preferences for a 100 percent weighting with the 
justification that favoring classes of loans without economic justification was 
tantamount to credit allocation.42
• Finally, a more limited definition of regulatory capital was created. From tier 
1, intangible assets (other than goodwill) were restricted and only 25 percent 
of a bank holding company’s non-cumulative, perpetual preferred stock could 
qualify. From tier 2, general loan loss reserves and asset revaluation reserves 
were prohibited. In addition, hidden reserves (from unrealized securities 
capital gains) were excluded as America’s Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAPs) prohibited them 43
In addition, the three regulators discussed the imposition of capital adequacy 
standards that went well beyond the policies addressed by the Accord. In particular, 
the regulators and some members of Congress wanted banks to put more capital aside 
for other business risks than the credit risks addressed by the Accord, particularly 
interest rate risk.44 Negotiations on this standard were protracted, however, as the 
OCC resisted demands from the Senate Banking Committee to implement measures 
for interest rate risk immediately by claiming that such measures were complex and 
took time to negotiate. As a compromise, the regulators required their banks to meet 
a tier 1 to non-risk weighted assets ratio of at least 3 percent45 This “leverage ratio”
*2American Banker, 12 July 1988.
43 Rehm and Duffy (1987).
44 Blanden (1998:17).
45 The minimum ratio was 3 percent for banks that received the highest possible regulator exam ratings. 
Other banks would have to maintain a 4-7 percent ratio. See Hall (1993:65).
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was to serve as a proxy for non-credit risk until agreement on more formal standards 
could be reached in Washington.46
For the most part, these rules were adopted as part of a united Fed-OCC-FDIC 
front without a great deal of bureaucratic in fighting. Yet, as in past efforts to 
harmonize capital standards, some discord did emerge between the FDIC and the 
national bank regulators. In particular, the FDIC refused to exclude goodwill and 
cumulative, perpetual preferred stock 47 In 1988, the FDIC director informed the 
House Banking Committee that such forms of capital were important for many of its 
smaller, regional-based, constituents. In addition, the director objected to the 
universal applicability of the standard and claimed that the Accord provided too large 
a record keeping burden for small-cap, regional banks which, by money center 
standards, were already very well capitalized and did not have such large balance 
sheet exposures to lesser developed markets. It took over a year of bureaucratic 
debate before the FDIC, under enormous pressure from the Fed, OCC and Congress, 
brought their interpretation into line 48 Yet, it would not be the first Basel-related 
defection by the FDIC.
This bureaucratic discord was brief and minor relative to the objections raised 
by the American financial marketplace. Though the money center institutions had 
supported the Accord in order to avoid being asymmetrically regulated relative to 
their international competitors, both they and regional banks lobbied against every 
discretionary interpretation made by the federal supervisors as these effectively 
unlevelled the playing field created in Basel.
46 Many bankers and financial economists observed that the leverage ratio may have created a heavier 
regulatory burden than the Basel Accord. Martin Feldstein (1992), former Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisors and economics professor, argued that the non-risk weighted nature of the 
requirement punished banks far more than the risk-sensitive Basel approach.
47 The 1988 Basel Accord prohibited the inclusion of both these items as allowable tier 1 or 2 capital.
48 Rehm (1988).
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The key debate centered on the 100 percent weighting assigned to home 
mortgage credits. The chief fear was that money center banks would need to shift 
their lending away from mortgage loans as the opportunity costs were increased for 
lending to lower weighted activities (such as loans to OECD governments), other high 
weighted activities where the rate of return was generally greater (loans to the private 
sector), or towards off-balance sheet instruments. In particular, the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), a congressionally chartered organization 
that makes secondary mortgage markets, argued that the weighting would 
disadvantage them relative to foreign competitors subject to a 50 percent weighting, 
and to securities issued by the US Government National Mortgage Association 
(Ginnie Mae).49 A spokesman for Freddie Mac argued that placing their “securities at 
a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis Ginnie Mae's will also have the unfortunate and 
unnecessary effect of increasing the cost of conventional mortgages for 
homebuyers.”50 This fear led to a widening of the public debate over the Accord’s 
interpretation to include a number of non-financial institutions such as consumers 
organizations and home building associations who were anxious to stabilize prices in 
the industry after the Savings and Loan crisis of the early 1980s.51
In addition to risk weights, the banking industry placed severe political 
pressure on their supervisors to amend their regulatory capital definitions. First, many 
bankers observed that there was no financial logic in excluding loan loss reserves, 
which formed a critical component of the capital base of most G-10 domiciled banks. 
The Chairman of Citicorp observed that, “unlike pollution standards, which are 
supposed to be based on scientific knowledge, new and constantly changing
49 Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae perform largely the same function, yet the latter carries an explicit
government guarantee and receive a 0 percent weighting. 
r° Rehm (1988).
51 Wall Street Journal, 24 December 1991.
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definitions of bank capital do not rest on such solid ground... as part of the Basle 
Accord, US regulators threw out loan loss reserves as parts of capital and all the 
sudden, US banks were under-capitalized—this massive shift of policy went 
unnoticed by most except those immediately affected.” The American Bankers 
Association concurred with this view and argued that, with loan loss reserves 
included, “our members continue to believe that the banking system is adequately 
capitalized and until the banking agencies can demonstrate that this is not the case, the 
implementation of any risk-based standards should be delayed.”53
Beyond loan loss reserves, money center banks were joined by the FDIC in 
objecting to the treatment of bank holding companies’ capital. In the first instance, 
America’s largest banks, led by Citibank, argued that the application of the Accord at 
the holding company level created, yet another, competitive disadvantage for 
America’s largest banks. The banks also argued, with the support of FDIC chairman 
L. William Seidman, that extending the Accord to holding companies compromised 
the legal firewalls built between BHCs and their subsidiaries. In letters to the Fed, the 
banks argued that the application of the Accord would cause the public to perceive 
that the holding company is covered by the same protection that the government 
provides the bank.54 To exacerbate these problems, the Fed (the lead regulator of 
BHCs) excluded goodwill and cumulative preferred stock from the tally of allowable 
tier 1 capital though these instruments formed a critical component in holding 
companies’ capital bases.
When confronted with these complaints in 1988-9, the three federal regulators 
largely stood firm on their interpretations. Though, as already discussed, the FDIC 
made some effort to provide regulatory forbearance to their region-oriented




constituents by adopting a looser capital definition, the OCC/Fed argued that the 
binds created by the 1988 Accord limited their scope for independent action on behalf 
of their banks’ interests. In particular, Seidman suggested that the European 
Community would never agree to the acceptance of goodwill. The Fed’s Chairman, 
Alan Greenspan, observed that, “there are elements of this [the Accord] all of us 
would like to change, but we accept it as it is or we go back to the drawing board.”55
The only major exception to this position was announced several months after 
the interpretations were issued in August 1988. The Fed yielded to the money 
center’s demands for the inclusion of perpetual, cumulative preferred stock in tier 1 
for holding companies. Though these instruments were expressly prohibited by the 
Accord, the BHCs had lobbied especially hard on this issue as, according to Salomon 
Brothers, this instrument comprised USD5.6 billion of the aggregate American BHC 
capital base in 1988 and its allowance would save the holding companies USD1 
billion of equity in their efforts to comply with the Accord. Yet, the Fed did mandate 
several restrictions: only 25 percent of a BHCs’ cumulative stock could qualify as 
capital and the stock’s dividends could not be determined by auction. These were 
highly restrictive parameters as 40 percent of the total cumulative preferred stock base 
carried dividends determined by “Dutch” auction or were actually money market 
preferred stock issues.56 The Fed thus provided some regulatory relief to its 
constituents, over the objections of its banks and the FDIC, though it held firm on 
most of its 1988 interpretations.
For about three years, US banks worked towards compliance with these 
comparatively rigid new capital requirements. Yet as America’s largest banks raised
55 Ibid.
56 Some adjustable rate cumulative preferred stock was permitted if the dividends were tied to interest- 
sensitive benchmarks such as the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate. See American Banker, 23 August 
1988.
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their capital ratios, the broader economy shifted into a recession. Growth in gross 
domestic product slowed from 3.5 percent in 1989 to negative in 1991. More acutely, 
the slowdown was accompanied by a downturn in bank lending.
American politicians, again anxious to avoid blame for economic 
mismanagement, accused the federal regulators of implementing unnecessarily strict 
capital standards.57 Though Congress had insisted on tough capital standards in the 
late 1980s through ILSA and demanded that interest rate risk charges be set, now 
many members of Congress argued that American banks had been forced to hold too 
much capital relative to their international peers. As the 1992 legislative and 
Presidential elections neared, Washington was awash with plans to ignite bank 
lending to lift the macroeconomy out of its slump. In particular, the Bush 
administration issued a large package of proposals to reduce the solvency standards 
for savings and loans and commercial banks to encourage such lending.58
Though Greenspan objected to this political interference and claimed that the 
changes demanded would not ease lending practices, the Fed, the OCC and FDIC 
considered the loosening of America’s risk-capital regime as the Basel transitional 
period ended in 1992.
6.3. L Hypotheses Review: First Period o f Implementation
The key goal of a theoretical analysis of the first period interpretation of the Accord in 
the US is to account for a relatively strict interpretation. Though some regulatory 
reversion began to take hold by the early 1990s, the main theme in America from
57 Much economic research has explored whether the US regulator’s interpretation of the Basel rules 
did actually cause or exacerbate the credit shortage that emerged during die US recession of this period. 
Research has produced quite mixed results and little consensus appears to have emerged. For a review 
of much of this literature, see Basel Committee (1999).
58 See National Mortgage News, 24 February 1992.
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1988 to 1991 is that bankers had behaved irresponsibly during the 1980s and needed 
to be dealt with in a heavy handed manner.
These events provide a high level of support for the economic instability 
hypothesis. Severe financial crises during the 1980s made the tightening of financial 
regulations a political imperative so that path dependence was not an option in 
America. Regulators overrode the “path dependent” interests of their constituents and 
implemented a narrow definition of the Accord. In this regard, economic instability is 
positively correlated with a strict definition of the Accord. The long historical view 
perspective provided by the first part of this chapter suggests that this sort of 
regulatory response to a major macroeconomic dislocation is not without precedent as 
it was the events of the Great Depression of the 1930s that led regulators to severely 
restrict the activities and geographical reach of large, commercial intermediaries.
Due in part to these 1930s restrictions, American banks do not wield a great 
deal of political power at the best of economic times. They are numerous, highly 
diverse by income and market segment, geographically separated, and regulated by a 
fragmented regulatory structure. They thus suffered from a classic collective action 
problem in their efforts to coordinate a common offensive against their regulators’ 
interpretations. In addition, any influence that the banks may have ordinarily 
exercised on their regulator’s behavior was confounded by their weak financial 
position in the 1980s, the very public blame received for excessive risk-taking, and 
the high level of policy orchestration among the Federal Reserve, OCC, and FDIC.59 
There is thus very little support for the hypotheses that bankers’ preferences wielded 
much importance during the early years of the Accord’s interpretation^In addition, 
there is little evidence to support the view that these preferences were influenced by a
59 Reinicke (1995) comes to the astute conclusion that the financial crisis of the 1980s forced a high 
level of regulatory convergence among America’s three main federal bank regulators.
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desire to “signal” to the international market or access other states’ banking markets. 
American banks’ preferences seemed to be geared towards maintaining the status quo 
or, at least, preventing the further tightening of their capital standards.
However, these events may lend some rather indirect support to the “capture” 
hypothesis: weak US banks were unable to successfully influence their regulators’ 
interpretation of the Basel Accord. A more reliable test of this hypothesis requires a 
study of the impact of economic crisis on capital adequacy policy in a banking system 
in which banks wield greater political power. This will be investigated in the case of 
Germany in Chapter 7.
Little empirical support is afforded to the Regional Effects hypothesis under 
scrutiny. In particular, regional influences do not seem to have played a large role in 
either bankers or regulators preferences.
6.4. Second Period: Implementation of the Basel Accord (1993-2000)
As the previous section argued, the United States implemented one of the strictest 
initial interpretations of the Basel Accord. This section will illustrate that by 2000, 
the American risk-capital rules were considerably weaker and on par with the rules 
adopted by other industrialized states. Curiously, as the implementation period of the 
Accord proceeded, America’s solvency practices returned to the more informal, non­
rule oriented style that had characterized the pre-Basel era. The Fed, OCC, and the 
FDIC re-worked the severe risk-weighting framework, further extended the definition 
of allowable primary capital, and may have reduced the enforcement of capital 
directives. These policy reversions made the US open to the charge that its 
commercial banks may have started to earn regulation-related competitive advantages. 
Whether they did or not, many BCBS members made such accusations and a new
190
conflict emerged in Basel, only now it was the US that was targeted for maintaining 
weak capital regulations.
This section reviews these changes in America’s capital standards by 
examining three episodes. First, the federal regulator’s acquiescence to President 
Bush’s capital adequacy program will be discussed. This follows-on from the 
previous section as Bush endeavored to jump-start the ailing US economy in the run­
up to the 1992 presidential elections. Second, America’s controversial decision to 
allow tax-shielded preferred stock into its definition of tier 1 capital will be reviewed. 
Many BCBS members, especially Germany, considered this decision to be in 
violation of the spirit of the Accord and an international furore emerged. Finally, the 
Federal Reserve’s decision to permit asset revaluation reserves in tier 2 capital will be 
discussed. It was the Bank of Japan’s allowance of this capital instrument that had 
partially led the US Congress to demand the Basel Accord be negotiated in 1987. It is 
thus ironic that the US began to adopt this practice and it is instructive of the changes 
that occurred in regulation of banking risks during the 1990s.
As discussed in the last section, the political recriminations from the 1991-2 
recession and bank credit crunch produced great political pressure on the federal 
regulators. Though data released in 1993 indicated that both macroeconomic growth 
and national bank profitability had improved throughout 1992, the Federal Reserve 
remained pressured by politicians and banks to amend its Basel interpretations. In 
December 1993, this pressure resulted in the amendment of the Federal Reserve’s 
asset risk-weighting structure.60
The result was a halving of the capital that commercial banks were obligated 
to carry for the construction of multifamily housing loans. The reduction of
60 American Banker, March 1993.
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mortgages to the 50 percent weighting category eased the US risk-weighting standard 
into convergence with most other G-10 states. This was a dramatic step-down for the 
Fed as they had negotiated hard for the 100 percent weighting of these assets in Basel 
and had only allowed Germany and other committee members to assign a 50 percent 
weighting as part of the compromise to conclude the Accord.61 When the Fed had 
decided to apply a 100 percent weight in 1988, it had argued that applying a lower 
weight would essentially result in a system of government credit control; the 
government would simply be responding to the political pressure of particularistic 
interests for cheaper access to bank credit. In the end, Greenspan was accurate and 
the purpose and intended effect of this loosening was to target voters for the 
presidential and congressional election campaigns in November 1992.
The Fed did manage to defend its initial 100 percent weighting for quite some 
time. The announcement to reduce the risk-weight was not announced in the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin until December 1993, more than a year after President Bush called 
for change. Yet, it may be inferred that the broad political pressure placed on the Fed 
was simply too strong. As was discussed in the previous section, debate on this 
element of the Accord had expanded well beyond the relatively narrow confines of 
the banking policy network to include building and consumers organizations. In the 
end, the Fed conceded.
It should be observed that Fed’s acquiescence coincided with an improving 
macroeconomic environment and strengthening banking sector. America’s recession 
appeared over by 1993. Economic growth increased from just over 1 percent to 3 
percent from 1992 to 1993 while unemployment fell from 6.1 percent to 5.6 percent 
during the period.62 The pre-tax profits of BHCs increased by 92 percent over their
61 Federal Reserve Bulletin, 20 December 1993.
62 World Development Indicators (2001).
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1991 performance.63 More importantly, the country’s largest banks experienced a 
rapid acceleration in growth. As Figure 6.2 shows, unweighted tier 1 capital for the 
country’s largest banks increased from under 500 basis points in 1991 to nearly 700 
basis points by 1993 before levelling off. By the time that the Basel transition period 
ended in late 1992, US banks had total capital ratios nearly 200 basis points above the 
8 percent level. This increase does not seem to, at least solely, reflect the influence of 
the Accord as these bank’s CARs had experienced a significant drop from 1988 to 
1991 before rebounding. This seems to suggest that the end of the recession, rather 
than the effects of the Accord, produced these solvency improvements. By the time 
the Fed has thus given in to political pressure, American banks were returning to 
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Figure 6.2. Unweighted Tier 1 Capital Ratios for Top 10 US Banks,
1988-2000
(Source: The Banker, various issues)
More importantly, perhaps, the Federal Reserve began to dramatically concede 
to bankers’ demands to further widen the definition of regulatory capital throughout 
the 1990s. The key source of banker’s grievances with the Accord began to emerge 
when non-financial institutions began to issue tax-deductive preference shares in 
1994. American corporations had initiated the issue of these securities in late 1993
63 The Banker, March 1993.
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and US investment banks followed suit soon afterwards. These securities allow 
issuers to raise tax-shielded preferred stock. This form of equity was considerably 
cheaper than commercial banks’ existing capital raising methods, yet such 
instruments were not permitted by the Accord.64 They were of questionable 
international legality—even within the “soft law” rules of the Accord.
America’s largest banks insisted that the Accord disadvantaged them vis-a-vis 
domestic non-bank financial institutions because of the structure of America’s 
financial activity regulations. This situation was partly the result of then US 
regulations forbidding commercial banks entry into securities, insurance, and real 
estate markets. Since the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, American commercial banks’ 
capital has been regulated distinctly from securities firms, who are regulated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. The result is that banks and securities firms 
are subject to distinct capital adequacy rules; a fact that commercial banks have 
always indicated has provided them with a competitive disadvantage both in regard to 
domestic securities firms and with their international commercial bank competitors.
In this instance, non-bank financial institutions were not bound by the Basel Accord’s 
exclusion of tax-deductible issues.
On this occasion, however, the Federal Reserve was receptive to commercial 
banks’ concerns. In October 1996, the Fed approved the use of tax-deductible 
preferred stock as tier 1 capital. In practice, US banks could issue these securities 
through two methods. The first was to allow bank holding companies to establish 
operating companies similar to real-estate investment trusts (REITS), called Special 
Purpose Vehicles (SPVs). These SPVs would essentially be assigned real-estate 
assets and would then be allowed to issue tax-deductible preferred stock that would
64 This discussion will draw heavily from Euromoney, March 1998; M2 Presswire, 29 October 1998; 
The Economist 17 April 1999.
qualify as a minority interest. Many banks that did not have large real-estate holding 
complained that they would be disadvantaged by this system. By mid-1996, these 
banks suggested that BHCs be allowed to issue deeply subordinated debt as tax- 
deductive preferred stock and then “downstream” this to individual banks. In the 
Basel Accord, such minority interests are acceded tier 1 capital status. The Fed agreed 
to recognize this status if the stock issues met a set of minimum criteria.65
Though rumors on Wall Street suggested that federal and state tax authorities 
viewed these capital instruments as little more than a tax dodge, their use rapidly 
proliferated in the American money centers. Between October 1996, when the Fed 
gave its approval, and February 1997 US banks issued over USD30 billion in tier 1 
tax-deductible stock. The impact of these instruments, marketed as capital securities, 
was evident. This much is clear from the reaction of the market to the extensive use 
of these assets. As this stock qualified as tier 1 capital, there was no Basel limit on 
their use in banks’ capital bases. Yet the relative weaknesses of these instruments, 
relative to pure equity or retained profits, was recognized by credit ratings agencies 
who were believed to have insisted that these instruments not comprise more than 20 
percent of a bank’s tier 1 capital or a downgrade would be considered.
Thus by 1997, the shape and structure of a major US downgrade in its capital 
regulatory severity was clear. The American tax authorities did not intervene and thus 
US banks were allowed to issue a new kind of capital instrument that did not 
necessarily violate, but certainly was not in the spirit of the Basel agreement. 
Recognizing that such instruments were indeed economic capital but not the pure 
equity capital that the Basel agreement intended to establish as tier 1, the market acted 
in a facilitating but limiting manner.
65 Federal Reserve Bulletin, 26 October 1996.
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The Federal Reserve’s decision created an international furore that resulted in 
a new showdown in Basel. It was not only the market that recognized the relative 
weaknesses of this tier 1 instrument, but European and Japanese banks demanded that 
their regulators permit them to issue these securities so as not to be competitively 
disadvantaged. French banks Credit Agricole and Credit Lyonnais attempted to issue 
such securities in 1993, yet their regulators forced them to reclassify these securities 
as tier 2. European and Japanese regulators were initially reluctant to approve this 
capital structure, yet began to develop a compromise solution in several rounds of 
negotiation in Basel. A solution would not be easy to reach, however, for while the 
new tax-deductible securities were “minor in the grand scheme of bank capital raising 
and management, [their use] was proving to be exceptionally divisive.”66
In particular, German regulators broadened the debate over tax-deductive 
securities into a wider attack on the Fed’s implementation of the Accord. The 
Germans objected to allowing US holding companies to issue capital securities on 
behalf of their member banks. This criticism struck at the Fed’s 1989 decision to 
allow BHCs to issue cumulative preferred stock as tier 1 equity, America’s first 
defection from at least the spirit of the Accord, as well as the tax-deductible issues. 
The US retorted by objecting to Germany’s policy of allowing dated securities to 
qualify as tier 1. The state-owned Landesbank do not have publicly listed shares, but 
instead issue dated debt securities called Still Einglagen or silent participations.
These instruments were explicitly permitted by the Basel Accord for use in Germany, 
yet the US regulators defended their BHC policies by indicating that the silent 
participations provided German banks an analogous competitive advantage. The
66 Euromoney, March 1998.
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Fed’s case was boosted when Deutsche Bank issued a Stille Einlagen variant during
fnthe course of the negotiations.
The BCBS negotiations on the American tier 1 decision were thus difficult and 
protracted. It was not until October 1998 when a compromise solution was reached. 
As might be expected, however, the solution did not amount to a detailed, point-by- 
point, guideline of the use of debated capital instruments, but to a short, two-page,
co
pronouncement. The pronouncement essentially emerged as another piece of Basel 
soft law. The BCBS resolution did not address the source of the dispute—Germany’s 
use of silent participations and the Fed’s approval of holding company down 
streaming—but provided vague and tacit approval to the US and German practices. 
With regards to the use of tax-deductible stock as tier 1 capital, the BCBS ruled that 
such instruments could not exceed 15 percent of the toted primary capital base. As a 
Euromoney article noted, “what the BIS has done is to legitimize the approach already 
taken by the rating agencies, and admit that there now exists an upper and a lower 
tier-one capital structure.”69 In effect, the Fed’s unilateral departure from the Accord 
resulted in the amendment of the Accord in its favor. The beneficiaries, however, 
were not simply American money center banks, but those of most of the G-10. The 
regulators of Japan, The Netherlands, and Italy quickly allowed their internationally 
active banks to mimic their American counterparts, while most of the remaining Basel 
Committee states approved these new capital securities with time.
Shortly after this international dispute’s resolution, the entire American bank 
regulatory community agreed to extend the definition of tier 2 capital. Soon after the 
BCBS decision on tax-deferred equity, the Fed, OCC, FDIC, and the Office of Thrift 
Supervision agreed to allow their banks to count up to 45 percent of their unrealized,
671 thank an anonymous official at the US Federal Reserve for this information.
68 The Banker, December 1998.
69 “Banking Capital Raising,” Euromoney, 1998.
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7(\pre-tax, holding gains for the sale of equity securities. Japan’s use of these capital 
instruments had been heavily criticized during the 1987 negotiations for Japan’s 
accession to the US-UK bilateral capital accord. In fact, one author noted that the 
dispute over these instruments had prevented Japan from joining the 1986 agreement 
for over six months.71 Though these instruments were permitted by the GAAP, US 
regulators had shied from permitting their treatment as regulatory capital because the 
value of these instruments, and hence their ability to absorb bank losses, was 
dependent upon their market value. The potential volatility of such instruments, as 
was observed with Japan’s use of them in the early 1990s, proved secondary to the US 
regulator’s growing concerns about the international competitiveness of their banks. 
These concerns led to a mass approval of the use of this instrument—all the way to 
the Basel minimum of 45 percent—for all domestic financial intermediaries.
What can explain this rapid transformation in America’s interpretation of the 
Accord? In the space of ten years, the US had turned from charging other states with 
adopting excessively loose capital standards to being the target of such charges. Part 
of the answer lies in the fundamental shift in bank capital management and bank 
regulation that occurred in the US during the 1990s. On an international basis, we 
have already seen that US banks were relatively well capitalized before the Accord.
As these banks began to further increase their capital levels after the 1990s recession, 
the philosophy of credit risk management began to change in both America’s banks 
and regulatory methods.
The management of credit risks is by far the most important job for a bank 
manager.72 Traditionally, these risks have been managed by raising and holding 
capital; this is obviously the regulatory position of the Accord’s rules. Yet, the high
70 Federal Reserve Bulletin, October 1998.
71 Norton (1992).
72 Euromoney, May 1997.
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levels of capital at US banks during the 1990s led to a shift in thinking about the use 
and purpose of bank capital by the American banking community. Capital was now
being viewed as an instrument for maximizing shareholder value, rather than simply a
n'xbalance sheet cushion against counterparty default. Bank managers argued that the 
Accord has made them over-capitalized and this was producing economic 
inefficiencies as holding capital entailed high opportunity costs that did not apply to 
their non-bank financial institutional competitors. Reflecting this, Citicorp—which 
had famously struggled to meet the Basel ratio minima by 1992—made a June 1995 
announcement to buy back USD3 billion of its own shares over a two-year period. 
Other money center banks announced their intentions to follow Citicorp’s example 
and the era of bank capital raising problems appeared over.
Such changes appear to have been partially responsible for guiding regulatory 
policy during this time. The loosening of capital standards was a key part of a 
shifting trajectory of the overall shape of bank regulatory policy. Decades of 
restrictive legislation were abolished during the 1990s so that, by 2000, banks were 
able to operate in product areas and geographical markets that had been forbidden to 
them since the 1930s depression legislation as Glass-Steagall was abolished.74 By 
1999, commercial banks were permitted to operate in securities, real estate, and 
insurance markets. Regulators responded by allowing commercial banks to hold and 
manage risk-capital in ways similar to the firms that operated in this markets. By the 
late 1990s, money center banks demanded that they be allowed to set their own credit 
risk capital charges with proprietary modelling tools. They demanded the right to use
n r
derivative products to manage their balance sheets. The Basel Committee had
73 The Banker, 1 September 1995.
74 The Banker, December 1999.
75 Financial Times, 6 April 1998.
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permitted banks to utilize such tools to manage market risks in 1996, yet not credit 
risks.76
The Fed did not agree to such demands. Though the Fed has supported the 
international adoption of these new risk management techniques into the Basel 
Accord 2, they did not unilaterally permit the use of internal modelling and 
derivatives methods. Yet they did extensively water down their interpretations of the 
Basel rules. They allowed banks to function more like securities firms and hold tax- 
deductible preferred stock as primary capital. They permitted them to hold assets with 
an underlying market value as secondary capital. In addition, some evidence exists 
that US regulators reduced their level of capital enforcement. In the mid-1990s it 
emerged that the FDIC may not have been enforcing many elements of the Basel 
agreement to its constituent banks.77 As the FDIC’s regulatory charges, the so-called 
“super-regional” banks had always been better capitalized than their money center 
peers, and the FDIC had always opposed elements of the Accord’s application in their 
sphere of influence. Though Seidman had failed to gain extensive concessions for his 
banks in 1988, the FDIC may have provided regulatory relief in the enforcement stage 
of the policy cycle.
6.4.1. Hypotheses Review: Second Period o f Implementation 
During the second time period of study, US capital adequacy regulation made a full 
circle return to a policy similar to that in place prior to 1988. The increased widening 
of the regulatory capital definition, increasing reliance on more informal capital-to- 
assets ratio requirements, and perhaps discretionary enforcement of capital policies all 
signal a reversion in America’s capital policies. What do the hypotheses generated in
76 See Basel Committee (1996).
77 American Banker, June 1995.
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Chapter 3 have to say about such a reduction in the severity in the Accord’s ‘‘
interpretation?
The relevance of the “path dependency” bank preference variable seems in 
some doubt. These events suggest that the path dependency hypothesis’ propositions 
worked in reverse in the US case. Economic crises led to a new regulatory path in the 
early 1990s, while increase bank profitability was correlated with a return to the 
original shape of the pre-Basel rules or a return to the original regulatory path. Yet it 
is not clear that it was longing for the original, pre-Basel regime, which guided banks, 
regulators, or politicians preferences during this period. Moreover, the crux of the 
path dependency preference was that international soft law would effect little really 
domestic policy change. In this regard, to suggest that the hypothesis is relevant after 
such a change occurred in the (/) period seems to present a time order difficulty for 
this hypothesis.
In an indirect manner, the policy reversion might provide some corroboration 
to the quantitative finding that private market governance is related to regulatory 
loosening for tier 1 capital. American banks were subject to relatively high levels of 
market governance. The market influenced the policies of banks during this period as 
they placed limits on the use of tax-deductible preferred stock as tier 1 capital that 
even the regulators did not. It is possible that American regulators felt able to reduce 
their regulatory stringency in the knowledge that the market would enforce minimum 
standards on banks. Indeed, a key US position at the Basel 2 negotiations has been 
that the market should exercise a key function in the setting of banks’ credit risk
*7 ftcharges. This suggests a refinement to the market governance hypothesis so that the
78 The Economist, 3 May 2003.
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preferences of regulators, not simply banks, may be driven by the market enforcement 
mechanism.
Less support is found for the remaining hypotheses. The economic instability 
hypothesis suggested that regulatory change would occur in the presence of economic 
difficulties during the second period. Yet, US regulatory change seemed to occur 
throughout the 1990s during economic difficulties and during economic prosperity. 
Little support was provided to this hypothesis for the second period.
A more interesting question concerns the capture hypothesis during the second 
implementation period. US banks did appear to extract large concessions from their 
regulators despite exercising relatively limited quantities of political power. Yet, the 
details of the chapter seem to suggest that these extractions were not so much the 
product of “capture” as mutual learning about the appropriateness of the Basel Accord 
to the banking system. Both US commercial banks and regulators recognized that the 
capital adequacy regulatory game had changed in the mid 1990s. New financial 
instruments and increasing levels of bank capital made elements of the American 
interpretation of the Accord less appropriate. As a result, a new consensus seemed to 
emerge among banks and regulators regarding a looser regulatory framework that 
permitted them to act more like the securities firms against which they would be 
engaging in direct competition.
Finally, the second period discussion suggests the importance of incorporating 
a number of possible explanatory variables not anticipated in Chapter 3. First, capital 
adequacy rule stringency may well co-vary with the elements of the electoral cycle.
In Section 2, the decision of Congress to demand their regulators pursue the Accord 
was clearly linked to the political need of congressmen to signal a heavy-handed 
approach to the “reckless” banking industry to their constituents. Second, President
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Bush’s 1992 electoral platform prominently listed his support for a weaker capital 
standard as a key plank in his inflation-fighting program. The hypotheses 
investigated here follow Ho’s (2002) advice in assuming that capital adequacy policy 
setting is largely an apolitical and technocratic policy area. Yet, evidence from the 
US case suggests that this may not always be the case.79
6.5. Conclusions
This chapter has detailed the implementation of the 1988 Basel Accord in the US. It 
has argued that up to the early 1990s, capital adequacy policy in the US was driven by 
the severity of LDC and savings and loan crises of the late 1980s. As a consequence, 
the US pushed for the adoption of the Basel Accord and implemented a severe 
interpretation of this agreement on their commercial banks. As the effects of this 
crisis receded by 1992, regulatory policy began to change. By 2000, American 
regulators were adopting a capital adequacy standard more similar to their pre-Basel 
rules and more in-line with international practice.
These events have been instructive on the applicability of a number of our 
hypotheses to this country case. The case did not provide unequivocal support for any 
hypothesis. Instead, some qualified support is found in the first period for the 
economic stability hypothesis and the private governance hypothesis. More 
importantly, the chapter has suggested some important qualifications to the 
hypotheses. First, it has suggested that measures of bank political power should take 
the economic climate into account. In the US, banks’ influence seemed to vary 
considerably in times of recession and solvency crisis versus period of stability. 
Second, this chapter suggests that the quantitative studies are incomplete as they
79 Rosenbluth and Schapp (2001) also suggest that political variables—particularly electoral rules—are 
correlated with types of prudential financial policy.
cannot operationalize and test the concept of regulatory learning. This appeared to be 
a critical element in America’s capital regulatory decisions over the period and it is 
necessary to address this possibility.
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Chapter 7
Implementation of the Basel Accord in Europe: 
The Case of France & Germany
7.1. Introduction
The European Union followed a very different approach to promulgating capital 
adequacy standards when compared to the United States. Unlike the US, the EU 
quickly moved to expand the coverage of the Basel Accord to investment banks and 
the market risks of commercial banks. In this respect, the EU moved more quickly 
than the Basel Committee in expanding the scope and coverage of a transnational 
capital regulatory framework, though with the unique goal of forging a single 
continental marketplace for financial services within a single prudential regulatory 
framework.
Yet, recognizing the limits of bringing about immediate convergence of inter- 
European banking regulations, the EU permitted their member-states to implement the 
Accord with the same “soft law” discretionary method set out in Basel. The result has 
been persistent divergence in Europe’s risk-capital regulations. This chapter will 
discuss this process of implementation in Europe generally, and France and Germany 
in particular.
These two states provide an interesting variation on the independent and 
dependent variables under investigation. Germany opposed the Basel Accord because 
it created a regulatory framework far more lax than its domestic capital standards.
Yet, over the course of the 1990s, German regulators acquiesced to domestic demands 
and reduced the stringency of their regulatory capital definitions to facilitate their 
financial institutions’ international competitiveness. This loosening of regulatory
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stringency persisted in Germany throughout the 1990s as the economic climate of the 
country declined after German reunification and the banking system experienced 
extreme financial distress. By 2000, Germany’s position on capital adequacy had 
turned full circle so that they opposed the Basel Accord 2 negotiations for creating too 
strict a code.
By contrast, France has been viewed as a loser in the Basel Accord process. 
Oatley and Nabors (1998) argued that French banks operated with comparatively lax 
international capital ratios and standards during the 1980s and thus had this privilege 
taken away at American and British insistence at Basel. There are grounds to 
challenge this argument. France’s pre-Basel capital ratios were on-par with most of 
continental Europe’s banks, their capital standards did not appear to be more lax than 
other G-10 state’s standards and, unlike Germany, France had implemented a risk- 
weighting approach well in advance of the Basel Accord. Moreover, France’s 
solvency standards do not appear to have altered much from the mid-1980s to 2000. 
France adopted an interpretation of the Accord that was roughly in-line with their 
existing practices and maintained this interpretation throughout the 1990s.
By examining France and Germany together, it is possible to formulate strong 
comparisons of two distinct reactions to the Accord. This chapter endeavors to 
understand why Germany’s capital adequacy regime experienced extreme volatility 
during the 1990s while France’s solvency standards remained largely constant. The 
chapter provides strong support for the path dependency and economic instability 
hypotheses. Both states’ negotiating positions and initial implementations were path 
dependent, though the presence of a macroeconomic downturn in Germany led to a 
novel regulatory path by 1993 while the absence of such difficulties allowed France to 
retain its initial interpretations. Support may also be suggested for the “regulatory
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capture” hypothesis. Continental European banks traditionally wield more political 
power than their American counterparts and the French and German regulators’ 
decision-making over the 1990s appears to have been largely congruent with the 
preferences of their banking industries.
Section 7.2 provides background to understanding the implementation of the 
Basel Accord in the European Union. After the Basel negotiations were completed, 
Brussels set to work on implementing the Accord into EC law. This additional layer 
of regional governance structured the implementation process in France and Germany 
and it is important to set out how this may have uniquely influenced European states’ 
implementation of the Basel Accord. Section 7.3 presents the capital adequacy 
background and Accord negotiating positions of France and Germany. Section 7.4 
discusses implementation during the first period of analysis (1988-1992) and 7.5 will 
look at the second period (1993-2000). In order to facilitate the close comparison of 
France and Germany’s reactions to the Accord, both states will be simultaneously 
analyzed in these sections. This will also allow for the succinct analysis of 
interactions between these two states over the Accord’s implementation. Section 7.6 
concludes.
7.2. Implementation in the European Community
The European Community negotiations for a capital adequacy agreement progressed 
in parallel with the work of the Basel Committee during the 1980s. Under the aegis 
of the Banking Advisory Committee (BAC), the EC states set about designing a 
common bank capital standard as part of the broader Community objective of creating 
a single market in financial services. These negotiations were part of a broader 
program to complete a common market for financial services providers that initiated
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with the adoption of the First Banking Co-ordination Directive in 1977.
There is some debate about the relationship between the European and Basel 
capital negotiations. Some have suggested that the BACs' work was prompted largely 
by its objectives to complete a single banking regulatory framework and was 
generally not influenced by the G-10 negotiations. As Josselin (1997:174-5) 
observes, this claim seems extraordinary in light of the similarity of the two capital 
standards and large overlapping membership of the two negotiating bodies. As the 
comparison between the Basel and EC rules in Appendix 3.1 shows, Europe created a 
twin-level capital structure (called own funds and additional own funds in Europe) 
and required banks to maintain a minimum 8 percent capital adequacy ratio. In 
addition, the definitions of capital and the specifications of risk charges for on and 
off-balance sheet assets were largely identical. It is thus seemingly inaccurate to 
claim that the European standard was not heavily influenced by the G-10's work on 
capital adequacy and a recent European Commission paper confirms this by stating 
that the, "definition of own funds prescribed by the Own Funds Directive is based on 
the work in the Basel Capital Accord of 1988."1
Yet there are a number of unique elements to the European capital directives. 
First, the definition of regulatory capital is slightly more stringent as current year 
profits may only be included if they are verified by auditors and latent revaluation 
reserves are expressly excluded. Moreover, the EU adopted a much larger list of 
deductions required from capital. While the Accord only requires goodwill to be 
deducted from primary capital before its inclusion in the list of regulatory capital, the 
EU requires that own shares and current year losses be subtracted.
Beyond just the stated capital adequacy guidelines, however, a key distinction
1 European Commission (2000:5).
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emerged between the long-term objectives of the two agreements. As has been 
mentioned, both the Basel and EC solvency rules provided for large degrees of 
national discretion or home-country control. Yet, the Own Funds Directive states 
that, in the future, the process of “competition between jurisdictions” in Europe may 
produce high levels of regulatory isomorphism as convergence becomes increasingly 
attractive and the single financial market is completed. The opportunity costs of 
persistent European regulatory divergence would drive European banks to demand 
that their domestic solvency regime be brought in line with that of their largest EC 
trading partners. Moreover, the Directive requires Member States to consider 
increased convergence with a view to a common definition of own funds and requires 
the European Commission to submit a report on the uniform adoption of the directive 
to the European Parliament and Council of Ministers by 1 January 1996. Article 2 
(2) of the Council Directive of 17 April 1989 on the Own Funds Directive required 
this report be prepared “with the aim of tightening [the Directive’s] provisions and 
thus achieving greater convergence on a common definition of own funds.” In this 
way, the European capital accords were more ambitious than the Basel standard.
Yet, did this ambition produce a higher degree of capital rule convergence? 
The univariate statistical analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that it did to some extent. The 
coefficients of standard deviation were not particularly lower in the European states 
than in other BCBS members in the first period (1988-1992), yet it appears that some 
convergence did emerge in the late 1990s. Still, some significant distinctions in 
capital practice remain. In its report to the European Parliament, the Commission 
noted that “[s]ome national implementation measures are somewhat stricter than the 
minimum standards required by the [Own Funds] Directive, particularly with regard
2 Murray-Jones and Gamble (1991:56).
3 Commission of the European Communities (2000:3).
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to further restrictions on eligible own funds and/or requirements of additional 
deductions from capital...[t]welve Member States have implemented such stricter 
requirements.”4
Nevertheless, the EC was quite successful in extending the original scope and 
coverage of the Own Funds and Solvency Ratio Directives. In the early 1990s, the 
EC moved more quickly in negotiating extensions and amendments to their capital 
standards than the G-10. If attention towards achieving credit risk rule convergence 
waned, the enthusiasm for creating a “soft law” framework for all financial 
institutions’ risks gathered pace. Brussels concluded a market risk capital charge 
three years before Basel. The Capital Adequacy Directive or CAD (93/6/EEC) 
designed a market risk charge for all banks and investment firms operating in the 
Community and was soon updated with CAD2 (98/31/EC) that brought EU rules 
more in line with the Basel market risk amendment. European rules were also issued 
to address capital adequacy regulation related topics such as consolidated supervision 
of financial groups (92/30/EEC) and large financial exposures (92/121/EEC). In a 
number of areas, the BAC has thus led the Basel negotiations and it is intriguing that 
hegemonic explanations of the 1988 Accord's negotiation have not taken this into 
account.
Yet, the focus of this chapter remains fixed on the implementation of the 1988 
credit risk regulations. Before turning to this, it is necessary to briefly discuss the 
negotiation of the Basel and Brussels solvency standards by Community members. 
The conclusion of the Basel Committee's work on the credit risk standard did not lead 
directly to the implementation of the Accord in Europe, but the initiation of a new 
round of European negotiations as the 1988 Accord needed to be enumerated into
4 Ibid. Bracketed comments added to the original text by author.
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European law. Many of the intra-European conflicts present in Basel reappeared on 
this new negotiation battleground and, in particular, a Franco-German split emerged. 
Details of this split and some background into the pre-Basel capital adequacy 
regulations of France and Germany are presented in the next section.
7.3. Background
7.3.1. France
According to the orthodox account of the Basel Accord’s origins, France was 
vociferously opposed to the agreement.5 If the United States utilized the Basel 
process to create a wealth redistributive regime, then the French were among those 
countries that lost banking wealth to America’s attempt to generate rents from an 
international capital standard. The French, with the Japanese, possessed the G-lO’s 
weakest credit regulations, the least capitalized banks, and as a result were the chief 
underwriters of America’s efforts to unilaterally strengthen their own domestic capital 
regime.6 By securing the implementation of the Accord, the US would be able to 
tighten its own regulations without ceding any competitive advantages to its 
international competitors.
The evidence supporting this position, however, seems quite weak. The only 
data that Oatley and Nabors provide are the illustration of France’s relatively weak 
pre-Basel capital-to-assets ratios and vague and undocumented claims that “Japanese 
and French regulators were the most vocal opponents of the U.S. initiative because 
the U.S. proposal would adversely affect French and Japanese commercial bank 
competitiveness.”7 First, the conclusion about France’s low capital ratios is derived
5 Kapstein 1989; Vemon et al (1991); Reinicke (1995); Oatley and Nabors (1998).
6 This “strong version” of the hegemonic explanation for the Accord is argued primarily by Oatley and 
Nabors (1998).
7 Oatley and Nabors (1998:47).
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from data for only one French bank, Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP). Yet, as Figure 
7.1 indicates, BNP’s capital ratios were about the lowest in France in the late 1980s. 
Moreover, if one takes the mean for the leading ten banks in each Basel Committee 
member-state during this period, it is evident that French banks’ average 1988 ratios 
were on-par with those of other industrialized countries when measured with 
identically narrow definitions of capital. These ratios are also especially high when 
considering that France had built up a large exposure to lesser developing countries 
debt during the 1980s.8
Bank Ratio (%)




SG Groupe Ecureuil 3.4
Groupe Ecureuil 2.9





G-10 1988 Average 3.9
Table 7.1. Capital-to-Assets Ratios of Leading Ten French Banks, 1988
Capital defined as common equity, disclosed reserves, and retained earnings
Source: The Banker
Second, France’s capital adequacy regime does not seem to have necessarily 
conferred any special competitive advantage to their domestic banks. If the 
PREBASEL index is disaggregated into its constituent elements, France’s pre-Basel 
capital adequacy rules meet the G-10 mean. A solvency regulation introduced in
8 Reinicke (1995:174). Curiously, Oatley and Nabors (1998:46-7) do not observe France’s large 
exposure to Third World debt. In arguing that the Accord was not pareto-improving on an international 
basis, the authors lay out the level of LDC debt exposure for the US, UK, and Japan and illustrate that 
the former two had a much larger exposure and thus the Accord did not help stabilize the Japanese 
banking system. In addition to providing a rather simplistic conclusion given the large array of 
variables associated with financial stability (see Matten 2000), the authors do not provide any data for 
France’s exposure to LDC debt.
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1979 forced domestic banks to meet a risk assets/capital ratio target of 5 percent. The 
definition of regulatory capital to meet this target was more limited than the Basel 
provisions as only common equity, reserves, general provisions, and subordinated 
debt was allowed and deductions were required for investments in banking 
subsidiaries and affiliates. Most importantly, France was only one of five G-10 states 
to implement a risk-weighting assets approach. In some respects, the risk- 
categorization limits were more lax than the Basel/EC minima as inter-bank loans 
received a 5 percent (as opposed to a 20 percent charge) yet in many areas, France’s 
regulations resembled the pending international codes.9
While it is true that France did oppose American efforts to craft the Basel 
Accord, its opposition was not qualitatively different from that of most G-10 
members. France’s objection to the Accord was, ostensibly, on the basis that it was 
not possible to derive an objective and generalizable definition of capital and that 
capital adequacy depended as much upon the entire scope of a bank’s activities and its 
management quality as it did upon its bank book portfolio.10 In this objection, France 
was joined by Germany and, about 1999, the Federal Reserve changed course to argue 
this point of view at the Basel Accord 2 negotiations.11
Also, the French objected to the Accord when negotiations were leading to the 
exclusion of capital instruments that were important to their banks capital bases and 
were appropriate for their accounting standards. In particular, French banks (like their 
American counterparts) argued, in Basel and at the EC negotiations in Brussels, that 
loan loss provisions must be included as, throughout the 1980s, they had built up such 
provisions to 40 percent of their exposure to Third World debtors.12 Also, they
9 Dale (1984:105), Beduc, Ducruezet, and Papadacci (1992:269).
10 Kapstein (1989:341).
11 Federal Reserve Bulletin, August 2,1999.
12 Reinicke (1995:174); Stoiy (1997:258).
213
demanded that the unrealized appreciation in physical assets, such as buildings, be 
included. Though excluded in those countries implementing GAAP standards, 
unrealized gains formed an important component of the French banking system’s
capital definition and indeed in most of the European Community, except for
11Germany and the United Kingdom. In demanding the inclusion of these items as 
regulatory capital (they were both included as tier 2 capital in the 1988 Accord) 
France was no more an opponent of the Accord than the US, who demanded the 
inclusion of preferred stock as tier 1 capital, nor most members of the EC that also 
pressed for the inclusion of unrealized gains. Thus, it is not clear that the 
implementation of the Accord was necessarily any more harmful to French interests 
than to any other G-10 country’s interests, nor that France’s pre-1988 capital rules 
were singularly weak.
What is unique about the French case, and relevant to the enforcement of 
capital standards, is the high level of state involvement in the banking industry that 
persisted through the early years of the Accord’s implementation. The French state 
has maintained a high level of intervention in the banking sector since well before the
iL
19 century. Economic historians have explained this intervention as partly a product 
of the fragmented nature of the sector which has been traditionally divided between 
large commercial banks with a national marketing reach (such as BNP, Societe 
Generale, Credit Lyonnais), numerous financial cooperatives with a regional 
orientation, and banks organized to target particular industries with credits (Credit 
Agricole for agriculture; Banques Populaire for artisans; Credit Mutuel for agriculture 
and small/medium sized enterprises). Until the 1980s, these differing credit 
institutions did not coordinate their policy objectives very effectively and, in the
13 Vernon, Spar, and Tobin (1991:150).
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absence of a strong orientation towards local or regional governance in France, this 
fragmentation resulted in the national government assuming an important role in the 
sector.14
With this role, the government assumed a great deal of domestic economic 
control. Part of this control has been implemented through the direct ownership of 
banks and the design of elaborate credit allocation systems. For the former, the 
government has initiated two large nationalizations in the last 50 years or so. The first 
involved the nationalization of the largest commercial banks directly after the Second 
World War. During the most recent mass nationalization, in 1982, the government 
took control of 36 banks and two large financial holding companies that gave the state 
control of 90 percent of bank deposits and 85 percent of outstanding loans.15 With 
regards to the control of credit flows, these became especially complex during the 
1970/80s as the government established a credit allocation regime that tailored 
restrictions for individual banks, as opposed to defining a quota for the whole banking 
system. The result was the creation of 70 separate interest rate regulations, covering 
44 percent of the country’s total bank lending by 1981.16
By controlling this chunk of the country’s bank lending, the state exercised a 
sizable amount of leverage on the patterns of domestic investment. Part of the 
traditionally high level of state control in France is facilitated not only by the degree 
of state ownership in the banking industry but by the pivotal role that financial 
intermediation has played in funding French industry since the 1960s. Securities 
markets have tended to be especially weak and investment credits have originated 
from banks rather than corporate debt or equities markets. As Coleman observed, 





highly dependent on the allocation of credit by institutional lenders following policy 
signals from the state.”17 Though efforts have been made to move away from this 
bank-centered model since the 1978 Loi Monory, in 1991 financial intermediation 
represented, on a flow-of-funds basis, close to 80 percent of aggregate financing. This
1 ftcontinues to give the state a large vote in the allocation of domestic credit.
In addition, the high level of state control has shifted a great deal of financial 
product innovation capacity to the public sector. A large body of regulatory research, 
initiated by Kane (1991), suggests that generally a regulatory dialectic persists 
between regulators and regulated firms. Firms will engineer new products or engage 
in market or non-market behaviors in order to circumvent the effects of new 
regulation. In order to ensure that the original standards remains relevant in light of 
these efforts, regulators will respond by issuing new rules (the synthesis), thus 
initiating the dialectic anew. Yet De Boissieu (1990) argues that the large state role in 
French finance alters this game so that, “[e]ven if the ‘regulatory dialectic’ is also 
valid in the French case, it appears that in France, as in Italy, public financial 
innovation predominates. Rather than a challenge, financial innovation is considered 
as a tool for economic policy.”19
However, it should not be assumed that, given this high level of state control, 
French banks are necessarily politically weak. In fact, at the end of a paper largely 
devoted to explaining the role of the state in French banking, Coleman (1997) 
concludes by questioning: “can the state counter (contre pouvoir) the power of the
OAbanks... [e]vidence suggests that this capability has weakened.” Though France’s 
score on the quantitative indicator of banks’ political power is well below the G-10
17 Coleman (1997:275).
18 De Boissieu (1990:184).
19 De Boissieu (1990:185).
20 Coleman (1997:290).
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average (0.31 versus 0.46), this measure may not be capturing the changes emerging 
in state-bank relationships in France.
Part of the explanation for this apparent paradox may be that the gap between 
state and bank control has been narrowing since the creation of the 1984 Banking 
Reform Act. This Act resulted in French banks’ gradual shift to a universal bank 
model, and the establishment of a strong corporatist banking policy network where 
political disagreements would be resolved rather than in the legislature. This policy 
network was created through the rationalization of the bank regulatory regime so that 
rules for different classes of intermediaries were harmonized and supervisory 
responsibility centered in three organizations: the Comit6 de la Reglementation 
Bancaire (CRB) which was charged with rule-making; the Comite des Etablissements 
de Credit (CEC) for licensing new banks; the Commission Bancaire (CB) for 
supervising the implementation of regulations. The Act also required all banking 
organizations to join an industry association that was a member of a government 
created peak organization, the Association Fran9aise des Etablissements de Credit 
(AFEC). Lastly, the largest commercial banks have begun to move out of 
government ownership as Societe Generate, BNP, and Credit Lyonnais were 
privatized in the 1980/90s and Credit Agricole moved out of direct state control in 
1987. These changes may have strengthened the political power of French banks.21
7.3.2. Germany
Germany entered the Basel and European Community capital adequacy negotiations 
with the strictest standards in the G-10. Prior to the implementation of the Accord, 
the German Federal Banking Supervisory Authority (FBSA) permitted only paid-up
21 Coleman (1997:281-91).
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share capital, disclosed reserves, and net profits to qualify as regulatory bank 
capital.22 Thus, Germany’s negotiating positions in Basel and Brussels were not so 
much geared towards ensuring the inclusion of capital elements important to their 
domestic banks so much as arguing that a narrow definition of capital be 
internationally adopted. Germany had incrementally developed its capital regime 
over a forty-year period and was anxious to maintain existing rules without suffering 
further competitive disadvantages relative to its G-10 and European peers.
Germany’s strict capital regime, and thus its Basel/EC negotiating positions, 
originated in the country’s post-war organization of the domestic financial services 
industry. After 1945, a West German system of “organized liberalism” emerged in 
which financial services policy was generated and implemented within a highly 
centralized and corporatist policy network. Prior to the 1960s, the Ministry of 
Finance and Bundesbank formulated policy with the consultation of the commercial 
banks that were represented by a comprehensive peak association, the Bundesverbank 
deutscher Banken. Historically, this regime’s origins may be explained by the 
patterns of politically disruptive financial conditions that the country endured after its 
unification under Bismarck. The 1873 Berlin financial crisis and the hyperinflation of 
the Weimar Republic contributed to a post-World War II consensus that financial 
institutions need to be deeply tied in to the oversight of the state to provide for 
stability.23
Though state ownership did not emerge, banks became the centerpiece of the 
government’s industrial policy. Tax incentives were created to facilitate copious 
amounts of cross-share holdings between banks and other financial service providers,
22 Murray-Jones and Gamble (1991:138-40).
23 Story (1997:246).
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and between these “universal bank” groups and industrial corporations.24 As Story 
summarized (1997:252), “Banks are part of a nexus of banks, insurance companies, 
and industrial corporations, which own each others’ shares and share each others’ 
supervisory seats. This nexus is woven into the fabric of the German state...” The 
result was a highly bank oriented financial system in which 18 percent of corporate 
investment between 1950 and 1990 were derived from bank credits. The ratio of bank 
assets/GDP was 1.21 in the 1990s, second only to Switzerland in the G-10, while the 
ratio of claims of deposit money banks on the private sector/GDP was 0.94, the third 
highest in the G-10. As the key government program for economic growth after 
1945 focused on building an export-oriented industrial strategy, banks were of central 
importance in order to extend credit to these industries directly and in funding the 
Hermes export insurance scheme 26
This central importance of banking in post-war Germany has two important 
consequences for understanding its bank capital regime. First, it was necessary for 
Germany to create a strict capital standard to ensure its massive commercial banks 
remained solvent. Though preventing bank failure is important in any domestic 
political economy, even heavily securities market-oriented systems such as the United 
States, it was especially so in Germany given the key role these organizations played 
in funding the macroeconomy. The result was the incremental development of a strict 
regulatory portfolio that sought to increasingly limit the activities of commercial 
banks.
Though tough regulations were discussed during the drafting of the Basic Law 
in the 1940s, much banking regulation remained state-oriented until Germany adopted 
an especially strict, federal bank capital standard with the 1961 Banking Act. This act
24 Esser (1990).
25 Demirgtif-Kunt and Levine (2001).
26 Story (1997:248).
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was created to enforce a nation-wide standard that would replace the disparate state 
regulations and provide the legal basis for the creation of the FBSA, a banking super­
regulator. The act required that all domestic financial intermediaries maintain a 
capital buffer that included mostly common equity and excluded preferred equity, 
debt, and any sort of hybrid debt/equity instrument.
These strict regulations were tightened even further in response to Germany’s 
banking crises of the 1970/80s. After the collapse of Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt in 1974, 
the FBSA created a new Bank Structure Committee to consider reformulations of the 
credit rules. The result was that the ceiling for large-scale credits was reduced from 
75 percent to 50 percent of equity capital, and capital adequacy standards were 
enforced on the consolidation of banking groups, including foreign subsidiaries. The 
latter was especially damaging to German banks as it closed an avenue by which they 
circumvented their narrow capital requirements by building up credit pyramids with 
their domestic and foreign subsidiaries without increasing the capital base of the 
parent bank. The financial difficulties experienced by SMH-Bank in 1983 brought 
a similar response from the Committee as the German regulators brought pressure to 
bear on the level of banks’ capital adequacy ratios.
Though German capital standards were the strictest in the world on the basis 
of the narrow regulations adopted, the banks’ capital ratios were actually among the 
lowest in the 1980s. In 1988, the average capital adequacy ratios for the leading ten 
German banks (by capital levels) was 59 basis points lower than their top ten French 
competitors and 248 basis points lower than their American peers. Even if the 
analysis is limited to the top three German banks (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, 
and Commerzbank), the Germans’ ratios remain 17 and 206 basis points lower than
27 See Rudolph (1990:360-1).
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the French and Americans, respectively. This comparison may not be surprising 
given the high capital standards to which German banks adhered. In fact The Banker 
observed that Germany’s ratios would be considerably higher if their regulations 
permitted the inclusion of the vast levels of hidden reserves that the banks had built 
up through their cross-holdings of German manufacturers. Nevertheless, these low 
ratios were a source of worry for the FBSA and pressure was placed on the banks to 
raise their CARs.
Yet while banks were subject to these strict requirements, it should not be 
deduced that they were a politically weak force in the German political economy. In 
fact, their role in the corporatist policy network allocated a powerful role to them in 
the federal public policy making process. The FBSA regularly includes the industry 
in the policy creation process and, perhaps more importantly, relies on it to ensure 
implementation and compliance. The Bundesverbank deutscher Banken (BdB) is 
perhaps the most influential bank peak association among the industrialized countries. 
The organization’s membership has funded and managed its own guarantee and 
settlement systems, provided emergency liquidity facilities to distressed members, 
and been charged with self regulatory powers in a number of issue areas. Numerous 
domestic interest groups, often led by the center-right Free Democratic Party, have 
accused the banks of exercising unjustifiable amount of power through their equity 
holdings in the country’s largest firms and demanded that the government clamp 
down.30
Thus the German banks did not have strict capital standards forced on them, as 
in the US, but agreed to such standards in a policy network that emphasized 





negotiations, its regulators and banks jointly pursued the adoption of a strict 
international capital standard. The centralized German policy network had, over a 
period of fifty years, produced a capital standard that satisfied the goals of the 
regulators and commercial banks and suited the risk management requirements of the 
German financial system. In addition, German banks were highly supportive of their 
supervisors’ efforts to create a tough international standard after their domestic 
regulations had been designed as tough initially and tightened further still in the 
aftermath of the Herstatt and SMH-Bank crises.
Despite this convergence of state and firm international goals, Germany was, 
of course, not ultimately successful in shaping the ultimate outcomes of the Basel or 
EC negotiations. They were initially successful in forcing a set of rigid capital 
standards in the EC negotiations, over French objections, when the “Proposal for a 
Council Directive on the Own Funds of Credit Institutions” (EC/C243/06) was 
submitted to the European Commission in September 1986 with the exclusion of 
perpetual debt instruments. Germany also successfully delayed the Basel negotiations 
for numerous years by vetoing the inclusion of undisclosed reserves, revaluation 
reserves, and loan loss provisions. Yet the trilateral agreement orchestrated among 
the US, UK, and Japan scuppered Germany’s ambitions, and the interests of the 
majority of G-10 states for the inclusion of their desired capital instruments defeated
i t
Germany’s aim to enforce a stringent standard on the world’s banking system.
These failures by the German bargainers in Basel and Brussels shook the consensus 
that had emerged in the policy network over capital standards and, for the first time, a 
wedge emerged between the regulatory preferences of the German regulators and 
those of the constituent banks.
31 For a description of Germany’s negotiating positions and tactics at the Basel and EC negotiations, 
see Sawabe (1995).
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7.4. First Implementation Period (1988-1992)
7.4.1. France
France was among the quickest EC member-states to implement the Basel Accord. 
While Germany did not get around to implementing the agreement until 1990, the 
Banque de France forwarded a letter to the French Banking Association in November 
1988 seeking immediate compliance among internationally active banks. A more 
formal guideline issued by the CRB in June 1989 went beyond the minima by 
applying the Accord to all French banks before the EC Own Funds Directive and 
Solvency Ratio Directive were implemented in February 1990 and March 1991.
The decision to quickly implement the Accord may be partly explained as a 
bargaining strategy that France adopted for the EC capital negotiations in December 
1989. After successfully pushing for the inclusion of loan loss reserves as part of tier 
2 capital in Basel, France faced the possibility that Germany and the UK would force 
their exclusion from the EC definition of own funds. Germany had strongly objected 
to the 1988 Accord on the grounds that it allowed far too many weak forms of capital, 
with questionable abilities to absorb financial loss, compared with its own largely 
equity-centered capital rules, and both the Germans and British had announced their 
intentions to exclude loan loss reserves from their own Basel interpretations. Yet 
when the Own Funds Directive negotiations occurred, under the French Presidency of 
the EC, the French Ministry of Finance was able to water down the definitions 
preferred by Frankfurt and London to include these reserves, citing the fact that they
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had been implemented in France’s Basel Accord interpretations for all of its domestic 
and internationally-oriented banks, for over one year.32
Beyond this, however, French regulators were careful to adopt the most 
minimalist interpretations possible for nearly each discretionary element of the 
Accord. Unlike the United States where there was a minimal amount of commercial 
bank input into the initial implementation process, the much tighter French policy 
network produced a high level of regulator to bank interactions in the Basel 
interpretation process. The result was an initial CREG score of 13, compared to the 
mean of 14.5, and a credit risk regime that shadowed the bare definitional and ratios 
minima. The only area of strict implementation involved the exclusion of asset 
revaluation reserves that, before Basel, had been disallowed due to French accounting 
regulations. These reserves were later allowed in 1990 when France’s largest banks 
lobbied for their inclusion after Germany added asset revaluation reserves to their
'X'Xdefinition of regulatory capital.
Ostensibly, French banks did not have a great deal of difficulty complying 
with these Basel Accord interpretations. The tier 1 (non-risk weighted) capital 
adequacy of the leading ten French banks increased fifty-three basis points from 
1988-1992, compared to the twenty-five and thirty-two basis point increases for the 
American and German banks over the same period. Focusing purely on capital ratios, 
one author observed that “on a global level, the French banking sector has not much 
to adjust in order to comply with the Cooke ratio.”34
32 The Germans’ acquiescence to France’s inclusion of loan loss reserves in Own Funds may have also 
been in an effort to secure Paris’ support in their attempt to reject London’s push for a pan-European 
stock exchange. In EU single financial market negotiations, France had often found it could find more 
common ground with Britain than with Germany and Frankfurt was anxious to shore up France’s 
support in further rounds of these talks. See Price Waterhouse (1991:27), Story (1997:258).
33 Price Waterhouse (1991:27); Maccario et al. (2002:26).
34 De Boissieu (1990:223).
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Yet the exact manner in which the French increased their ratios to these levels 
was controversial and created some political furore within the Basel Committee.
First, one may conclude that it is not difficult to imagine that the French could 
increase their ratios faster than their German and American counterparts as, according 
to the quantitative implementation index, they were permitted a larger quantity of 
financial instruments with which to raise capital and, most importantly, did not 
require the deduction of the holdings of other financial institutions’ capital from tier 2. 
Another explanation maybe that, beyond the scope of the rules covered in Basel, 
French regulators allowed their banks to follow some creative efforts to raise fresh 
capital. One prominent example is that state-owned banks topped up their CARs by 
swapping shares with other state-owned companies. As industrial enterprises tend 
to be much better capitalized than financial institutions, this provided French banks 
with the opportunity to dip into these rich capital reserves while providing some relief 
for the state who would have had to front the capital necessary for the nationalized 
banks.36
In addition French banks, with the encouragement of the government, put 
considerable effort into engineering financial instruments that provided an alternative 
to equity financing in order to raise capital. Ultimately, banks of every nationality 
engaged in this sort of financial engineering, the aim being to circumvent the Basel 
rules, yet French banks began this process early. In the early years of 
implementation, before 1993, numerous banks issued perpetual subordinated capital 
debt to qualify as tier 1. Members of the Basel Committee, however, were suspect 
of this regulatory treatment and, in November 1988, initiated an investigation into
35The Economist, 2 May 1992.
36 One prominent example of this was organized, by the government, between Credit Lyonnais and 
iron/steel firm Usinor Sacilor. See Caroline Monnot and Yves Mamou, “L’augmentation de capital 
d’Usinor sera entferement souscrite par le Credit Lyonnais,” Le Monde, 16 July 1991.
37 Price Waterhouse (1991:15).
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Credit Lyonnais’ issue of these notes. By the year’s end, the committee ruled that 
such issues must be classified as tier 2 capital, over the objections of the French state 
and its banks.38
EC regulators raised similar objections over France’s risk-weighting of 
securitization issues. In a likely effort to assist banks’ capital raising efforts and 
Paris’ long-term challenge to London as Europe’s premier financial center, the 
Commission Bancaire adopted a standard which would relieve French banks of 
having to provide any capital charge to securitization issues made through their 
special-purpose vehicle companies, which were designed by banks to make these 
issues. The result was that the banks would be able to shift loans off of their balance 
sheets without any capital charge penalty as would need to be paid by another Basel 
Committee country. Though this practice was permitted by the EC, it was given 
considerable review as negotiations proceeded for the Capital Adequacy directive.
Thus, while France has been generally perceived to be disadvantaged by the 
Basel process, it is not especially clear that this was the case. France did not depart, 
in any sizable measure, from its extant regime when implementing the Basel 
framework. As the French negotiators objected to the creation of the Accord in the 
first instance, this seems to be a sizable diplomatic victory.
7.4.2. Germany
By contrast to France, Germany was the last Basel Committee state to implement the 
1988 Accord and the last EC member to adopt the 1991 Own Funds/Solvency Ratio 
Directives. Though in May 1990, the FBSA did amend the Banking Law to 
incorporate some of the Accord’s terminology into their domestic rules, significant
38 De Boissieu (1990:223).
39 Wilson (1989).
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distinctions remained until implementation formally occurred in 1992. Until this date, 
Germany’s regulations made no distinction between primary and supplementary 
capital, did not provide for any risk-weighting methodology commensurate with the 
Accord, and did not require their banks to meet a common capital-to-assets ratio. 
Though the largest German banks were required to report information on their 
implementation of the Basel guidelines to the Bundesaufsichtsamt from 1990, it is not 
clear with what exact capital standard these reports were made.40
This slow implementation seems extraordinary in light of Germany’s tough 
pre-Basel capital standards. Oatley and Nabors (1998) concluded that the Accord was 
redistributive only for Japanese and French banks and their paper seems to suggest 
that the Accord was largely neutral for Germany as the country did not need to 
strengthen their own rules to meet the Accord and, unlike the US, German regulators 
were not aiming to drastically increase their own domestic regulations in the years 
leading up to the Accord. Though German rules were tightened in the mid-1980s, 
these changes were not a wide departure from the pre-existing standards, unlike the 
US Congress’ demands for a new American capital standard in the late 1980s. In fact, 
utilizing Oatley and Nabor’s model, it may not seem entirely inappropriate to 
conclude that the Accord could be viewed as wealth distributive in favor of German 
banks, especially as they were in the process of completing a single European market 
in financial services with a selection of states which, save for Britain, held far weaker 
capital rules. If this model were correct, one would logically expect Germany to 
instantly adopt the new Accord, as the US did, while France would waffle in its 
implementation. In fact, it seems the opposite effect emerged as France adopted the 
Accord a full four years in advance of Germany.
40 Price Waterhouse (1991:29); Murray-Jones and Gamble (1991:138).
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One explanation that may be posited to solve this paradox is derived from 
Germany’s pre-Basel negotiating position. Germany may be the only Basel 
Committee state in which both regulators and commercial banks agreed that a strict 
international standard should be developed. The other two proponents of a Basel 
standard with a narrow definition of capital, the US and Britain, experienced heavy 
criticism from their domestic banks which were not eager to follow a new rigid set of 
regulations if there was a chance that their international peers would be freed from 
such rules by their own regulators. Thus the conclusion of the negotiation of the 
Accord (and directives) represented a failure for the entire German policy network. 
Every major Basel Committee member achieved some concession from the 
negotiations: Japan was permitted to include asset revaluation reserves; France won 
the right to include loan loss reserves; American banks were permitted to issue non- 
cumulative preferred stock as primary capital. Yet, Germany did not seem to receive 
any concession as the adoption of Germany’s position would threaten concessions 
made to other members.
Once the Accord moved into the implementation phase, the initial response of 
the FBSA was simply to alter the existing domestic regulations to comply with the 
regulatory language established in Basel. That is, classify some of its permissible 
capital elements as tiers 1 and 2 and adopt the risk-weight bucket delineations on top 
of its pre-existing risk-weighting regulations.41 Germany would essentially follow the 
status quo, though now its banks would need to adhere to a capital-to-assets standard 
that was 250 basis points higher.
German banks objected to this arrangement. Though the largest commercial 
banks, represented by the peak association, had supported their negotiator’s strict
41 Rudolph (1990:365-6).
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stance in Basel, they now demanded the sort of regulatory concessions that the FBSA 
had allowed to their Japanese, French, and American counterparts by agreeing to the 
Accord. While the German banks were only legally allowed to count equity and 
equity-like instruments in their capital base, some estimations suggest that their 
hidden reserve holdings were as high as those of Japanese banks in the 1980s; yet 
they were to be entirely excluded from Germany’s tier 2 capital definition.42 As 
policy making in the German banking policy network tended to rely on consensus, the 
result of this FBSA-bank stand off was the total paralysis of capital adequacy rule 
making in the early years of the Accord’s implementation.
It should not be understood that German banks were entirely unresponsive to 
the Accord. Some reports suggest that most German banks were complying with a 
form of the standard on a voluntary basis from 1988, though it is not clear what this 
standard may have been. The largest banks increased their capital ratios by 32 basis 
points from 1988 to 1992; a full 13 basis points more than the American money centre 
banks over the same period.43 Data from the Basel Committee indicates that, in the 
early 1980s, German banks were making an effort to increase their capital ratios by 
increasing their capital stocks and shedding assets.44 This is quite unique as it 
suggests that some market pressure for compliance was exerted on German banks 
during this period in which there was no clear domestic commitment to implement the 
Basel Accord.45
The implementation standoff eventually ended with the economic crises of the 
early 1990s. The reunification of Germany exerted enormous costs for the banking
42 Sawabe (1995).
43 Murray-Jones and Gamble (1991:138).
44 Basle Committee (1999:8).
45 The role of the market in eliciting compliance has been widely discussed, yet little direct evidence of 
this has been found in the academic literature, which has generally focused on compliance in the US, 
UK, and Japan. For a review of this literature see Basle Committee (1999).
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system of West Germany from 1990. Banks found it increasingly difficult to 
maintain, much less increase, their capital ratios as the deadline for the full 
implementation of the Accord neared in 1992. Faced with the possibility of being the 
only Basel Committee state, save for Japan, to fail to meet the implementation 
deadline, the FBSA conceded to banks’ demands and, in the first instance, permitted 
the inclusion of hidden securities reserves as tier 2 capital.46 Once this concession 
was made, other quickly followed as, by end-1992, the FBSA permitted the inclusion 
of revaluation reserves and general loan provisions 47 Faced with pressure from their 
banks and a tough economic climate, German capital regulations quickly fell into line 
with other members of the G-10.
7.4.3. Hypotheses Review: First Period
The analysis of France and Germany’s implementation in the first period suggests that 
the two were initially guided by the rules of their pre-Basel standards. Though 
characterized as a loser in the Basel negotiations by Oatley and Nabors (1998), France 
successfully negotiated the inclusion of the capital elements most important to its 
domestic banks, particularly loan loss reserves. While the bank political power 
hypothesis suggested that banks with a relatively weak domestic power positions 
would suffer a strict interpretation of the Basel rules, this does not appear have been 
the situation in France during the late 1980s. The high level of state involvement in 
the French system provided for more a symbiotic relationship among regulators and 
banks, rather than the conflicting relationship assumed by the hypothesis. If the 
regulators increased the capital requirements, it would be the state itself that would 
have to bank roll much of this increase. The high level of government ownership in
46 American Banker, 31 December 1991; Economist, 26 October 1991.
47 For a review of Germany’s present capital standards, see Maccario et al. (2002).
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the French banking market thus seems to have been influential. In addition, the 
regulators and firms were especially anxious to influence the EC capital adequacy 
negotiations to ensure that the 1986 German-led effort at a strong standard was 
watered down to allow for the inclusion of France’s capital preferences. To 
accomplish this, the entire French policy network presented a united front at the Own 
Funds/Solvency Ratio Directive negotiations. This convergence of goals continued 
into the 1990s so that the regulators allowed and even suggested that banks issue 
capital instruments and engage in capital raising activities that drew objections from 
other Basel Committee states.
For France, there did not appear to be much of a distinction between the initial 
implementation and the evolution of implementation over time. The same regime that 
the country adopted in the 1970s survived largely intact until the early 1990s. Path 
dependence characterized the French approach to the implementation of the Accord as 
the agreement did not make any major demands for change upon existing practice and 
there were no influential domestic interests that supported change.
Likewise, Germany’s initial interpretation of the Accord largely mirrored its 
extant practice. Distinct from France, however, this path dependency originated in 
the divergent, not isomorphic, interests of the German regulators and banks. As Story 
(1997:267) observed, “the German social market’s buzz word is inclusiveness which a 
feature of corporate governance among the firms and of federal and state politics.” 
Within this framework of policy making, the German banking regulator was reluctant 
to implement capital standards that the country’s major banks opposed, especially as 
the peak association was responsible for many implementation/compliance duties on 
behalf of the state. Without a consensus, there was no effort to implement the Basel
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Accord until the early 1990s and the existing capital standards, already among the 
strictest, were left unchanged for numerous years.
Unlike France, however, Germany experienced a great deal of evolution in its 
Basel interpretations during the first three years of the Accord’s implementation. 
Support seems to be provided for the economic instability hypothesis. In Germany 
there was a massive change in regulatory content over a two-year period. Unlike the 
US, however, this change did not come so much from a Kane-style regulatory 
dialectic process so much as a practical response to the fear that their largest banks 
would be among a minority of the G-lO’s internationally active banks who would not 
comply with the Accord by 1993. It seems that international and regional imitation 
factors were important in driving the convergence of Germany’s capital regime with 
that of other G-10 and European states. The economic upheaval created by 
Germany’s reunification strained their banks’ resources to the point where it became 
clear that a change would have to be made. As the German peak association already 
had a list of improvements to the Credit Law prepared, which called for the inclusion 
of hidden reserves and loan loss provisions, the easiest option for the Federal Bank 
Supervisory Office was to agree to their requests. In doing so, Germany altered a 
capital adequacy regime that had remained largely intact since the 1960s. The failure 
of the FBSO and Bundesbank to negotiate any of their positions successfully in Basel 
and Brussels placed Germany’s banks in a position where they could no longer 
support their regime while the economic difficulties of the 1990s pushed the FBSO 
into an agreement with its banks.
Drawing together the results from the initial implementation period of France, 
Germany, and the US, banking crises seem to have been the chief contributor to 
departures from pre-existing regulatory regimes. The political economic imperatives
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created by banking crises led to changes in the German and American regimes and, in 
the absence of such a crisis, the French maintained the status quo. The success of this 
hypothesis seems to augment explanations that predict that domestic interpretations of 
international soft laws will largely reflect only the state of the previous regime, since 
the presence or absence of an imperative such as a financial crisis may intervene in 
this relationship. Evidence for the capture hypothesis seems more mixed as the bank 
power positions in Germany remained constant over the period of time studied yet 
different regulations emerged over time.
Lastly, little support seems to be provided for the international pressure or 
hegemonic hypotheses. Other than EC objections to France’s weighting of 
securitizations, which made little impact on French practice, there is not much 
evidence that the Basel members exerted pressure on one another’s interpretations 
during this period. In the case of Germany, fear of international competitive 
disadvantage drove the loosening of regulations. Yet, such pressures emerged only 
after the onset of macroeconomic instability. This latter variable thus seems to be 
more important in explaining Germany’s policy during this period.
7.5. Second Implementation Period (1993-2000)
Unlike their American counterparts, French and German regulators did not effect 
constant amendments to their capital adequacy standards through the 1990s. 
Germany’s capital standards remained constant after 1993 and France’s constant for 
the entire sample period. Understanding why these European states’ credit risk 
standards were relatively stable for this seven year period of time will be the concern 
of this section.
First, it should not be suggested that attention to capital adequacy regulation
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waned in Europe after 1993 and remained active solely in the United States. Rather, 
the focus of European regulators seemed to shift more towards the negotiation and 
implementation of substantial amendments and extensions to the Own Funds and 
Solvency Ratio Directives. Though the Americans discussed the formation of a 
unilateral interest rate risk charge and proved to be keen advocates of the Basel 
market risk amendment and the negotiation of the Basel Accord 2, European states 
were involved in an endless round of negotiations on the capital adequacy of their 
financial institutions.
In particular, the EU rapidly negotiated a standard for the market risks of their 
financial institutions. The negotiation of the CADI agreement in advance of the 1996 
Basel market risk standard seems quite natural from the point of view of their 
implementation of the 1988 Basel Accord. The application of this credit risk standard 
to all financial institutions (including local and regional banks and securities firms in 
addition to transnational commercial banks) made it more necessary to develop a 
charge for banks' market risks—a more critical business risk for investment banks than 
commercial banks. European states were thus more concerned with the integration of 
these standards into the credit risk regulations than US banks. The market risk 
amendment was not implemented in the US until 1996 and then was only applicable 
to a sub-set of the US banks.
To understand the influence of these negotiations on France and Germany's 
credit risk regulations, the following sections will analyze the state of the French and 
German banking markets and regulatory practices from 1993 to 2000.
7.5.1. Germany
Capital adequacy regulation became an increasingly important political topic in
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Germany after the 1988 Accord. As discussed, deep fractures emerged in the 
relationship between German money center banks and the FBSA during the 
implementation of the credit risk directives. This politicization intensified through the 
1990s as the scope of regional and international capital adequacy negotiations seemed 
to further diverge from German interests.
Germany had become increasingly wary of multilateral efforts to regulate 
capital. In particular, it was extraordinarily delinquent in its implementation of CADI 
and the ISD. These directives were implemented by nearly all EU member-states by 
the January 1996 deadline. Yet, Germany claimed that the complexity of the 
directives prevented their immediate implementation for German banks and securities 
houses. It is not clear why these regulations were more complicated to implement in 
Germany than the other 14 signatories yet many believed that German banks derived 
a substantial competitive advantage from not implementing these directives. This was 
certainly the view of many EU states that also had to deal with complications arising 
from how to regulate German bank operating within their jurisdictions. The EU rules 
require the home state to regulate subsidiaries operating abroad, yet this delineation is 
complicated when the host state implements regulations that the home state has not.48
Moreover, it is possible that Germany was able to sidestep the effects of the 
original CAD altogether. CAD2 was negotiated in line with the 1996 Basel 
amendment to allow banks to set their own capital requirements for market risks with 
their own risk management modeling systems. Many German banks opposed any 
effort to implement CADI after the 1996 deadline expired, and moved straight to the 
implementation of CAD2 that would impose a smaller regulatory burden. Such 
behavior was not well received in many European capitals though a London-based
48 Euromoney, April 1997.
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finance industry lobbyist observed that, "[t]he Germans have been bloody smart about 
this...[o]nce CAD2 is in place they [German banks] can have one-stop 
implementation...[o]ur banks [in Britain] have had to go to standard rules for two 
years, that has meant a big investment in systems.”49
Germany has been instrumental in delaying the successful negotiation of the 
Basel Accord 2. German regulators have insisted on being provided with special 
derogations from the new Accord's definitions of capital and risk-weight 
specifications. Germany claims that these derogations are necessary to ensure the 
Accord matches the idiosyncrasies of its banking market, much like the 1988 Accord 
was molded around the particularistic interests of G-10 states in a "soft law" 
arrangement. Yet, on this occasion, the Basel Committee has not been so easy to 
convince that Germany is not simply out to preserve competitive advantages at the 
expense of domestic financial stability and a homogenous regulatory playing field. 
Many agree with The Economist's conclusion that German regulators are seeking "to 
protect their charges by rigging international rules in their favour."50 Alan Greenspan 
warned Germany to stop playing politics with a necessary amendment to the Accord 
in the protection of "provincial interests."51 This rift has proven more serious than the 
1998 US-German dispute and some journalists have hypothesized that it portents the 
end of the collegiality of the Basel Committee and may hamper future efforts to work 
through this committee.52
By mid-1999, the Basel 2 deadlock was broken as the US agreed to most of 
Germany's objections. The future viability of the Basel 2 agreements and the Basel 
Committee are not yet settled. Yet looking back at the negotiation of the 1988 Accord
49 Ibid.
50 The Economist, 22 May 1999
51 The American Banker, 7 May 1999
52 Financial Times, 13 May 1999.
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and EC directives, it is unexpected that Germany should emerge as a threat to the 
Basel process. Referring back to the discussion of the Accord's negotiation in 
Chapter 2, Germany joined France and Japan in opposition to elements of Basel 1; yet 
they were alone in arguing that the Accord established too lax a standard for 
multinational banks. Germany moved from a position of rejecting financial "soft law" 
that provided a wide latitude of national discretion to the loosening of their own 
capital standards in the early 1990s. More particularly, Germany became an opponent 
of multilateral capital agreements on the basis of their severity and an unambiguous 
non-complier with European capital directives.
7.5.2. France
France's capital adequacy policies provide an interesting contrast to American and 
German practices after 1993. Like Germany, France did not alter its Basel rule 
interpretations to any great extent during the 1990s, yet nor did it emerge at the center 
of international regulatory disputes like it did at the original Basel negotiations and 
like Germany during the late 1990s. A search of the pages of French language 
publications Les Echos, Le Monde, and Europolitique reveal eight stories concerning 
fonds propres from 1991 to 1992 and just six from 1993 to 2000. Moreover after 
1993, the stories radically alter from discussions of how French regulators and 
banking markets are adjusting to the Basel provisions to reports on the negotiation of 
additional capital standards in Brussels and Basel. There are no juicy soap operatic 
stories of diplomatic wrangles between Paris and other capitals over capital 
discussion. A study of the steady stream of financial code updates on the Commission 
Bancaire website reveal little mention of changes to France's capital standards during 
the late 1990s.
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The only major alteration in French policy involved the implementation of the 
1998 BCBS document concerning tax-deductible tier 1 preferred stock. A number of 
French banks, especially Credit Agricole and Credit Lyonnais, had attempted to raise 
capital with such instruments in New York markets during the early 1990s. Preferred 
stock was not allowed by French regulators at this time and French banks hoped to 
circumvent domestic law by issuing these securities through Wall Street subsidiaries 
and “downstream” them to the parent firm as American banks sough to do in the mid- 
1990s. French regulators had ruled that such behavior was unacceptable, and 
relegated these issues to tier 2 status. In implementing the 1998 agreement, France 
allowed its banks to give these tier 1 status.53
Yet France did not play a large role in this German-American dispute. France 
thus seemed to move from a position of voicing opposition to the 1988 Accord to 
being a more passive contributor to additional capital codes. The French moved from 
a position to being of being bullied by the US in international capital negotiations in 
the late 1980s, to being a seemingly cooperative partner by 2000.
7.5.3. Hypotheses Review: Second Period
A survey of the behaviors of France and Germany towards trans-national capital 
adequacy policy from 1993-2000 produces some unexpected results. Given the 
bargaining positions of these two European states at Basel, it is surprising that 
Germany turned into an opponent of efforts to extend the international capital 
adequacy regime while France did not. The economic instability hypothesis seems to 
play an important role in explaining these policy changes. Looking at the capital-to- 
assets and bank profitability data for France and Germany during this period, it seems
53 Euromoney, March 1998
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that German banks did not recover their profitability after German reunification, 
(Figure 7.1). German capital adequacy ratios were consistently over 200 basis points 
below those of their French competitors during the entire 1990s, while profitability 
only caught up during the latter part of the decade. Traditionally, German capital 
ratios were not high by international standards, yet many considered Germany a tough 
regulator of bank capital because of its restrictive definition of bank capital. After 
this definition had been expanded, Germany’s ratios now make the country seem a 
poor enforcer of solvency standards. As a result, German has adopted the position, 
once held by France and Japan, of opposing international capital adequacy policy and 
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Figure 7.1.
Unweighted Tier 1 Capital Ratios for Leading 10 French and German Banks: 1988-
2000
(Source: The Banker, various issues)
Conversely, French banks seemed in relatively good shape during the period. 
Though the largest ten commercial banks experienced a large profitability lag in 
1994-5, this did not effect capital adequacy ratios to any great degree. Consequently, 
in the absence of economic crises to force a massive shift in capital adequacy, French 
regulators and banks preferred to keep the status quo.
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Also, the private governance hypothesis seems to add little insight to either of 
these cases. In the case of the US, private market governance seems to have been 
quite instrumental in shaping banks and regulators preferences. Yet, French and 
German banks are subject to a much lower level of market governance than the US, 
and in line with the private governance hypothesis little market effect seemed to 
operate.
A final question pertinent to the study of these EU states is whether much of 
what occurred during the sample period was the result of regional imitation effects. 
Simmons (2000) found that states were significantly more likely to liberalize their 
capital accounts if their regional peers had liberalized. The root of this hypothesis 
was that adjacent states may share similar business practices and philosophies and 
regional economic exchange would be facilitated through the implementation of 
similar policies. This sort of regional effect does not seem to have influenced French 
and German regulators. The “mutual recognition” framework of EC single market 
policies ensures that regulatory convergence is not necessary to facilitate exchange. It 
may perhaps be argued that regional effects drove German regulators as they reduced 
their standards during the first implementation period and thus moved their standards 
closer to the French position. Yet, the changes in German policies appeared to be 
driven more by concern for the financial health of German banks rather than intra- 
European competition. Despite the wide degrees of regulatory cooperation in Europe, 
little regional convergence was evident.
7.6. Conclusions
This chapter detailed the implementation of the 1988 Basel Accord into European law 
and then analyzed the implementation of the EC Own Funds and Solvency Ratio
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Directives in France and Germany. The empirical detail suggests that France adopted 
a path dependent implementation position. The French “fit” their pre-Basel capital 
standards within the soft law provisions of the Accord and did not alter their 
interpretations to any great degree throughout the entire sample period. It was 
indicated that such policies lend support to the path dependence and economic 
instability hypotheses.
Germany started off on the same path dependent course as France. Yet, the 
onset of economic instability was correlated with a large loosening of Germany’s 
standards during the early 1990s. Moreover, Germany moved from a position of 
opposing international capital adequacy agreements because they establish weak 
credit standards in the late 1980s, to opposing them on the basis of their stringency 
during the late 1990s. The events also provided support for both variants of the path 
dependency hypothesis and the economic instability hypothesis.
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Chapter 8
Implementation of the Basel Accord in Japan
8.1. Introduction
Japan was expected to be financially disadvantaged by the 1988 Basel Accord. As 
previous chapters emphasized, many academics and members of the financial media 
believed that the Accord was a weapon designed by the United States to stem the 
international ambitions of Japanese banks by forcing them to adhere to the sorts of 
capital adequacy standards recognized by other industrial economies. This chapter 
commences by challenging this claim. Drawing from the political analyses of Tamura 
(2003b) and Sawabe (1995) and a string of econometric results by Wagster (1996), 
Section 8.1 argues that significant amounts of Japan’s input went into the final 
drafting of the Accord. Moreover, financial market actors regarded the Accord as a 
victory for Japanese banks during the late 1980s. Institutional investors and credit 
rating agencies believed that Japan’s largest banks would easily meet the capital 
adequacy standards laid out in the Ministry of Finance’s (MOF) interpretation of the 
Accord and accumulate more international market share.
As Sections 8.3 and 8.4 explain, Japanese banks were subject to a relatively 
lax interpretation of the Accord’s rules. This interpretation contributed to the 
domestic and international market optimism regarding the ability of Japanese banks to 
benefit from the agreement. Yet, this optimism quickly turned to pessimism as 
Japan’s economy shifted into more than a decade of recession from 1990. The 
collapse of the domestic asset price bubble exerted a disastrous impact on many of 
Tokyo’s largest banks. Generally, declining asset prices can impact any country’s 
banking system, yet the effect was far more acute in Japan where significant portions 
of bank capital are directly linked with equity market values. From around 1990 to
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after 2000, Japanese banks operated almost exclusively in the red and many may have 
maintained capital adequacy ratios significantly below the Basel minima.
Curiously, the severity of MOFs’ interpretations of the Accord varied very 
little during this period of economic instability. This chapter advances the argument 
that international market and political pressure prevented MOF from providing 
regulatory relief to their constituents for fear that such actions would further 
undermine confidence in the banking sector. Yet, it is extremely likely that Japan 
practiced “hidden defection” from the Accord by not penalizing banks for non- 
compliance with prudential codes and allowing—or indeed encouraging—banks to 
adhere to accounting and loan-loss provisioning policies that were of dubious 
prudential value. Though direct evidence for these implicit forms of defection are not 
easily obtained, recent research by Fukao (2002) attempts to quantify the impact of 
these policies on providing the cosmetic appearance that technically insolvent 
commercial banks were adhering to the Accord. In addition, significant amounts of 
secondary data by financial market analysts and actors supports the existence of such 
policies.
This chapter places new demands on the hypotheses enumerated in Chapter 3. 
The theoretical propositions were designed to explained variations in the stated 
severity of capital adequacy policy after the implementation of the Accord. Yet, such 
an approach seems of little heuristic utility when coming to grips with Japanese 
capital adequacy policy through the 1990s. Initial interpretations of the Accord, just 
after 1988, provide support for the “path dependency” hypothesis in the predicted 
direction. Yet, the emerging gap between stated policy and actual bank practice alters 
the dependent variable of interest. It is advanced that the maintenance and increasing 
severity of Japan’s stated capital adequacy codes resulted from international pressure
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from financial markets and BCBS members to hold domestic banks to a tough 
regulatory line. Yet, economic instability forced MOF to provide some regulatory 
relief while maneuvering through systemic constraints. The result was a return to the 
types of capital adequacy practices Japan maintained before the Accord: unenforced 
and of questionable prudential value.
8.2. Background
According to most political science accounts, Japan joined France in being 
economically disadvantaged by the Basel Accord. Oatley and Nabors (1998) and 
Kapstein (1989,1991,1994) concluded that the Accord established a regulatory 
capital definition much more severe than Japan’s extant practice and required a 
minimum capital-to-assets ratio much greater than Japan’s international banks could 
comfortably meet. This section advances the argument that the extent of Japan’s 
disadvantage from the Accord has been overstated. In a similar fashion to the 
discussion of France’s pre-1988 capital regime in Chapter 7, it will be argued that 
Japan’s extant capital practices were not necessarily much weaker to those in other 
industrial economies. At best, Oatley and Nabors, Kapstein, and others advanced 
their arguments without providing sufficient evidence to remain convincing when put 
to simple empirical test.
Secondly, this section investigates why Japan was so willing to agree to a 
multilateral capital adequacy accord in 1986 while European Community states 
balked. As Chapter 2 discussed, Japan agreed to join the 1986 US-UK bilateral 
capital agreement fairly expediently, while Germany and France denounced the 
bilateral deal as a threat to achieving a truly international accord. Given the stress 
placed on Japan’s loss in the Basel negotiations, it is curious that Oatley and Nabors
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do not conduct a more thorough analysis of why Japan agreed to join the bilateral 
accord so rapidly. Oatley and Nabors conclude that market pressure was responsible 
for Japan’s defeat in Basel. Yet, by drawing on Sawabe’s (1995) discussion of the 
domestic politics of Japan’s preferences in the Basel negotiations, this section 
concludes that the Accord was much more congruent with the interests of Japan’s 
policy-makers and banking institutions than is generally considered.1
Part of the explanation for this is that Japan’s financial regulatory regime was 
entering a period of relatively radical change in the mid to late 1980s. The financial 
sector was burdened with binding regulations after the Second World War. As Hall 
(1993:86) observed, ‘The post-war Japanese financial system was characterized by 
[the] rigid compartmentalization of financial institutions, underdeveloped financial 
markets, and blanket regulation, reinforced by extensive administrative guidance (i.e. 
moral suasion) of all financial intermediaries.” Under American supervision during 
the post-war occupation, banks and securities businesses were separated with legal 
firewalls. The banking sector itself was further segmented into institutions 
specializing in the issue of long term or short-term credits, those serving small and 
medium-sized businesses and specific industries, and those based in major cities or in 
more rural areas.3 The two lead regulators—the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the 
Bank of Japan (BOJ)—micromanaged commercial bank’s activities by setting 
standards on the sources and uses of their funds, the terms on which they could 
borrow and lend, and their ability to establish branches or merge/acquire other
1 This argument is also advanced in Tamura (2003).
2 For a discussion of the American influence on the post-war Japanese financial system, see Rosenbluth 
(1989:41).
3 Interestingly, the Japanese banking system’s emulation of the American system dates further back 
than the World War H reconstruction era. The present day financial system can be traced back to that 
established after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, which was then based on the US model. See Hall 
(1993:13-4).
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intermediaries.4 Heavy controls limited the activities of Japanese banks abroad and 
prevented foreign banks from operating in Japan.5 This tight system of regulation 
persisted for roughly forty years, yet began to weaken under a vector of domestic and 
international pressures in the mid-1980s.
Internationally, the United States worked to effect regulatory reform of the 
Japanese financial system in order to slow the growing international dominance of 
Japanese banking institutions. During the 1980s, the large Japanese ‘city’ banks 
initiated an enormous global expansion program. Japan’s banks had always played an 
important role in their domestic political economy through their cross-share holding 
linkages with the country’s largest industrial manufacturing and high-technology 
firms in the zaibatsu and keiretsu networks. Yet, until the late 1980s, these banks 
were relatively small participants in the international marketplace. In 1980 only one 
Japanese bank (Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank Ltd) ranked among the world’s largest ten.6 
Under a host of domestic regulatory incentives, however, this situation quickly 
changed over the course of the 1980s so that by 1988 Japanese banks held 38 percent 
of the international banking assets and all ten of the world’s leading ten banks, by 
capital, were Japanese.7
A large proportion of their expansion occurred through the acquisition of 
market share in the United States. By 1991, for example, US branches and 
subsidiaries of Japanese banks accounted for 18 percent of all US commercial and 
industrial (C & I) loans. This easily made Japan’s banks the largest foreign banks in 
the US. Moreover, Japanese banks accounted for over 60 percent of C & I loans 
issued by foreign banks over 50 percent of the US banking assets held by foreign
4 Ibid.
5 Verdier (2002:160-1).
6 The Banker (1980) produces an annual list of the world’s largest banks by capital.
7 Financial Regulation Report, 1 June 1994.
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Q
banks. Part of this rapid expansion may be explained by a favorable macroeconomic 
environment in which Japanese banks benefited from a booming domestic equities 
market, low domestic interest rates, and the strong value of the Yen vis-a-vis the US 
dollar over the decade. Yet, banks and policy-makers in the United States felt that 
this uncanny international expansion at least partly resulted from the favorable 
regulatory environment provided by Japan’s banking regulators.
Members of the US banking community objected to the weak capital adequacy 
standards enforced on Japan’s international banks. As discussed in Chapter 6, part of 
these objections lay with the low capitalization levels permitted by the MOF and the 
BOJ and the allowance of unrealized gains from investment accounts into the 
definition of regulatory capital.9 More broadly, however, US regulators argued that 
Japan’s aggressive international expansion was due to the tight reign that regulators 
kept on all aspects of the Japanese financial system. It was argued that controls on 
deposit rates permitted Japanese banks to raise capital cheaply by providing reliable 
access to low cost deposits. As Figure 8.1 indicates, Japan’s cost of equity has been 
significantly cheaper than other G-10 states. The absence of any international 
competition further kept capital costs down as the price of domestic bank shares on 
the Tokyo equity market was internationally high.10 In response to these perceived 
sources of competitive inequality, the US initiated numerous dialogues and discussion
groups11 to negotiate the liberalization of the Japanese market and the American
10Congress even threatened retaliation if national treatment were not adopted.
8 Peek and Rosengren (1999:30-1).
9 Scott (1995:894).
10 Hall (1993:144).
11 Especially the Joint Japan-US Ad Hoc Group on Yen-Dollar Exchange Rate, Financial, and Capital 
Market Issues.
12 This threat was included as part of the Riegle-Gam Bill. The original draft of this bill was aborted in 
October 1990. See Hall (1993:98).
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Interestingly, American demands were not inconsistent with those of Japanese 
bankers. As Japan’s banks accumulated a larger share of the global marketplace, they 
lobbied for the removal of the binding regulations on their range of activities. In 
parallel with the American banking policy network, Japanese banks demanded the 
liberalization of their deposit and lending rates, the removal of narrow maturity 
restrictions, and the ability to issue new financial instruments in which they could 
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Figure 8.1. Averages for G-10 Countries' Major Banks' Cost of Equity 
(source: Maccario, Sironi, and Zazzara (2002:27)
Japanese regulators responded to these demands, yet placed strengthening the 
prudential regulatory framework ahead of a ‘big bang’ liberalization.14 In June 1985, 
the MOF advisory committee issued a paper entitled “The Development of Financial 
Liberalization and its Environmental Arrangements.” Interestingly, a key element of 
this paper on liberalization concerned the need to amend banks’ capital adequacy 
practices in advance of plans to liberalize the domestic or international activities of 
banking institutions. Japanese banks had been subject to explicit minimum capital
13 Hall (1993:97).
14 Tamura (2003) claims that the restrictive financial environment was partly the product o f the weak 
capital adequacy regulatory requirements.
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requirements since 1945, yet these were not enforced by regulators and largely 
ignored by banks.15
However, MOF officials had little reason to hope that strict capital adequacy 
standards could be implemented in tandem with their liberalization program. A 1979 
effort by MOF to tighten capital regulations—through the implementation of a 
minimum 10 percent ratio requirement—was soundly defeated by the commercial 
banks’ powerful peak organization, the Federation of Bankers’ Associations of Japan 
(FBAJ). The FBAJ successfully appealed to the governing Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) to remove MOF s’ capital adequacy regulations from the legislative agenda. 
Bankers argued that they were more capable of monitoring their own solvency than 
regulators and possibly sealed their case by paying off influential legislators.16 
Hence, Japan’s lead banking regulator needed to employ an alternative policy strategy 
in order to strengthen prudential standards over bankers’ objections before 
liberalization proceeded.
Tamura (2003b) and Sawabe (1995) argue that the MOF utilized the Basel 
Accord as part of such a strategy. Unable to overcome domestic political opposition 
to the implementation of a unilateral capital adequacy standard, Japanese banking 
regulators used the international forum to foist a new prudential standard on their 
regulatees. The need for such a strategy was evident by early 1987. An effort to 
revisit the tightening of capital standards after the issue of the 1985 liberalization 
paper proved that banks remained resistant to attempts to raise their capital ratios. In 
May 1986, the MOF issued an administrative guidance considerably less severe than 
their 1979 attempt. Banks with overseas branches were required to hold 6 percent of
15 It is possible that regulators had made efforts to make capital standards more actionable, yet failed. 
Hall (1993:145) notes that MOFs 1985 paper on the topic followed a failed attempt to implement a 10 
percent target ratio over the objections of the banking lobby.
16 Tamura (2003) suggests that banks paid as much as 500 million yen to influential LDP politicians to 
ensure the capital adequacy legislation’s defeat.
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non-risk-weighted assets in capital and were permitted to count 70 percent of their 
unrealized capital gains as regulatory capital.17 Moreover, the legislation did not 
grant any new enforcement powers to MOF or the BOJ to assign penalties for non-
10
compliance. Despite MOFs’ concessions, banks were largely unresponsive. There 
is little evidence that banks complied with the regulatory capital limitations and 8 of 
the main 13 city banks decreased their CARs in 1986. Tamura (2003b:7) concludes 
that, “[t]he new guidelines were a victory for banks, on balance.”
The result was the MOFs1 acquiesce to the 1986 US-UK bilateral capital 
accord.19 It should not be concluded that MOF sought to discipline their banks while 
subordinating the goal of representing their interests entirely in Basel. It certainly was 
not in MOFs’ interests to stem the raising international profile and competitiveness of 
their constituents. Remember, that American and British regulators were opposed to 
permitting any quantity of unrealized capital gains into regulatory capital. Such gains 
(which qualify as “asset revaluation reserves” in the Accord’s Tier 2 capital) were 
viewed as a highly impure form of capital that could potentially destabilize a banking 
system. These reserves represent banking holdings in securities and real estate and 
thus their value (and their ability to contribute to a “capital cushion”) may be 
diminished by declines in the market values of these assets. British and American 
regulators pointed out that such reserves could decline during a market downturn, 
therefore creating a procyclical exacerbation of the economic cycle. This was the 
exact opposite of the intended effect of capital adequacy policy. Nevertheless, these 
reserves were an important component of Japanese banks’ capital and MOF battled its
17 Unrealized capital gains are considered to be a very weak form of capital and some have observed 
that their inclusion in regulatory capital can increase bank stability. More will be said of these reserves 
later in this chapter, yet also see Section 4.2.2. (Part A) in Chapter 4 and Rabobank International (1999) 
and Matten (2000).
18 Tamura (2003:7).
19 For a further discussion of these negotiations, see Section 2.2 in Chapter 2.
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international counterparts for their inclusion and was ultimately successful in securing
a clause allowing 45 percent of such reserves into the US-UK accord and ultimately
the 1988 standard.20
Nevertheless, much evidence suggests that MOFs’ objective were also to pull
their banks into line. Tamura (2003b: 10) argues that MOF leveraged the information
asymmetries created by the closed nature of the Basel (and US-UK trilateral)
negotiations to force Japanese banks to raise their CARs. Banks were warned that the
negotiations were not proceeding according to their interests and that banks must
agree to re-capitalize and be prepared to compromise over levels of required capital
01and specifications of capital. The result was that the FBAJ was satisfied with the 
ultimate results of the trilateral negotiations and willing to comply with the new 
standards, glad that revaluation reserves were to be permitted and the capital-to-assets 
ratio was no greater than that prescribed by MOF in 1986.
Thus, as the Accord moved into the implementation phase, it is not clear that 
the key members of Japan’s banking network were dissatisfied with the results. MOF 
was able to at last implement a firmer prudential framework to underpin the 
liberalization program, while Japanese banks felt that they had achieved a victory in 
the international negotiations. In fact, in Price Waterhouse’s (1991) survey of bankers 
in the Basel and EC states, Japanese bankers responded that they did not feel
disadvantaged by the Accord nor did they have any major amendments they would
00aim to make to the Accord’s provisions.
20 Interestingly, Tamura (2003) argues that the Japanese success in securing the inclusion of revaluation 
reserves was due, in part, to the importance of Japanese banks to the international banking market. 
Oatley and Nabors (1996) argued that it was US market power that allowed it to dominate the Accord’s 
negotiation process on its terms. Yet, Tamura argues that the large international market share and high 
quality credit ratings of Japan’s banks made Japan a fully necessary part of any multilateral regulatory 
standard and a necessary ally for further discussions in Basel.
21 Interview with Nakahira K Suke, Director General of the MOF Banking Bureau, September 1999 in 
Tamura (2003:11).
22 Price Waterhouse (1991:32).
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What are the implications of this result for the redistributive explanation for 
the Accord’s negotiation? Oatley and Nabors (1996) argue the Accord was designed 
to distribute market share away from Japan in order to distribute it to its US and 
British competitors. This argument assumes that Japan had relatively weak capital 
ratios and capital standards before the Accord and that Japan’s banking policy 
network maintained a monolithic preference.
First, as in the case of France, it is not easy to unambiguously assert that 
Japan’s capital adequacy practices were below the international norm. While MOF 
certainly thought that its banks’ capital ratios were too low to sustain their level of 
international involvement, statistical analysis confounds the easy confirmation of this 
argument through cross-national comparison. The un-weighted capital ratios of 
Japanese banks’ (see Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2) are not among the highest in the G-10, 
yet over a fifteen-year period (1970-1985) they are also not the lowest. Moreover, 
these data are taken from The Banker’s global bank rankings that compare banks on a 
very limited capital definition: common stock, disclosed reserves, and retained 
earnings. Japan maintained a relatively narrow definition of capital save for the 
inclusion of unrealized gains. The amount of these reserves was unknown. A 1989 
Merrill Lynch Capital Markets study concluded that an approximate figure might be 
around USD300 billion, yet the property price bubble that emerged in the 1980s 
potentially made the reserves virtually “limitless.” In fact, when the revaluation 
reserves are included in the capital definition, Japan’s capital ratios are nearly 200 
basis points above the G-10 average.24
It may be asserted that including any quantity of unrealized gains constitutes a 
weak capital definition given the potential procyclical effect these leverage on bank’s
23 American Banker, 29 September 1989.
24 Data taken from calculations made by De Nederlandsche Bank, presented in Basel Committee 
(1999:7).
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balance sheets. Yet, Japan was not the only state to maintain such reserves and, as 
Table 4.4 in Chapter 4 illustrated, the majority of the sample utilized here adopted 
some form of revaluation reserves. Finally, it is extremely difficult to argue that 
revaluation reserves constitute a weaker capital instrument than allowing cumulative 
preference shares in tier 1 as the US maintained. As with implementation, there is 
probably not an either/or conclusion possible, yet a nuanced or “degrees of severity” 
possibility that endogenizes tax and accounting standards, costs of equity, and a 
number of other political economic variables. A thorough review of the capital 
adequacy literature in Basel Committee (1999) indicates that such an analysis has not 
been successfully completed.
Where Japan may have indeed been demonstrably weaker is in the 
enforcement of its pre-Basel standards. Though codified since 1945, neither MOF nor 
BOJ possessed powers of enforcements and clearly, from the discussion above, 
enforcement was a key problem. Yet, the Accord did not provide much guidance on 
the domestic enforcement of its provisions and hence it is not clear that Oatley and 
Nabor’s (1998) argument is relevant to this concern.
Second, the redistributive argument assumes that all members of the Japanese 
banking policy network maintained convergent preferences at the trilateral and 
multilateral negotiations. By assuming that states are unitary actors, Oatley and 
Nabors sketch a parsimonious explanation of the Accord’s economic intentions and 
effects. In doing so, they “black box” away the extent to which MOF leveraged upon 
multilateral public policy for local policy enforcement. In so doing, these authors 
miss Tamura’s (2003b) conclusion that both Japanese regulators and bankers were 
satisfied with the Basel Accord for the domestic and international objectives that it 
helped fulfill as the agreement entered the implementation phase.
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8.3. First Period Implementation of the Basel Accord (1988-1992)
Japanese bankers seemed especially optimistic about their prospects for further 
international expansion immediately after the implementation of the Basel Accord. 
The MOF implemented the 1988 Accord with an administrative guidance issue soon 
after the multilateral talks completed. The result was a new domestic capital 
adequacy standard that offered banks a wider selection of capital instruments to count 
as regulatory capital. Though bankers needed to work their balance sheets to meet the 
new tier 1 ratio targets and MOF had implemented a slightly stricter interpretation of 
the risk-weighting framework than Basel required, the growth of the domestic equities 
market remained unabated in the late 1980s and bank profitability continued to rise. 
Some academics have gone so far to as conclude that equities markets rewarded 
Japan’s banks for emerging from the Basel regulations without incurring any 
disruptive compliance costs. As this section narrates, however, this optimism ended 
as soon as equities markets began to tumble in 1990. By 1992, many city banks 
struggled to meet the Basel ratio minims. Similar to the case of the US in early 
1990s, this economic turbulence led bankers to lobby for leniency in the application 
of the Accord’s provisions and a break down in the Accord’s enforcement resulted.
Yet before the burst of the Japanese “bubble economy,” the Accord produced 
optimism in the Japanese banking markets. Bankers, regulators, and international 
market actors were confident that the city banks would easily clear the minimum 
requirements and some expected the Accord to fuel further international market 
expansion and profitability. The reason for such optimism seems to be the
25 Wagster (1996).
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performance of the Tokyo equities market during the late 1980s. As Figure 8.2 
indicates, the value of the Nikkei 225 index escalated rapidly from 1985 to 1990.
While American, French, and German bankers battled with their respective 
regulators over the minutia of the implementation process, Japanese banks worked to 
raise capital through the realization of securities profits. Though only 45 percent of 
such profits contributed to the capital base, the value of such holdings continued to 
inflate as the broader macroeconomy accelerated. If there was any cause for concern, 
it was in the city banks’ ability to raise sufficient quantities of tier 1 capital. One 
report concluded that these banks would need to raise 6,325 billion yen of equity 
capital to reach the minimal standard. Yet with the booming stock price 
performance of the city banks, it became increasingly easy for these banks to raise 
fresh equity. Indeed, an officer at Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank commented that after a 
series of fresh equity injections, the bank would have a CAR well in excess of 8 
percent and would seek to use this as a marketing tool to further their inroads into the 
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Figure 8.2. Nikkei 225 Index: 1985-2000 
(source: Fukao 2002)
26 The Banker, 1 January 1989.
27 Financial Regulation Report, 1 June 1988.
28 Euromoney, July 1988.
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Some academic studies of the microeconomic effects of the Accord concurred 
with this optimistic assessment. In particular Cooper, Kolari, and Wagster (1991) and 
Wagster (1996) estimated the effects of public regulatory announcements concerning 
the implementation of the Accord on the stock prices of internationally active banks. 
They found that Japan benefited in the eyes of investors. In particular, Wagster 
(1996) found a statistically significant 32 percent cumulative wealth gain for Japanese 
banks when analyzing public announcements until 11 July 1988. The author 
concludes that this indicates that investors considered the Accord a “ratification by the 
G-10 and EC countries of the market share gains made by Japanese banks.” Before 
the Accord, Japanese banks faced the prospect of being shut out of the American and 
European markets through political intervention. Yet the Accord assured access so 
long as these banks met the Basel standards. By allowing Japanese banks to count 45 
percent of their unrealized gains, the Accord assured that compliance could be easily 
obtained and that compliance costs would be minimal compared with the benefits of 
diffusing the political controversy over Japan’s regulatory system.
The MOFs generous interpretation of the Accord seems to support this set of 
inferences. As Chapter 4 revealed, Japan’s First Period CREG score was 13, which 
was about one standard deviation lower than the 18-country sample mean. Minimal 
interpretations were adopted in the three of the six policy areas (tier 1 capital, 
minimum ratio requirement, and off-balance sheet risk-weights) with superequivalent 
interpretations being made in two (Tier 2 capital and on-balance sheet risk-weights) 
and a below minimum interpretation in one (capital deductions). The superequivalent 
interpretations are the result of the exclusion of one form of asset revaluation reserve 
in regulatory tier 2 capital and the imposition of a 10 percent weighting on local
29 Wagster (1996:1342).
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government credits. The below minimum interpretation included the watering down 
of the requirement that banks deduct the value of investments in the capital in 
unconsolidated banking and financial subsidiaries. The latter likely reflects MOFs 
desire to support the broad cross-equity holding structures of many keiretsu. Thus on 
balance, MOFs interpretations were just at the minimal level. Both market and 
political actors seemed to regard this as an advantageous regulatory position for 
Japanese banks.
As observed earlier, however, this optimism evaporated very quickly when the 
Japanese macroeconomy slipped into recession. Beginning in 1990, economic growth 
dramatically slowed and the value of traded equities tumbled. As Figure 8.2 
illustrates, the Nikkei 225 index lost over 40 percent of its value from fiscal years 
1989 to 1990. Banks’ share prices were particularly hit as the slump in equities prices 
directly bit into their capital bases through the plummeting value of core capital and 
the stunting of banks’ abilities to raise secondary capital through the realization of 
securities holdings. As Figure 8.3 indicates, the fall in the index of banks share prices 
was particularly brutal from a high of 97.1 in 1989 to 56.4 in 1992.
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As the extent of the burst of the asset bubble became clear, many worried that 
Japanese banks would be unable to meet the Basel minima by 1992. While declining
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equities prices can produce deleterious consequences for any publicly traded banks’ 
capital adequacy, it is especially the case for Japanese banks due to their strong 
reliance on unrealized securities values. As mentioned, these instruments can 
contribute a procyclical effect on bank stability as their values decline in a general 
market downturn, just when intermediaries require them most urgently. Yet, it was 
their key importance to the Japanese banking industry’s capital practice that makes 
this a more acute difficulty than in other G-10 and European economies. The Banker 
produced a rough estimate (see Table 8.1) that the further the Nikkei 225 fell below 
22,000 the greater the number of Tokyo city banks would fall below the minimum 
Basel ratio requirements. Though The Banker’s data can only be regarded as an 
estimation, if these data are plausible then all but one of Japan’s city banks would 
have total capital to risk-assets ratios below 8 percent by 1992. It is impossible to 
empirically verify whether such an event occurred as Japanese banks’ disclosures of 
their full Basel ratios was sketchy at best. Yet, looking at the un-weighted primary 
capital data employed in other case studies, it is clear that Japan’s ratios were 
declining in absolute and relative terms. Moreover, the poor disclosure record of the 
total risk-weighted ratios is suggestive of a possible breach of the Basel minima, 
particularly in consideration of Dai-Ichi’s earlier comments that the publication of 
such ratios would be employed as a marketing tool.
Moreover, the declining equity market was not the only difficulty hitting 
Japanese banks’ balance sheets. The collapse in the Tokyo market raised suspicions 
about the stability of Japan’s banks in the international financial markets so that
30 The data cannot be assumed to be fully accurate, as they are estimates relying on possibly unreliable 
assumptions about the composition of banks’ balance sheets (i.e. their level of risk assets) and the 
banks’ abilities to raise capital through the issue of other instruments, such as subordinated debt.
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Nikkei 225 Level: 18,500 19,500 20,500 21,500
Dai-Ichi Kangyo 7.21% 7.41% 7.61% 7.80%
Mitsui Taiyo Kobe 7.06% 7.30% 7.35% 7.35%
Sumitomo 7.61% 7.79% 7.96% 8.14%
Fuji 7.51% 7.70% 7.90% 8.09%
Mitsubishi 7.39% 7.59% 7.80% 8.01%
Sanwa 6.99% 7.19% 7.39% 7.59%
Tokai 7.50% 7.73% 7.96% 8.05%
Daiwa 7.42% 7.71% 8.00% 8.29%
Hokkaido Takushoku 8.25% 8.46% 8.67% 8.74%
Bank of Tokyo 6.85% 7.01% 7.17% 7.33%
Kyowa Saitama 7.56% 7.79% 8.01% 8.24%
Average 7.40% 7.61% 7.80% 7.97%
Table 8.1. Estimated Effects of the Nikkei 225 on City Banks9 Capital Ratios
(source: The Banker, 1 January 1992)
raising other forms of supplementary capital was stymied. Though the unwillingness 
of Japan’s bankers to publicly discuss their funding positions makes primary data 
sources difficult to obtain, market data suggests that after 1990, Japanese banks were 
forced to offer 14 basis points more on CD issues in the Eurodollar inter-bank market 
than their North American and European competitors. Despite the economic 
difficulties of many American, French, and German banks during this period, they 
were able to issue CDs at around 7 BP below the London inter-bank bid rate (LIBID) 
while Japan’s banks paid 7 BP over LIBID, up from 3 BP at year-end 1989.31 Efforts 
at raising supplementary funding were also hit on the domestic market as demand for 
Japanese banks’ freshly issued subordinated debt was not sufficient to allow this
T9instrument to make up for the decline in unrealized securities gains’ values. Also, 
Hall (1993:17) observed that the initiation of the MOFs’ liberalization program hurt 
bank funding. While emboldened to pursue deregulatory policies now that a formal 
capital policy was in place, MOFs’ decision to lift official deposit rate ceilings from
31 The Banker, 16 October 1990.
32 The Banker, 1 January 1991.
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1990 impaired city banks’ margins further thus hurting these banks’ abilities to add 
retained earnings to regulatory capital.
In short, what emerges by the end of the Basel transition period is a full 180- 
degree turnaround in the fortunes of Japan’s largest banks. The economic response by 
the city banks was a growing retrenchment from their expansive growth in both 
international and domestic positions that had evolved steadily since 1945. Again, data 
from Japan’s banks was limited, yet Peek and Rosengren (1990) suggest that the 
macroeconomic contraction led city banks to reduce their asset holdings after 1990, 
the first such decline since the end of the Second World War. Japan’s banks may 
have sought to shift lending away from the low-margin but high volume businesses 
that had bolstered their international position in the 1980s into low risk lending in 
domestic housing loans, government bonds, and guaranteed loans to domestic small 
and medium sized enterprises. Though unpublished, the market decline may have 
caused the level of non-performing loans to explode, possibly to a level of 7 percent 
of total outstanding credits during this time. Moreover, these intermediaries began 
to withdraw from their international exposures. Though more of this will be 
discussed later, the withdrawal of Japanese banks from the American market may 
have exacerbated the supply-side credit crunch that emerged throughout the US 
during the early 1990s.34
The city banks’ political response was to demand forbearance of the Basel 
Accord’s application. Like their American peers, Japanese banks demanded that 
MOF provide regulatory relief to banks in light of the changing macroeconomic 
environment. The composite of data collected on Japan’s implementation of the 
Accord suggests that banks were only partly successful in this effort. Relying on
33 Huh and Kim (1994).
34 Hall (1993:157).
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Japanese language documents, Tamura (2003b) argues that MOF resisted efforts to 
change their interpretation of the Accord. Noishimura Yoshimasa, the director of 
MOFs’ Fiscal and Monetary Research Institute, argued that this was necessary as a 
lenient or postponed interpretation of the Accord would only exacerbate the growing 
international confidence crisis in the Japanese financial system.35 In fact, rather than 
water down their interpretation of the Accord, MOF further codified their extant 
interpretations through supporting a 1992 revision to the Banking Law that provided a 
statutory—rather than administrative guidance—basis for formal, domestic capital 
requirements patterned on their interpretation of the 1988 agreement.
Other evidence, however, suggests that banks were not so overruled as a literal 
reading of their statutory requirements might suggest. European and American 
bankers, academics, and regulators seem fairly unanimous in believing that Japan’s 
capital adequacy regulations were poorly enforced. Though further evidence of this 
came to light in the mid to late 1990s, by 1992 it was clear that MOF was not likely to 
punish banks that did not meet the required Basel minima. No prompt corrective 
mechanism was in place to automatically sanction banks failing to meet the trigger 
ratios laid out in the Accord and there is no evidence that MOF took any discretionary 
action to sanction city banks that were clearly in breach of the Accord. By 2000, 
evidence suggests that this “enforcement gap” increased to the point that it may be 
argued that MOF intentionally circumvented the spirit of the Accord through lax 
enforcement guidelines. This will be further discussed in Section 8.4.
35 Sh_kant_y_Keizai, 5 September 1992 in Tamura (2003:13).
36 American Banker (20 April 1992), Financial Regulation Report (1 June 1994), Scott and Iwahara 
(1994), Scott (1995), Ward (2002), and Tamura (2003a).
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8.3.1. Hypotheses Review: First Period Implementation
The first several years of the Accord’s implementation in Japan lends some support to 
a number of the hypotheses. First, elements of the broader “bank preferences” 
hypotheses received some support. Banks preferences seemed conditioned by a desire 
to include elements of the pre-Basel capital regime—or rather non-regime—into the 
1988 Accord and its domestic interpretation. As part of a broader effort to support 
their continued international expansion, Japanese bankers resisted efforts to 
implement an international standard that excluded unrealized securities, the key 
idiosyncratic instrument of their capital base. The inclusion of these instruments in 
the bilateral and multilateral Accords might reflect a negotiation victory for Japanese 
regulators and banks and it minimized the gap between Japanese banks existing 
practice and new demands placed on them by a Basel Committee agreement. 
However, contrary to the predicted direction of effect, the involvement of Japanese 
banks in international markets did not prompt them to pursue the implementation of a 
stricter standard than the international norm. Yet given the positive signals given by 
international equity markets to Japan’s implementation of the Accord, this does not 
seem to have been necessary. If anything, supporting the implementation of any 
international standard included some portion of unrealized securities by the city banks 
was enough to placate international markets that might have feared far worse when 
the US-UK bilateral deal was announced without such reserves in regulatory capital.
The macroeconomic variables also seem to receive some measured support. 
Principally, economic instability from 1990 clearly had an adverse impact on the 
Japanese banking industry. Yet, the collapse of the asset bubble did not contribute to 
a change in the published capital policy. In fact, some evidence suggests that the 
level of international governance might have interacted with the macroeconomic crisis
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to produce this “no change” as MOF officials worried about the influence of lax 
capital adequacy regulations on international markets. Yet, banks were not without 
some regulatory relief as evidence suggests that MOF did act to forbear the bite of the 
Accord through lax enforcement. In this regard, some support may be provided to 
“bank power” hypothesis in conjunction with the macroeconomic instability 
hypothesis, as Japanese banks were indeed able to acquire some regulatory relief.
The failure to endogenize enforcement is clearly a weakness of the 
quantitative study conducted in Chapter 5. Though numerous academics and 
practitioners have observed enforcement’s importance in looking at the impact of 
capital regulations, most opinions on this topic have identified Japan as the particular 
culprit. The US, France, and Germany case studies did not suggest that enforcement 
was of particular concern. Also, it is difficult to design an ex ante measure of rule 
enforcement. Given that rule enforcement involves a vector of unobservable—or at 
least difficult to observe—policy variables, it is difficult to capture this phenomenon 
with one variable. More will be said of this topic in the next section.
8.4. Second Period Implementation of the Basel Accord (1993-2000)
During the period of time analyzed in this section, the Japanese banking industry 
moved from one major crisis to the next. By some estimates, Japan’s city banks were 
in the red for eight consecutive years from 1993 to 2001. As one commentator put it, 
“[i]t may seem strange, but banking has turned into an unprofitable, structurally 
depressed industry.”37 During this period of acute distress, the vagaries of allowing 
particular forms of capital instruments or requiring certain ratios became subordinate 
to constructing a package of lax enforcement and accounting standards that would
37 Fukao (2002:7).
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permit many technically insolvent Japanese banks to remain afloat and ostensibly 
remain in compliance with the Basel Accord. With one exception, there was very little 
change in the broad contours of the interpretation of the 1988 Accord, yet policy areas 
touched on by the Accord were of central attention to Japanese banks, regulators, and 
policy-makers.
The asset price bubble collapse of 1990 strangled macroeconomic growth for 
the remainder of the decade. Economic growth remained stagnant and even dipped 
into negative over the 1990s. The average real growth rate from 1991 to 2000 was 0.8 
percent per annum. By the late 1990s, deflation gripped the economy despite the 
BOJs’ adoption of a zero interest rate policy from February 1999. The GDP deflator 
fell 7 percent from 1994 to 2001.38
Microeconomically, the banking sector suffered during this time. Declining 
asset quality produced 72 billion yen in bad loans from March 1992 to March 2001 
according to a conservative estimate. To give idea of magnitude, this figure 
represents 14 percent of Japan’s GDP in 2000.39 Public funds were necessary to buy 
these under-performing loans and ensure a systemic banking collapse did not ensue.40 
As Figures 8.2 and 8.3 indicate, neither bank shares nor the broader Nikkei index 
experienced a sustained rebound. As a consequence, bank capital ratios were 
depressed well below the G-10 average. The risk-weighted ratios presented in Figure 
8.4 suggest that, on average, the city banks’ CARs varied from 8-9 percent from 1991 
to 2000. Though these ratios were ostensibly in compliance with the Accord, they 
were generally 100 BP below the average G-10 bank for the period.
Further, most academics and financial practitioners agree that Japanese banks 
were not even performing as well as these official data suggest. While the official
38 Fukao (2002:2).
39 Ibid.




8.4 Capital Adequacy Ratios: 1988-1996  
(Source: Estim ated from calculations by De Nederlandsche Bank in 
B asel Committee (1999)
capital adequacy standards and ratios were at about the Basel minimum, 
overwhelming evidence suggests that Japanese regulators and policy-makers 
produced “hidden defection” of the Accord through the implementation of weak 
accounting requirements and continued lax enforcement. Fukao (2002) and others 
identified at least three key areas in which Japanese authorities manipulated the 
domestic capital adequacy regime during the 1990s to provide regulatory relief:
1. First, regulators may have permitted banks to operate with a 
financially inappropriate non-performing loan provisioning policy. 
Regulatory forbearance may have been granted by MOF through 
permitting banks to adopt weak loan classification standards. The 
IMF criticized Japan for allowing banks to resist classifying as 
“non-performing” dubious or underwater credits. In addition, 
banks were not required to set aside sufficient loan-loss reserves 
against these non-performing loans.41
2. Second, MOF permitted city banks to hold deferred tax assets on 
their balance sheets inappropriately. Banks kept deferred tax assets 
though they had been losing money for the whole of the 1990s and
41 International Monetary Fund (1995).
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1988  1989  1990  1991 1992  1993 1994  1995  1996
loss carry forward is limited up to five years under Japanese tax 
codes. As there was little chance of getting the deferred tax asset 
by through the creation of profits, MOF should not have permitted 
these assets as regulatory capital.
3. Third, most subordinated loans of banks are held by friendly life 
insurance companies. Banks, in turn, held subordinated loans and 
surplus notes of life-insurance companies. This practice is so- 
called double-gearing and the cross-held quasi capital should not 
be treated as genuine capital of banks or life insurance companies.
The expected effect of these forbearance policies were to overstate Japanese 
banks’ capital assets ratios and water down the application of the Accord. Though 
poor Japanese disclosure practice during the 1990s again makes the empirical 
verification of the effects of these forbearance rules difficult to ascertain, the Japan 
Center for Economic Research (2001) makes such an effort. Table 8.2 presents the 
results of this organization’s attempt to estimate Japanese city banks’ CARs with 
capital defined as primary capital, estimates of unrealized capital gains, and loan loss 
reserves less standardized estimated loan losses from disclosed non-performing loans 
and tax deferred assets for the period March 1998 to September 2000. Though the 
loan loss calculations likely understated their actual levels, the figures suggest that 
Japan’s major banks were well below the minimum ratio requirements. These figures 
do not reflect true “Basel ratios” as they measure capital to un-weighted assets, yet 
they clearly indicate a fairly low capitalization level. When comparing these data to 
the
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Date Average Capital Ratio Nikkei 225 Level
March 1998 0.93% 16527
March 1999 2.07% 15837
March 2000 3.48% 20337
Sept 2000 2.36% 15747
Table 8.2. ReformulatedCapital/Asset Ratios of Major 
Japanese Banks, Mar 1998-Sep 2000
Capital defined as core capital, unrealized capital gains and loan loss reserves 
less estimated loan losses, and deferred tax assets. Sample size varies 
by year, but includes all major banks for which data is available. 
(Source: Japan Center for Economic Research (2001))
officially published ratios in Figure 8.4, they suggest that city banks may have 
received a sizable “regulatory rent” from MOFs’ forbearance and were not in 
compliance with the Accord. Though data is incomplete to support this position, the 
consensus of academic and practitioner opinion is that Japanese banks’ CARs were 
highly overstated.42
Further support for this conclusion is provided by the reactions of international 
market actors and Basel Committee members over Japan’s capital adequacy policies 
during this period. In particular MOFs’ peers in the BCBS and the IMF voiced 
concern over the weak provisioning and reserve policies permitted in Japan 43 
Though these standards were technically not a violation of international regulatory 
policy, they obscured the true solvency position of Japan’s major banks.44 The US 
Federal Reserve’s criticisms of these policies became intense in 1995 when it
42 Other works supporting this conclusion with empirical evidence include: The Banker (1 January
1994), Scott (1995), The Banker (1 January 1996), The Economist (22 September 2001), The Banker 
(1 November 2002), and Tamura (2003a).
43 International Monetary Fund (1995).
44 The Banker, 1 January 1994.
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emerged that Daiwa Bank’s Wall Street subsidiary failed to disclose more than USD1 
billion in trading losses to US regulators.45 American regulators and credit rating 
agencies partly blamed MOFs’ poor prudential oversight capabilities and, in 
particular, centered on the tangible issue of provisioning and reserve requirements for 
criticism 46 A representative from Fitch IBCA commented that many Japanese banks 
actually had negative capital and that the 8 percent minimum was only being met 
through “unconventional bookkeeping practices.”47
MOF responded to these criticisms by amending its provisioning 
requirements, though by only minor degrees. After 1995, MOF twice extended the 
non-performing loan definition so that more doubtful credits would qualify as “non­
performing” and hence require that greater loan-losses be set aside.48 Yet, it is not 
clear that these amendments produced much substantial change in the efficacy of 
these provisioning requirements as US regulators continued to demand that further 
action be taken to tighten loan standards in late 2002 49 Moreover, in Barth, Caprio, 
and Levine’s (2001a) survey of over 100 states’ banking regulations in the late 1990s, 
MOF left the authors’ open-ended survey questions on provisioning regulations blank. 
Hence, it seems that international political pressure produced only moderate changes 
in provisioning standards in the first instance.
More obvious international success was exhibited in efforts to force Japan to 
adopt a compliant interpretation of required tier 1 deduction standards. BCBS 
regulators had long been critical of MOFs’ decision not to implement the “double 
gearing” deduction set out in the Accord. As discussed in Section 8.3, Japanese banks 
were not required to deduct the value of cross-shareholding between financial
45 Federal Reserve Board (2003).
46 Tamura (2003:7).
47 Global Risk Regulator, January 2003.
48 Fukao (2002:3).
49 The Banker, 1 November 2002.
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institutions from primary capital as stipulated in the 1988 Accord. As the weakness 
of Japan’s banks became evident in the mid-1990s, however, BCBS and market actors 
demanded that the full scale of these banks losses be disclosed against an 
internationally accepted definition of capital. MOF yielded to this international 
pressure in 1998 and brought Japan’s required deductions in-line with international 
standards.50
Yet, it is curious that the public input of Japanese banks appears to have been 
negligible in determining MOFs’ reactions to these international criticisms. Tamura 
highlights the paradox that while “[t]he fact that many lenient policies were carried 
out intensively in the midst of the 1997-8 banking crisis suggests that such policies 
were deliberately used to pump up the capital bases banks... the Japanese Bankers 
Association did not publicly seek any type of capital injection to clean up [non­
performing loans] or to boost capital ratios, since acceptance of public assistance 
would signal the banks’ weak financial position and invite political interference in 
bank management and lending decisions.”51 Moreover, in order to dissociate the 
government from claims that they simply represented the interests of insolvent banks, 
in October 1998 the LDP refused to accept political contributions from city banks that 
had received any public funds to reduce non-performing loans.52 Tamura (2003a) 
attributes MOFs’ lax policy program to LDP politicians’ central concerns of ensuring 
re-election through stimulating the macroeconomy and ensuring that bank credits 
continued to flow to key members of the LDP support base such as small and 
medium-sized enterprises.53
50 Kin-yu Yaisei Jijzo, 22 June 1998 in Tamura (2003b: 13).
51 Tamura (2003a: 10,13).
52 The Japan Times, 10 October 1998.
53 Tamura (2003a: 11).
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This suggests that Japanese city banks lost a great deal of political leverage 
during this period. By the late 1990s, these intermediaries were no longer the 
international standard bearers they had been a decade earlier. Japanese banks’ 
combined share of international lending dropped from 38 percent in 1988 to 16 
percent by year-end 1996. More dramatically, their lending share in Asia declined 
from a high of 50 percent to 28 percent in 1996. An analyst at ING Barings suggested 
that this decline represented the end of the Japanese banks’ international 
competitiveness.54 In addition, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s 1997 program 
to liberalize wide swaths of the Japanese financial sector with a non-graduated or “big 
bang” measure by 2001 was partly designed to discipline Japanese banks through 
exposure to greater market discipline.55
Thus, in the lead up to the Basel 2 Accord discussions in the late 1990s, 
Japanese regulators occupy very a different negotiating position than in 1987. Rather 
than representing the interests of the world’s largest banks in an effort to ensure 
continued international market access, the MOF is now seeking to ensure that a new 
standard will not push their domestic banks into full insolvency. In fact, in November 
2002, Prime Minister Koizumi’s government worked to implement a non-performing 
loans policy that was more in-line with international practice, yet would not force city 
banks to declare capital assets ratios well below the Basel minimum.56 Market actors 
believed Japanese banks to be well prepared for the implementation of the 1988 
Accord. Twelve years later, BCBS and market actors have doubts that this Accord 
was ever truly implemented in Japan and few expect that Basel 2 will be 
implemented.57
54 Retail Banker International, 18 June 1999.
55 The Banker, 1 June 1997.
56 The Banker, November 2002.
57 Global Risk Regulator, February 2003.
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8.4.1. Hypotheses Review: Second Period Implementation
The period of time analyzed in this section provides a strong level of support for the 
international influence, market governance, and macroeconomic instability 
hypotheses. The variation in Basel rules to be explained by these variables is 
explicitly only the reinterpretation of the capital deductions requirements in 1998.
Yet, these hypotheses also shed light on the “hidden defection” elements highlighted 
throughout the section. It was illustrated that international political pressure exerted 
by members of the BCBS (particularly the US after the 1995 Daiwa collapse) and 
international markets were critical in provoking MOF and members of the LDP to 
alter their “double gearing” policy and alter the scope of their non-performing loan 
classification rules. Though not ultimately successful in effecting a convergence in 
the latter, external political economic pressure was clearly linked to even modest 
efforts by MOF to reorganize these standards.
Moreover, external pressure could well be considered a driver of MOFs’ 
decisions to pursue “hidden defection” in the first place. As Fukao (2002) suggested, 
a key goal of the lax accounting and enforcement policies was to give the impression 
that banks were better capitalized than they were. Tamura (2003a:7) points out that 
part of MOFs’ objective was to hide the true level of banks’ loan losses and low 
capitalization levels from the Diet. While this is a plausible suggestion grounded in 
the broader argument that regulatory agencies seek to maximize power through the 
leveraging of information asymmetries, it is clear that legislators were well aware of a 
major problem in the banking industry from the early 1990s. It was necessary for the 
Diet to be involved in the formulation of public institutions to purchase bad credits
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from Japanese banks from early 1993. Therefore, it is possible to advance that 
regulators and policy-makers utilized “hidden defection” policies in order to protect 
themselves and their domestic banks from further international criticism and further 
losses of market confidence. As the market governance and international influence 
hypotheses suggest, the Accord acted as a seed of prudential good housekeeping and 
all members of Japan’s banking policy network were anxious to avoid poor marks.
It is also clear that domestic and international preferences were conditioned by 
the deleterious macroeconomic environment that emerged after 1990. In fact, the 
depth and extraordinary length of Japan’s economic malaise during the 1990s and 
early 2000s may be the key causal variable of the events discussed in this section. Of 
all of the variables analyzed, it is the only one that varies from the first to second 
implementation periods. Before the economic crisis, Japanese banks were expected to 
benefit from the 1988 Accord; afterwards a complex menagerie of accounting 
practices needed to be manipulated to give the cosmetic appearance of compliance. 
Like in the US case, the instance of macroeconomic shock produced a general 
loosening rather than tightening of capital adequacy standards after the initial 
interpretations of the Accord were made.
It is less certain what effect bankers’ preferences made on the policy process. 
Tamura (2003a) argued that the city banks lost political influence as their funding 
positions deteriorated. Though in a bank-centered financial regime like Japan’s, it is 
reasonable to assume that large banking institutions will always have some political 
power, it is not clear that the agenda was driven by the FBAJ to the same degree as it 
had been prior to the implementation of the Accord. Though the adoption of lax
58 In 1993, the Diet authorized the creation of the Cooperative Credit Purchasing Company to utilize 
public funds to purchase Japanese bank’s non-performing loans. See The Banker, 1 January 1994.
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accounting and enforcement policies was likely agreeable to city bankers, the 
initiation of these policies was from the policy machine more than societal interest.
Finally, some note should again be made of the insights this section provided 
on the appropriateness of the quantitative methodology adopted in Part II. To a 
greater degree than even Section 8.3, this section highlighted that analyzing capital 
adequacy policy in Japan without reference to accounting and enforcement policies 
produces incorrect inferences. According to the quantitative data, Japanese capital 
adequacy practice increased in stringency from the first to second periods through the 
adoption of a stricter deductions policy. Clearly, this result is incorrect when the 
broader capital adequacy environment is considered. If possible, future studies should 
endeavor to quantify the strictness of these financial policy variables that influence 
the strictness of capital adequacy. In lieu of such quantitative variables, it will be 
constantly necessary to complement the quantitative studies of capital adequacy that 
are of such importance in financial economics, with in-depth qualitative counterparts.
8.5. Conclusion
This chapter has detailed the implementation of the 1988 Basel Accord in Japan. It 
has argued that Japan was not as politically nor economically disadvantaged by the 
Accord as many academics and financial market commentators initially believed. 
Japan’s regulators and international banks were successful in ensuring the inclusion of 
unrealized security gains into the Basel Accord, over the opposition of most G-10 
states. Market actors interpreted this as a Japanese negotiation success during the late 
1980s as measured by marginal stock returns to announcements on the conclusion of 
the multilateral accord and Japan’s interpretation of the agreement. Regulators made
273
an interpretation of the Accord that was in-line with Japanese practice in many ways 
and support was found for the “path dependence” hypothesis.
The situation radically changed after the collapse of the Japanese asset bubble 
during the 1990s. The dramatic decline in the value of the Tokyo equities market 
exerted a disastrous impact on Japan’s banks whose capital base was linked to stock 
prices through unrealized security holdings. The profitability of Japanese banks 
plummeted through the decade as the value of non-performing loans accumulated and 
the value of collateral dropped.
Yet, during this period there was little alteration in Japan’s stated capital 
adequacy policies. It was argued that international political and market pressures 
convinced MOF and Japanese banks that reducing the severity of capital adequacy 
standards would further undermine confidence in the banking sector. Yet, substantial 
direct and indirect evidence suggests that the economic instability led MOF to 
promote a package of “hidden defection” policies that allowed banks to understate 
their loan-loss reserves, improperly hold tax deferred assets as capital, and avoid 
penalties for breaches of compliance with prudential capital codes. The goal of these 
policies was to provide the cosmetic appearance of compliance with the 1988 Accord 
by banks whose real capital ratios were well below the international minima.
These events were instructive on the applicability of a number of the 
theoretical propositions enumerated in Chapter 3. First, the First Period provided 
some support for “path dependency.” Second, the extended Second Period provided 
support for the effects of international market and political pressures and economic 
instability. Yet, the impact of these variables was unanticipated as a divergence 
emerged between Japan’s stated capital policy and actual bank and regulatory 
enforcement practice that were exogenous to the hypotheses’ expectations. This
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suggests that explicit attention needs to be given to incorporating a broad array of tax, 
accounting, and enforcement policies in conjunction with stated capital adequacy 
rules when considering the implementation of the Accord. This suggests that the 
quantitative studies in Chapter 4 and 5 did not provide a full picture of the 
measurement of severity and laxity of capital adequacy policies after the negotiation 
of the Basel Accord. Yet, it also suggests the necessity of pairing a qualitative 






This study sought to contribute to a fuller empirical understanding of the 1988 Basel 
Accord on the regulatory behavior of the industrialized world. It endeavored to 
understand if an international financial “soft law” regime could produce any impact 
on state behavior in the absence of a political or judicial enforcement mechanism. 
The agreement under study here represents a particularly hard case of soft law. The 
Accord did not produce a legally binding constraint nor prescribe a homogeneous 
selection of rules. States were requested to adhere to a set of minimum best practices 
and given wide latitudes for exercising discretionary policies and remain “in 
compliance” with the Accord.
Though the Basel Accord has been subject to extensive academic study, 
political scientists have generally failed to address its soft law characteristics directly. 
Students of international law and financial economics have succeeded in identifying 
the legal ramifications of the Accord’s soft law provisions and identified the 
microeconomic impacts of distinct national interpretations of these provisions.1 Yet, 
the majority of political scientists writing on the topic have adopted the assumption 
that the Accord ex ante enforced a uniform prudential standard. It is generally 
common to agree with Oatley and Nabor’s (1998:49) erroneous declaration that the 
agreement “eliminated the regulatory status quo from G-10 policymakers’ choice 
sets.”
1 Eyssell and Arshadi (1990), Cooper, Kolari, and Wagster (1991), Madura and Zarruk (1993), Cornett 
and Tehranian (1994), Ladennan (1994), Wagster (1996), Wagster, Kolari, and Cooper (1996), 
Alexander (2000a; 2000b).
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The goal of this study was to conduct the first large-scale investigation of the 
impact of the Accord from the political science perspective. It has been assumed that 
industrialized states’ capital adequacy policies after 1988 reflected the interactions of 
domestic and international political economic variables, just as they had prior to the 
Accord’s negotiation. By releasing political scientists’ assumption of the 
homogenizing affects of the Accord, we are free to investigate patterns of national 
convergence or divergence around the 1988 agreement’s informal rules and 
understand what variables are correlated with these patterns.
This concluding chapter reviews the substantial empirical and theoretical 
results. Section 9.2 provides a summary of the findings. The four research questions 
enumerated in Chapter 1 are addressed. Section 9.3 considers some of the 
implications of these findings for the political study of the impact of the Basel Accord 
and, more generally, for the international and comparative political economic study of 
international financial cooperation. Section 9.4 reviews some of the key 
methodological problems of this study. These provide caveats to the research 
findings. Particular concerns are raised by omitted variable biases and quantitative 
variable miss-specification. It is hoped that combining quantitative and qualitative 
research methodologies resolved some of these concerns, yet the difficulties of 
comparing results in triangulated studies creates its own problems that must be 
explicitly detailed. Section 9.5 suggests future avenues of academic research 
indicated by the findings.
9.2. Summary of Findings
The thesis addressed four questions concerning the way the Accord was implemented. 
These questions were detailed in Chapter 1. Two questions touched on how the
277
Accord was implemented. These questions concerned the role of the Accord in 
eliciting change in states’ pre-Basel capital adequacy practices and in producing 
transnational regulatory convergence. The final two questions addressed why states 
adopted the interpretations they did and thus why we observe patterns of convergence 
and divergence. These questions are addressed in light of the findings of the 
quantitative and qualitative analyses presented in Chapters 2-8.
Question 1. Did the Accord produce or contribute to transnational convergence or 
divergence in industrialized states ' capital adequacy policies shortly after the 
Accord's negotiation?
The best data with which to address this question are the descriptive statistics for the 
Capital Regulation (CREG) index in Chapter 3. These data indicate that the 18 
sampled states adopted remarkably convergent capital adequacy practices over and 
above the minimum requirements. First, there was convergence in the overall 
strength of these states’ capital adequacy rules as 17 of the 18 states had CREG scores 
over the minimum level established by the Accord. Only 4 of the 18 states adopted 
some form of non-compliant interpretation while 17 states adopted a superequivalent 
interpretation in at least one area of capital policy. Thus, residual distinctions 
involved divergence in the severity of interpretation over the minimum levels. There 
was little evidence that a regulatory “race to the bottom” emerged as the Accord 
established an effective floor that few states failed to observe.
Among the remaining distinctions, the majority were centered in four of the 
six separate policy areas addressed by the Accord. High levels of convergence 
emerged in the level of minimum capital ratio levels and risk-weight charges for off-
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balance sheet assets. Much greater diversity emerged in the defining of capital, 
required capital deductions, and on-balance sheet risk weights. These results should 
not seem surprising ex post. The capital definitions set out in the Accord were 
designed to be broad enough that the wide diversity of the BCBS states’ extant capital 
adequacy regulations might be included within the international framework.
Similarly, the on-balance sheet risk-weighting scheme was designed with a number of 
discretionary elements. Given the importance of primary capital to ensuring bank 
stability and soundness, it may be concerning that the tier 1 capital rules did not 
produce a higher level of convergence. Yet again, remember that distinctions here are 
policy divergences over and above the minimum established in the Accord.
Question 2. Did the Accord produce or contribute to transnational convergence or 
divergence in industrialized states ’ capital adequacy policies during a twelve-year 
period (1988 to 2000) after the Accord’s negotiation. Put differently, did initial levels 
o f convergence or divergence alter over time?
Higher levels of capital adequacy rule convergence did emerge over the 1990s. 
Quantitative measures of dispersion indicated that differences in the states’ 
interpretations narrowed over time, while the sample’s average CREG score remained 
unchanged. As 12 of the 18 sample states altered their capital adequacy policies over 
time, the unchanged sample mean indicated that a fairly equal amount strengthened as 
weakened their interpretations of the Accord. In 2000, the number of states having 
adopted a non-compliant interpretation fell from 4 to 3. The three policy areas 
courting the largest residual distinctions directly after the Accord’s negotiation 
retained these positions, yet the diversity of interpretations of tier 1 capital narrowed
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significantly over time. While this may be positive for those prescribing international 
policy convergence, it is of some prudential concern as this convergence was 
achieved through an overall weakening of the interpretation. Yet again, diversity 
remains grounded in generally above minimum distinctions and, among these, a high 
level of convergence emerged from the Accord. Perhaps most importantly, however, 
no regulatory race to the bottom or series of tit-for-tat regulatory competition emerges 
in a way measured by the quantitative indicators.
Question 3. Why did states adopt loose or strict interpretations o f the broad, “soft 
law ” provisions o f the Accord?
Providing evidence for the why questions is not as straight-forward as for what 
questions as data is derived from the quantitative analyses presented in Chapter 5 as 
well as the qualitative case studies of the US, France, Germany, and Japan. The 
difficulties of deriving convergent results from triangulative methods are discussed 
below, but at this stage there are a number of common explanatory themes that 
emerge from the quantitative and qualitative data as a whole.
The quantitative and qualitative research suggests that “path dependence” 
considerations were important contributors to capital regulatory policy after the 
implementation of the Accord. In Chapter 3, the hypothesis was advanced that the 
Accord may have affected little independent impact on the industrialized economies’ 
extant capital adequacy practices. Drawing from Ho’s (2002) research and that of 
disparate political science and economic explanations of public policy 
implementation, this hypothesis suggests that any inter-state agreement’s effect on 
state policy is influenced by the distance between the requirements of the agreement
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and existing state practice. As Down, Rocke, and Barsoon (1996) found, international 
agreements requiring “deep” changes to existing state practices produce less 
compliance than those solving inter-state coordination problems or those requiring 
little change. Though “path dependence” was, following Ho (2002), presented in the 
context of a broader network of hypotheses on the impacts of domestic bank 
preferences, it is clear from the qualitative study that political and market actors other 
than banks maintained a high powered path dependent preference.
Though this hypothesis is intuitive to a full class of international agreements, 
it seems most pertinent to soft law agreements in general, and the Basel Accord in 
particular. Like all soft law, the Basel Accord was not enforceable through 
international law; a political or judiciary authority could not sanction states for non- 
compliance. Moreover, the Accord might be distinguished as one of a class of 
international financial regulatory codes or “best practices” that are a “softer” version 
of soft law. Ignoring the awkwardness of this nomenclature, the point is that the 
Accord (and similar agreements) did not promulgate a set of hard and fast rules with 
which states must comply to be “in compliance.” Rather it set out a minimum 
baseline of standards and then permitted domestic policy-making authorities a wide 
discretionary role. One objection may be: “is this being overstated?” After all, the 
Accord did establish some minimum guidelines and clearly the Accord has produced 
some impact on state behavior, bank strategy, or financial market sentiment.
The goal of this research project has been to focus on the first of these 
“impacted variables”, namely state behavior. State behavior was basically 
operationalized as capital adequacy regulatory policy after 1988. The quantitative and 
qualitative tests found that the Accord may not have impacted state behavior as much 
as believed. The argument detailed in Chapter 2 is that political scientists have
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overstated the importance of the Accord on state behavior and thus advanced 
erroneous arguments about the Accord’s political motivations and intended effects. 
Previous state behaviors were found to be a key determinant of state behavior after the 
implementation of the Accord. In other words, the quantitative measures of pre-Basel 
practice—crude as they were—were found to be statistically associated with the 
quantitative measures of types of compliance with the Accord. In a final way of 
formulating this argument, states “fit” their pre-Basel capital adequacy practices into 
their interpretations of the Accord in many instances.
The qualitative research provided some specific support to this general 
argument. Though the quantitative results found that the United States implemented 
an overall stringent interpretation of the Accord just after 1988, American regulators 
allowed cumulative preferred stock to qualify as tier 1 capital. This was an important 
element of American banks’ capital bases prior to the Accord and, despite a desire to 
push ahead with a punishing interpretation of the Accord after the LDC debt crisis and 
Savings and Loan fiasco, American authorities permitted this old practice to carry 
over to their implementation of the Accord, though such instruments were expressly 
forbidden in tier 1 by the agreement. Similarly, Japan’s Ministry of Finance was 
successful in negotiating and then implementing a version of the Accord that 
permitted their money center banks to include unrealized securities holdings in their 
regulatory capital. Though regulatory authorities and market actors generally 
regarded such instruments to be a volatile financial instrument that might exacerbate, 
rather than alleviate, bank instability, this practice carried over from the pre to post- 
Basel stages in Japan’s capital adequacy codes. Similar evidence was found for 
France and inclusion of loan loss reserves in the Basel and European capital adequacy 
frameworks.
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So, what do these results speak to on findings about the Accord’s impact on 
bank behavior and market sentiment? Looking at the results of the vast financial 
economic research into the Accord, the answer appears quite elusive. In a survey of 
the academic literature on the impact of the Accord, the Basel Committee (1999) 
found few robust answers.
Yet, neither the quantitative nor qualitative examinations suggested that the 
“path dependence” forces were the only determinant of the Accord’s impact on the 
sample states’ interpretations. The quantitative results suggest that the presence of a 
microeconomic banking crisis might lead to departures from existing practice during 
the early years of the Accord’s implementation. These results suggest that a 
domestic, systemic banking insolvency crisis would lead states to tighten their 
domestic capital adequacy practices and thus adopt strict interpretations of the 
Accord. As Chapter 3 enumerates, this essentially economic argument is also 
embedded with a political argument. States experiencing an economic dislocation 
would tighten their regulations as policy-makers would need to intervene to protect 
the electorate’s deposit base. The qualitative studies supported the causal importance 
of instability on policy. One case study country—the United States—experienced a 
banking crisis in the years directly before the implementation of the Accord, with the 
result being the adoption of a uniquely strict capital adequacy regime in that country. 
Path dependence was not a policy option in the US directly after 1988 as Congress 
needed to subscribe blame for the fire storm of banking and savings and loan 
insolvencies to reckless bank behavior and unresponsive regulatory oversight. As has 
been well documented, this Congressional pressure was one of the key factors behind 
the negotiation of the Basel Accord over the G-10 states’ apathy in the late 1980s and,
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as this study illustrates, was linked with an initially tough interpretation of the Accord 
by American regulators.
As interesting as the two hypotheses receiving support, are those that did not 
receive strong support or those that received mixed support. First, the hypotheses that 
banks’ preferences would be driven by market governance or their international 
ambitions seemed to receive some, though not robust support. In aggregate tests, 
these hypotheses were not strongly associated with compliance in a consistent 
direction. Among the four case studies, it was predicted that US and Japanese 
compliance might be influenced by these two variables. Support was found in the US 
for the impact of market governance. Japanese authorities did not come under 
sustained pressure from their domestic banks to provide regulatory relief when the 
macroeconomy entered recession in 1990 and the banking sector first came under 
pressure. In fact, a MOF official explicitly indicated that regulatory relief would 
undermine stability in Japanese banks. Interestingly, such market pressure may have 
contributed to the beginning of “hidden defection” from the capital accord through a 
lax enforcement of prudential capital regulations as regulatory relief may have been 
provided in a way neither easily verifiable nor quantifiable by financial markets. It is 
interesting that little evidence was found for these “bank preference” variables in the 
US case. Previous econometric research found little evidence that the market reacted 
negatively or positively to the American regulators interpretation of the Accord as 
they did with Japan—whose implementation was initially greeted positively. Thus 
the market may have been rather indifferent to the details of America’s interpretations 
relative to Japan. Wagster (1996) concluded that the rise in Japanese banks’ stock 
prices after the implementation of the Accord reflected the market’s relief that Japan’s
2 Wagster (1996).
284
banks might not be as competitively disadvantaged by the Accord as was feared as 
unrealized securities holdings were permitted as regulatory capital. There is little 
evidence that the market ever maintained such fears about the US case and we may 
infer that less market attention was given to the Fed’s interpretations.
Mixed support is also provided for the argument that implementation would 
vary according to the fragmentation of domestic political institutions. Again, little 
support was provided in the aggregate studies. Yet, some support was found in the 
three case countries with fragmented systems—the US, Germany, and Japan. The 
crux of this hypothesis was that in fragmented political systems, capital adequacy 
policy might be influenced by a wide range of economic actors—perhaps banks, 
consumers organizations, industrial manufacturing concerns, labor interests, minority 
political parties—able to leverage the multiple veto access points of the domestic 
political regime. In the US, a wide range of economic actors such as mortgage 
lenders and consumers’ organizations were able to exert pressure for the loosening of 
capital adequacy regulation by pressuring Congress. In Germany, we witness both 
national and state banks guiding the drastic loosening of Germany’s capital policies 
during the first three years of the Accord’s implementation period. Finally, Japanese 
peak organizations representing small and medium sized enterprises influenced the 
creation of capital adequacy policy through pressuring the governing Liberal 
Democratic Party.
Finally, little qualitative or quantitative evidence supports the International 
Influences hypotheses. The first of these suggested that types of compliance would be 
similar within regions. The means tests in Chapter 4 provided fairly weak evidence 
for a regional clustering effect. More telling, the Europe case study indicated France 
and Germany’s policy-making to be guided more by internal than regional dynamics.
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Though EU directives did guide and extend the Accord’s capital adequacy guidelines, 
these were grounded in the same “soft law” or subsidiarity-type approach as the 
Accord. Finally, no support was found for the hegemonic argument in the qualitative 
or quantitative tests.
In addition to the results of those hypotheses presented in Chapter 3, this 
research indicates that some support may be provided to hypotheses on the influence 
of electoral cycles on prudential banking policy. The thesis did not explicitly consider 
the possibility that the timing of democratic elections might influence capital 
adequacy policy. The involvement of political actors was embedded in the 
macroeconomic instability hypothesis, yet for the most part, the assumption that 
capital adequacy policy was a largely “non-political” policy area dominated more by 
technical experts than election rhetoric was adopted. As a result, no quantitative 
exam was conducted of this hypothesis or of similar hypotheses that types of 
democratic institutions influenced interpretations of the Basel Accord. Yet, the US 
and Japanese case studies provide support for an electoral timing hypothesis. Both 
the tightening of US capital policy in the late 1980s and its loosening in the early 
1990s was a key electoral campaign issue in legislative and Presidential elections. 
Also, the LDP policy on bank capital was driven by the need to secure the electoral 
support of SME interests during the early 1990s. In both instances, the critical 
explanatory variable may macroeconomic instability, yet further exploration of 
elections and electoral cycles seems warranted in the future.
Question 4. What led states to increase or reduce the stringency o f their initial 
interpretations o f the Accord over a 12-year period o f time (1988 to 2000)?
3 Rosenbluth and Schaap (2002) find evidence that electoral regime types (first past the post vs. 
proportional representation) influence types of prudential bank regulatory policy. Economic studies of 
the influence of a wide range of constitutional rules on economic policy outcomes have also found that 
such rules matter in many instances. A good review is presented in Persson and Tabellini (2003).
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The evaluation of the evolution of the industrialized states’ capital adequacy 
regulations after the creation of the initial interpretations faced some unexpected 
difficulties. These difficulties came to light only during the qualitative analyses. The 
quantitative results were straightforward. The modest escalation of transnational 
capital policy convergence was explained by the effect of private market governance 
leading states to tighten their initial interpretations. This was interpreted to mean that 
states subject to international market governance increased the stringency of their 
regulations in relation to the market’s demands. Yet, the quantitative studies provided 
little indication of what prompted states to reduce the stringency of their policies over 
time.
Of the four case study countries reviewed, two reduced their capital adequacy 
stringency over time while one increased their interpretation. The US and Germany 
watered down their initial definitions of regulatory capital and the US amended its 
risk-weighting framework in support of economic interests disadvantaged by the 
allocating of mortgage loans to the 100 percent risk category. As the previous section 
explained, a combination of macroeconomic dislocation and political pressure 
effected these transitions. However, the quantitative evidence in Chapter 4 suggested 
that Japan increased the stringency of their initial interpretations by bringing their 
capital deductions policy in-line with the Accord’s stipulations on cross-share 
holdings among financial institutions. The latter case supports the quantitative 
findings as MOF yielded to pressure from credit ratings agencies to amend their 
deductions policies.
Yet, the qualitative studies uncovered a number of unanticipated variations in 
capital adequacy policy in these three case countries. Specifically, the US, German, 
and Japanese cases exhibited variations in policies related to interpretations of the
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Basel Accord that were not addressed in the theoretical predictions in Chapter 3 nor 
the aggregate analyses in Chapters 4-5. These policy changes were not reflected in 
the quantitative CREG index.
As Chapter 6 saw, regulators’ attitudes towards capital adequacy policy 
changed dramatically in the late 1990s. The increase in the American money centers’ 
capital adequacy ratios after the Accord prompted the Fed, FDIC, and OCC to alter 
their regulatory focus away from requiring particular ratios and limited definitions of 
capital towards allowing banks to effectively manage shareholder value through the 
implementation of tailor-moulded credit scoring models. As the US removed decades 
of restrictive ownership and marketing regulations from commercial banks—allowing 
them to operate as and own securities firms and insurance corporations—the 
trajectory and focus of capital adequacy policy changed in tandem. Much of these 
changes—particularly credit scoring models—are exogenous to the concerns of this 
research. Yet, as they are of central concern to the Basel II Accord, they must be 
addressed in future research.
Second, capital adequacy policy did not shift quite so dramatically in Germany 
during the late 1990s. In fact, by battling the Fed over the inclusion of many new 
capital instruments at the Basel Committee, Germany seemed to fight against such sea 
changes in capital adequacy policy. Yet, by the 1990s, Germany had reversed course 
on its role in the international political economy of capital adequacy policy setting. In 
1988, Germany was a central figure in the Basel negotiations. The Bundesbank was 
widely regarded as the hawk for adopting a stringent international capital accord and 
objected to efforts to design an inter-state state standard that could be tailor made for 
all states’ various capital instruments. Yet, by the late 1990s, Germany supported the 
watering down of the risk-weighting framework adopted as part of the first round of
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the Basel 2 negotiations. They refused to implement new European capital adequacy 
standards that disadvantaged Germany’s commercial banks.
Perhaps most importantly, Japan’s lax enforcement and accounting policies 
are not fully endogenized in this study. By looking only at stated capital adequacy 
policy, the aggregate analysis obscures the true nature of Japan’s interpretation of the 
Accord. While the CREG index records a strengthening of Japan’s interpretations 
over time, the case study revealed an almost entire breakdown in the application of 
these prudential policies by the late 1990s. While it is difficult to directly observe— 
much less quantitatively measure—the severity of all the enforcement and accounting 
policies that bear on the stringency of stated capital adequacy standards, further 
efforts need to be made along these lines for a wide group of states.4
93. Implications of the Findings
The study contributes a number of methodological and empirical findings to the
international and comparative political economic study of economic cooperation. A
number of the thesis’ specific contributions to the state of knowledge of the Basel
Accord were outlined in the previous section. Yet, it is also necessary to identify the
place of these Basel-centered findings within the wider spectrum of the study of
international economic relations. Specifically, the research suggests the importance
of adopting a new, more differentiated approach to the study of the implementation of
international regimes than is generally employed. Second, the implementation of the
Accord contributes novel research concerning the importance of international regimes
to state behavior. Finally, insight is given to the process of transnational regulatory
convergence in the area of banking regulation. As this section explains, these broader
4 The only systematic effort to analyze the impact of tax, accounting, and enforcement policies in 
conjunction with capital adequacy standards looks only at Japan and the US. See Scott and Iwahara 
(1994).
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contributions of the thesis overlap in a number of important ways. For this reason, the 
three will be discussed in concert.
First, all points of the study suggest that existing theoretical approaches tend 
to be insufficiently calibrated to endogenize the sort of empirical question addressed 
here. Following the lead of Botcheva and Martin (2001), Chapter 3 explained that the 
binary conceptualization adopted by the vast majority of studies of international 
regime implementation obscures critical points of detail. By measuring 
implementation as a “yes” or “no” phenomenon, these studies are incapable of 
explaining elements of compliance with international legal arrangements that are soft 
in obligating compliance or imprecise in enumerating rules that implementing states 
must adhere with to be “in compliance.”5 This methodological approach is 
parsimonious to implement and congruent with the testing of reasonably tractable 
hypotheses, yet can be a liability when understanding compliance with some forms of 
international cooperation.
The impact of many of the international financial regulatory standards issued 
in the past ten years by organizations such as the IMF, IOSCO, and the Basel 
Committee is not amenable to dichotomization.6 Many of the international standards 
issued by these organizations are confederations of best practices or suggested codes 
of conduct that are not enforceable by a political or judicial authority or, more 
particularly, are fairly ill defined. A cursory glance at the titles of many of these 
agreements in Appendix 3.1 supports this: the majority bear labels such as “minimum 
standards,” “codes of practice,” or “principles of memoranda.” Though these 
agreements generally enumerate a minimum regulatory level or floor that 
implementing states are requested to stay above, the example of the Basel Accord
5 Abbott and Snidal (2000:421) identify these as characteristics of international “soft” law.
6 See Appendix 3.1 for a list of many of these standards.
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demonstrated that such floors can be fairly modest and quite possibly below the level 
of many states’ existing practices. In such circumstances, binary implementation 
variables are difficult to design as the minimum requirements may be too vague to 
establish reliable trigger levels at which to code states’ practices as “non-compliant.” 
In addition, such variables may not satisfy content validity requirements as they fail to 
endogenize situations in which states adhere to certain elements of international 
agreements (perhaps well above the minimum floor) but fail to satisfy other 
requirements. This could lead to a situation in which a state is erroneously classified 
as compliant or non-compliant. An easy remedy might be to utilize an iteration of 
dummy indicators for various policy areas. Yet, even this approach is seldom utilized 
and this research suggests that if soft law rules are fairly complex—as in the example 
many banking regulations—a more differentiated indicator may better capture 
compliance with the vagaries of soft law arrangements.
In the study of the Basel Accord, such a differentiated approach was a 
minimum requirement for fruitfully addressing the impact of the 1988 agreement on 
state behavior. The methodology and results of Daniel Ho’s (2002) study of the 
implementation of the Accord are indicative. Following the methodological pattern of 
the majority of international political economy studies of regime implementation, Ho 
investigated correlates of the successful implementation of the Accord through a 
Large-# survey. He fitted a number of logistical regression models that situated a 
dummy variable on the left hand side that took the value of unity if states complied 
with the Basel Accord. As over 90 percent of the sample were coded unity, Ho was 
left with the task of explaining non-compliance in about ten states, the majority of 
which were extremely low-income economies. Though few studies of regime 
compliance have such skewed datasets as this, Ho’s study indicates the importance of
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adopting a more differentiated measure of compliance. It is intuitive that the 
empirical problems posed by the implementation of the Basel Accord are: why did so 
many states claim to be in compliance with the Accord and how compliant were they 
really? These questions cannot be addressed with binary measures of compliance. It 
is likely that studies of the implementation of other financial “soft law” agreements 
require the same differentiated treatment as Basel.
In addition, Ho’s study does not permit researchers to conclude if the Accord 
influenced state behavior. As Chapter 3 observed, much of the concern of 
international cooperation students has centered on the independent impact of 
international agreements on state’s practices. Distinct answers—even 
interpretations—of this question have divided International Relations studies into two 
broad camps. The first approach has been characterized as the Enforcement School.7 
This broad-church school includes Realist and rationalist Institutionalist approaches 
that collectively suggest that the probability of states’ compliance with an 
international agreement increases if they are subject to an exogenous enforcement 
mechanism. This may be an international political or judicial institution trigger 
mechanism or the threat of retaliation by a hegemonic state or group of states. The 
opposing school of thought suggests that such measures are almost universally 
unnecessary as, “almost all nations observe all principles of international law and 
almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.”8 This catch phrase of the 
Management School implies that international agreements independently influence 
state behavior in absence of a punishment mechanism. For both schools, however, a 
binary conception of compliance with the Accord fails to provide enough 
observations for an effective test of hypotheses on the importance of punishment
7 See Mitchell (1994) for a review of these literatures.
8 Chayes and Chayes (1993:177).
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mechanisms. With the vast majority of nation-states claiming compliance with the 
Accord, there is not enough variation in the dependent variable to draw any firm 
conclusions regarding compliance or non-compliance.
However, the differentiated compliance variable permits a more accurate 
testing ground for these competing predictions. The utilization of a more nuanced 
measure of compliance seems to support the Management School at first glance. The 
descriptive statistical inferences drawn from the operationalization of the CREG 
variable in Chapter 4 indicated a high level of compliance with the Accord by nearly 
every country in the sample. Though the Basel Committee explicitly labels their 
regulatory recommendations as “voluntary” and does not sanction states for non- 
compliance, very few states failed to meet the minimum criteria in all of the policy 
areas addressed in the Accord.
Further support for the Management School might be obtained from the US 
and Japan case studies. These two states failed to meet the Basel minima in some 
respects. The American regulators permitted their domestic bank holding companies 
to count cumulative preferred stock as tier 1 capital, while the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance did not require their international banks to deduct cross-share holdings with 
other financial institutions from total capital. In both instances, however, domestic 
actors within these two states argued that these breeches were necessary defections 
given the idiosyncratic structure of their banking systems. The dominance of cross­
share holding industrial and financial complexes was an important component of 
Japan’s industrial structure while American banks were globally unique in 
maintaining large cumulative preferred equity holdings before the negotiation of the 
Accord. In these instances, Management School theorists might suggest that these 
instances of non-compliance were expected as the US and Japan could not implement
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the Accord due to the technical difficulties involved rather than from a desire to defect 
from the agreement in order to free ride on the commitments of other Committee 
members for material advantage.
Yet, the results of the quantitative and qualitative hypotheses tests make 
support for the Managerialist position less obvious. In particular, the strong 
performance of the “path dependence” hypothesis suggests that compliance with the 
Accord may not have been an arduous process for many states. Many may not have 
needed to amend their existing capital adequacy rules to a great degree to comply with 
the 1988 standards. To the extent that this is a valid conclusion, it is possible that the 
Management School’s correlation of regime rules and subsequent state behavior is 
spurious in this instance. This point supports Downs, Rocke, and Barsoon’s (1996) 
observation that studies of implementation must begin by assessing the extent to 
which an international agreement requires states to depart from their existing policy 
practice. Failure to specify this as a starting point creates exposure to the risk of 
drawing false empirical inferences as the possibility that an inter-state agreement 
merely ratified extant practice or solved a simple coordination problem is precluded.
It thus appears that both the Management and Enforcement schools’ 
predictions maintain some validity here. Clearly the Basel Accord did produce some 
alteration of state behavior. The statistical and qualitative evidence indicated that 
departures from the regulatory status quo did emerge after the implementation of the 
Accord. Such departures may be partially attributed to domestic political economic 
considerations, such as domestic banking crises, that may or may not have been 
related to the effects of the Accord. Yet, the Accord did constrain the discretionary 
behavior of regulators in some instances. In particular, Japanese regulators went to 
great lengths to give the impression that their domestic banks were in compliance
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with the Basel minima while the US, France, and Germany each limited their 
definitions of regulatory capital because of the input of other Basel Committee 
members. There is no question that much of the Accord’s effects—particularly in 
Japan—were related to the pressure that market actors exerted on banks and policy­
makers. Yet, the expectations of these actors were clearly shaped by the Accord in 
ways measured by financial economists.9 Yet, at the same time, the wide 
discretionary bands permitted by the agreement meant that states whose pre-1988 
behavior departed from the Accord’s provisions to a greater degrees were able to meet 
the standards without a great deal of domestic political or economic dislocation. The 
Accord thus appears to have had an impact on state behavior, though its impact may 
not have been as great as most political science accounts suggest.
This mixed conclusion also applies to insights this study poses to hypotheses 
that financial services regulations will converge under pressures from economic 
globalization. A number of studies have either assumed or hypothesized that the 
internationalization of banking and financial services firms would produce a common 
regulatory status quo among distinct national regulatory practices.10 The reason 
underpinning this prediction is that market actors such as institutional investors and 
credit ratings agencies will punish state and firm behaviors incongruent with market 
preferences, resulting in high opportunity costs for non-market friendly policies and 
an international convergence around a common, often neoliberal, model.11 Financial 
services may represent the most likelihood test of such predictions for as Gilpin 
(2001:261) observed, “[international finance is the one area to which the term 
‘economic globalization’ clearly applies.”
9 See Basel Committee (1999) for a review of this research.
10 Moran (1991), Coleman (1994), and Gilpin (2001:261).
11 See Friedman and Rogowski (1996).
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Yet, this study agrees with previous empirical tests of this argument in 
concluding that convergence has been present yet incomplete. Moran (1991) and 
Coleman’s (1994) research of convergence in securities and banking regulations and 
firm practices, respectively, found that convergence emerged in some areas yet was 
ultimately spotty. They found that through transnational regulatory learning, market 
constraints, and US pressure, some levels of convergence were found. However, 
national policy makers and domestic financial markets retained maneuvering space in 
which to maintain distinct forms of policy and market behavior. With regards to the 
Accord, some convergence did emerge after 1988 and more was produced from 1988 
to 2000. Again, much of the convergence involved the adoption of a common 
language for classifying and regulating bank capital and the creation of a minimum 
regulatory floor that seemed to constrain state behavior to some degree. Yet, the 
Accord explicitly permitted space for discretionary maneuverability and this seems to 
have been exploited. National distinctions remain and the current state of the Basel 2 
negotiations indicates that this is not likely to change soon.
9.4. Review of Methodology
The review of the thesis’ empirical and theoretical findings highlighted many of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the adopted methodology. Yet, in order to be realistic 
about the reliability and generalizability of the findings, it necessary to make these 
qualities explicit.
First, combining qualitative and quantitative research designs presented 
opportunities and problems. In terms of opportunities, the three case study chapters
12 An excellent method of monitoring the Basel Committee states’ distinct attitudes and strategies in 
negotiating the Basel Accord II is found Global Risk Regulator. See Januaiy (2003) and February 
(2003) for a number of articles discussing the importance of maintaining national distinctions in the 
broader outlines of the new Accord.
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certainly permitted the chance to corroborate and elaborate the quantitative results. 
The aggregate studies were useful in evaluating the Accord’s effect on the capital 
adequacy policies of a wide sample of states. In particular, the descriptive statistics 
for the CREG indicator in Chapter 4 allowed for the first rigorous cross-sectional and 
time series comparison of capital policies. Yet, the weaknesses of the bivariate and 
multivariate hypotheses tests in Chapter 5 required a disaggregated companion study 
to ensure reliability. The extremely small sample size employed may have violated 
the assumptions of the central limitations theorem, despite efforts made to ensure 
reliability. It was thus necessary to further explore the quantitative results through 
detailed inspections of the observable implications of the hypotheses with an “on the 
ground” inspection. Though the quantitative studies examined 18 countries, only two 
periods of time were analyzed. Yet, the case studies allowed an examination of 12 
years of study (1988-2000) of the post-Basel implementation plus a number of years 
of pre-Basel capital adequacy policy. In this way, the qualitative analyses extended 
the degrees of freedom and descriptive inferences of the research.
In addition, the qualitative analysis was necessary due to the level of 
measurement of many of the quantitative variables. The dependent variable—the 
CREG index—was constructed through the quantitative coding of many financial 
regulators’ texts. Though the coding of the Initial Period was straightforward as the 
regulations were reported in a uniform fashion by a Price Waterhouse (1991) study, 
the Second Period data was obtained exclusively from the sample states’ respective 
regulators. Though every effort was made to ensure that the CREG scores were 
congruent to the stringency of these states’ capital adequacy practices according to the 
coding scheme, a margin of error always persists in these interpretative exercises. It
13 These goals of multi-method research were found in Rossman and Wilson (1985).
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would have been ideal to have a less interpretive benchmark with which to compare 
the results as a reliability test, yet there is no such previous exercise.14 As a result, it 
is necessary to corroborate the essentially ordinal level CREG indicator with an in- 
depth survey.
Moreover, many of the explanatory variables are crude indicators of the 
phenomenon they endeavor to proxy. For example “market governance” is a 
complex, multi-faceted phenomenon that current data can only proxy through a six- 
point indicator created through the distribution of questionnaires to bank supervisors 
by World Bank researchers.15 As an additional example, the measure of 
macroeconomic instability is constructed with Caprio and Klingebiel’s (1995) dummy 
variable that takes the value of unity in the instance of a banking crisis in which 
nearly all bank capital is exhausted. These data have a limited endpoint at 1995 and, 
moreover, are not sensitive enough to capture macroeconomic shocks that do not 
exhaust bank capital, yet may influence banks’ funding positions and a state’s 
preferences for capital adequacy policy. Germany’s economic dislocations after 
unification clearly influenced the operations of Germany’s banks past 1989, yet this 
occurrence did not register as unity on the STABILITY measure after this date as its 
effects did not approach the high threshold set by the indicator’s construction 
methods. In this instance, the qualitative results provide a necessary extension on the 
incompleteness of the numerical indicators.
Yet, the combination of these two research designs is not without some caveat. 
It can be difficult to resolve distinctions in the results of the two methodologies. For 
instance, the market governance indicator was found to be positively correlated with
14 For example, Quinn and Incldn (1997) quantitatively code the text of the OECD states’ current and 
capital account regulations with the ability to “back test” their results against cruder measurements 
made by other researchers.
15 Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a).
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increases in capital adequacy rule stringency in the aggregate tests for the Second 
Period. Yet in the US case, high levels of market governance were correlated with a 
weakening of regulatory standards. This illustrates the tensions that can emerge in 
comparing quantitative and qualitative results. What can create a correlation among a 
larger sample of states may not be the case for any given state, which may be an 
outlier to the general trend. Though this certainly opens up the opportunity to explain 
deviations in the two results, which can provide further descriptive inference, it does 
not contribute to the drawing of parsimonious conclusions.
9.5. Implications for future research
As far as I am aware, this is the first study to systematically investigate the 
implementation of the Basel Accord across a large sample of states over a period of 
time. Inevitably, research of this nature tends to raise as many questions about an 
event or a theory as it answers given space, data, and human limitations. First, future 
work could endeavor to increase the number of observations on the dependent 
variable. This could be done through increasing the number of sample states and 
increasing the number of years observed. In particular, comparing this thesis’ results 
with an empirical analysis of lesser-developed and emerging market economies seems 
necessary. A key finding of this study is that the Accord was implemented with 
various degrees of stringency by industrialized economies, yet these interpretations 
were generally always above the minimum levels prescribed by the Accord. It seems 
logical that this condition would not hold in an investigation of implementation 
among a broader spectrum of income levels in which a much more differentiated 
quantity of compliance would likely prevail.16 Second, a similar study could be
16 Evidence for this statement is found in Walter (2002).
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conducted into degrees of compliance with the major 1996 amendment to the 1988 
Accord that extended this agreement’s reach to banks’ market exposure risks.
Though one study suggested that the 1996 amendment did not pose as large a 
challenge to existing regulatory and bank practice as the 1988 agreement, this 
statement remains to be put to systematic empirical test.17
In addition, the quantitative Capital Regulatory (CREG) index could be 
inputted into studies of the Accord’s economic impact. Previous research has not 
found regulatory and political variables to be strong predictors of bank capital ratio
1 ftlevels compared to purely macroeconomic models. Yet, the CREG variable could 
be shifted to the right hand side as a predictor of ratio levels. Alternative exogenous 
variables might include bank stability, bank’s funding positions, or costs of capital.
Moreover, a more systematic effort should be made to compare capital 
adequacy stringency with related policy practices. The Japanese case indicated that 
tax, accounting, and provisioning policies as well as enforcement quality need to be 
studied in conjunction with the stated capital adequacy rules. At present, existing data 
does not support an aggregate study of these related policy practices. Daniel E. Ho’s 
(2002) research into the implementation of the Accord measured quality of 
enforcement with measures of degrees of government corruption. Such indicators are 
not refined enough for comparisons among industrialized states as the standard 
deviation of such data for wealthier economies is near zero.
Finally, fiiture studies of international regime implementation might consider 
employing differentiated indicators of compliance. As Chapter 3 suggested through a 
graphing exercise, empirical detail can be lost for many types of international 
agreements by considering i f  states comply rather than how. Though binary
17 Bank of England (2002).
18 DeBondt and Prast (2000).
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compliance indicators are sufficiently calibrated to measure compliance with some 
types of international agreements, international financial regulatory pacts seem ill 
captured by such variables. As over 100 countries claim to be in compliance with the 
Basel Accord, clearly the interesting study is about how these countries complied. 
The same will be increasingly true of other inter-state financial agreements struck 
through international organizations like the BCBS, IMF, IOSCO, World Bank, the 
International Accounting Standards Board, and others.19




Compendium of Financial Standards
Issuing Body
Information provided by Financial Stability Forum1 
Regulation Date Issued
BCBS2 Sound Practices for Loan Accounting, Credit Risk Disclosure Jul 1999
BCBS Enhancing Bank Transparency Sep 1998
BCBS Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Sep 1998
BCBS International Converge on Credit Risk Capital Standards Jul 1998
BCBS Overview of the Market Risk Capital Amendment Jan 1996
BCBS Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision Sep 1997
BCBS The Supervision of Cross-border Banking Oct 1996
BCBS Framework for Backtesting of Internal Models for Market Risk Jan 1996
BCBS Min Standards for Banking Supervision; adds to Concordat Jul 1992
BCBS Basle Concordat for Banking Supervision May 1983
OECD3 Principles of Corporate Governance for OECD and non-OECD May 1999
IOSCO4 Guidance on Information Sharing Nov 1998
IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation Sep 1998
IOSCO Securities Activity on the Internet Sep 1998
IOSCO Disclosure Standards for Offerings/Listings by Foreign Issuers Sep 1998
IOSCO Risk Management and Control Guidance for Securities Firms May 1998
IOSCO Methods for Determining Capital Standards with VaR models May 1998
IOSCO Supervision of Operators of Collective Investment Schemes Sep 1997
IOSCO Client Asset Protection Aug 1996
IOSCO Cooperation between Market Authorities and Default Procedures Mar 1996
IOSCO Operational/Risk Management Controls for OTC Derivatives Jul 1994
IOSCO Principles for Design and Approval of Stock Index Futures Oct 1992
IOSCO Principles of Memoranda of Understanding Sep 1991
1 www.fef.org
2 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
3 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
4 International Organization of Securities Commissions
302
IMF5 Codes of Practices on Transparency in Monetary/Financial Policies Jul 1999
IMF Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency Apr 1998
IMF General Data Dissemination System Dec 1997
IMF Special Data Dissemination Standard Mar 1996
IAIS6 Supervisory Standard on Derivatives Oct 1998
IAIS Supervisory Standard on On-Site Inspections Oct 1998
IAIS Supervisory Standard on Licensing Sep 1998
IAIS Principles Applicable to International Insurers Sep 1997
IAIS Insurance Supervisory Principles (Core Principles) Sep 1997
CPSS7 Principles for Systematically Important Payment Systems Dec 1999
CPSS OTC Derivatives: Settlement Procedures/Credit Risk Management Sep 1998
CPSS Clearing Arrangement for Exchange-Traded Derivates Mar 1997
CPSS Real Time Gross Settlement Systems Mar 1997
CPSS Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Transactions Mar 1996
CPSS Delivery Versus Payment in Securities Settlement Systems Sep 1992
CPSS Interbank Netting Schemes—Lamfalussy Report Nov 1990
5 International Monetary Fund
6 International Association of Insurance Supervisors
7 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
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Appendix 3.2
Review of Daniel Ho’s (2002) Hypotheses of Implementation with the 
1988 Basel Accord___________________________________________
This appendix provides a summary of the hypotheses advanced in Ho’s (2002) study 
of the implementation of the Basel Accord. This study searches for correlates of the 
implementation of the Basel Accord in around 100 developed and developing 
economies. The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if a 
state claimed to adopt the Accord in the late 1990s as indicated in the research of 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a). Presented here are a summary of Ho’s hypotheses 
and their expected sign of effect on implementation. The actual sign of effect from 
logistical regression analyses are presented with signs presented in duplicate (++, —) 
indicate the variable was statistically significant at the 10 percent level in the majority 
of the models it was employed. There are several hypotheses detailed in Ho’s 
theoretical discussion that do not receive empirical test. The first of these exclusions 
(bank capitalization levels) is due to data limitations, the others are not justified. 
Moreover, the empirical results of two hypotheses that are operationalized are not 
reported.
Hypotheses marked in bold represent those hypotheses modified for 
application to understanding degrees of hypotheses in this thesis. A number of Ho’s 
hypotheses are not employed here. In many instances, the decision to exclude a 
hypothesis was made because of the difference in sample parameters. The hypothesis 
that democratization or government corruption influenced implementation is more 
appropriate for Ho’s sample of 100 states than an 18-country sample including only 
industrialized economies. The standard deviation of such variables among 
industrialized economy samples is near zero. Moreover, it is not clear how some of
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the excluded variables would influence decisions pertaining the interpretation of the 
Accord. Other than as a proxy for economic instability, the relevance of national debt
levels is not intuitive.
Hypothesis Description Expected Effect Actual Effect
Bank/National Preferences
Domestic banks* capitalization levels + not tested
Small banks will oppose implementation - not tested
Conventional banks will oppose implementation not tested
Macroeconomic Variables
International financial exposure + +
Level of trade openness indeterminate +
Drawings from the IMF + not reported
Domestic savings rate + ++
National debt levels + ++
Economic instability indeterminate ~
Banking sector concentration indeterminate -
Government ownership levels - -
Political Institutions
Political fragmentation indeterminate —
Regulatory capacity + —
Presence of deposit insurance + —
Levels of government corruption - —
Levels of democratization + ++
Signatories vs. opt-in countries signatories: + not reported
Regional norms + +
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Appendix 4.1
Differences between the Basel framework and the EU directives
REGULATION BASEL FRAMEWORK EU DIFFERENCES FROM BASEL
Tier 1 Definitions
• paid-up share capital/common stock; perpetual non-cumulative 
preference shares
• disclosed reserves
• minority interests in equity of subsidiaries less than wholly owned
• current year profits
• current year profits included only if verified by 
auditors
• funds for general banking risks included without 
limits as a separate category
Tier 2 Definitions
• undisclosed reserves
• asset revaluation reserves (including latent reserves)
• general provisions/general loan loss reserves
• hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments
• subordinated term debt
• latent revaluation reserves not allowed
• commitments of co-operative members specified 
as included
Deductions
• From Tier 1: goodwill
• From Tier 2: investments in unconsolidated banking and financial 
subsidiaries; investments in capital of other banks and financial 
institutions
• From Tier 1: goodwill and other intangibles; own 
own shares held at book value; current year losses
• From Total: investments in capital of other banks 
and financial institutions under certain conditions
Ratio • Minimum 8% capital to risk-adjusted assets• Tier 2 limited to maximum of 100% of Tier 1
Appendix 4.2
Coding of the Capital Regulatory (CREG) Index
This appendix presents the methodology used to create the quantitative indicator of 
states’ interpretations of the 1988 Basel Accord. The Capital Regulatory (CREG) 
index ranges from 0-24 with higher values indicating higher levels of capital 
regulatory stringency in areas addressed by the 1988 Basel Accord. It is constructed 
through the summing of five variables which correspond to the key five capital 
adequacy policy areas addressed by the Accord (see Table 4.1).
Each of the five policy variables is an ordinal scale that ranges from 1-4 with 
higher values indicating greater stringency. The coding procedures for each policy 
variable follows:
Definition of Tier 1 Capital
Code Description
1 Tier 1 standard has been implemented, but at a below-minimum interpretation. 
More than the minimum four tier 1 capital elements permitted.
2 Tier 1 standard implemented, the four Tier 1 capital elements allowed by the 
Accord are fully allowed without restriction
3 Tier 1 standard implemented so that a slightly more stringent interpretation 
has been made. This will include the subtraction of one or two allowable tier 
1 items from the domestic definition of regulatory capital—save for the 
definition of equity capital, which has remained intact.
4 Tier 1 standard implemented so that three or more non-equity tier 1 items are 
subtracted from the domestic definition of regulatory capital or the definition 
of equity capital has been made more stringent
Definition of Tier 2 capital
Code Description
1 Tier 2 standard has been implemented, but at a below-minimum inteipretation. 
More than five of the five allowable tier 2 capital instruments permitted or at 
inflated discount factors
2 Tier 2 standard implemented, base five tier 2 capital elements permitted (four 
in EC) in the domestic definition of regulatory capital at specified discount 
factors
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3 Tier 2 standard implemented so that one or two capital elements or discount 
factors has been subtracted from the domestic definition of regulatory capital 
or been implemented in a superequivalent fashion
4 Tier 2 standard implemented so that three or more capital elements or discount 
factors have been subtracted from the domestic definition of regulatory capital 
or been implemented in a superequivalent fashion
Deductions from Capital
Code Description
1 No deductions from capital required or deduction standards have been 
implemented, but not all baseline deductions are required to be made from the 
domestic definition of regulatory capital
2 Deduction standard has been implemented, all baseline deductions are
required.
3 Deduction standard has been implemented, yet domestic regulators require one
more than the minimum baseline deductions to be made from the domestic 
definition of regulatory capital
4 Deduction standard has been implemented, yet domestic regulators require
two or more than the minimum baseline deductions to be made from the 
domestic definition of regulatory capital
On-Balance Sheet Risk Weights
Code Description
1 Risk-weight standard has been implemented, yet several assets are assigned a 
lower risk-weight than required or risk-weighting scheme not implemented
2 Risk-weight standard has been implemented with all assets assigned to their 
minimum required risk-weight
3 Risk-weight standard has been implemented yet one of the two discretionary 
risk-weighting assignments has been to a higher than required weight
4 Risk-weight standard has been implemented yet both of the two discretionary 
risk-weighting assignments have been to a higher than required weight
Off-Balance Sheet Risk Weights
Code Description
1 Risk-weight standard has been implemented, yet several assets are assigned a 
lower risk-weight than required or risk-weighting scheme not implemented
2 Risk-weight standard has been implemented with all assets assigned to their 
minimum required risk-weight
3 Risk-weight standard has been implemented yet one of the two discretionary 
risk-weighting assignments has been to a higher than required weight
4 Risk-weight standard has been implemented yet both of the two discretionary 
risk-weighting assignments have been to a higher than required weight
Minimum Canital-to-Risk Weights Assets Ratio Requirement
Code Description
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1 No minimum capital-to-assets ratio requirement or minimum ratio assigned 
but at levels below the specified minima
2 Minimum ratio assigned but at levels required by the Accord
3 Minimum ratio assigned but at levels 100-200 basis points above the 
minimum levels required the Accord
4 Minimum ratio assigned but at levels over 200 basis points above the 
minimum levels required by the Accord
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A ppendix 4.3
Sources o f R egu la to ry  D ata fo r Q uan tita tive  D atabase
This appendix presents bibliographical references for the regulatory documents, 
websites, agencies and individuals that contributed data for the construction of the 
quantitative measures presented in Chapter 4. Data for the Capital Regulatory 
(CREG) index was obtained for all countries in Price Waterhouse (1991) and Murray- 
Jones and Gamble’s (1991) surveys of implementation of the Basel Accord in a large 
sample of countries. Yet these studies only provide data for the initial interpretations 
made of the Accord’s rules by industrialized economies. In order to corroborate the 
findings of these two surveys and extend the scope of coverage to the most recent 
interpretations of the Accord, it was necessary to obtain data directly from the bank 
supervisory authorities of the 18-country dataset. References of the data source points 
are presented, by country, below.
Australia
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (http://www.apra.gov.au)
• Prudential Standard APS 110-Capital Adequacy, July 2003
Austria
Oesterreichische Nationalbank (http://www.oenb.at)
• The A ustrian Banking Act and A ustrian Financial Market A uthority Act (2002)
Belgium
Banking and Finance Commission (http://www.cbf.be)
• Circulaire D1 96/1 Aux Etablissements de Credit (2 April 1996)
• Lettre Circulaire Dl/TB/332 Aux Etablissements de Credit: Adaptation du 
reglement relatif aux fonds propres des etablissements de credit (13 July 
2000)
• Circulaire D1 2001/5 Aux Etablissements de Credit (4 July 2001)
Canada
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (www.osfi.gc.ca)
• Guideline: Capital Adequacy Requirements, A-Part I, January 2001
Denmark
Financial Agency (http:// www.finanstilsvnet.dk)
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• The Commercial Banks and Savings Banks, etc. Consolidation Act 
(Consolidation Act No. 787) (4 September 2001)
Finland
• Financial Supervision Authority (http://www.rata.bof. fi)
FSA Regulation 106.6 and 203.3
France
Banque de France website (http://www.bang ue-france.fr)
• Reglement No. 99-02 (21 June 1999), modifying Reglement No. 91-05 o f 15 
February 1991
Germany
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (http://www.bakred.de)
• Principle I Concerning the Capital o f Institutions, last amended 20 July 2000 
(Federal Gazette No. 160).
Japan
Financial Services Agency http://www. fsa. so. ip
• Inspection Manual (28 June 2001)
• Tamura (2003b)
Luxembourg
Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (http://www.cssf.lu/fr/index/html)
• Circulaire CSSF 2000/10 (October 2000)
New Zealand
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (http://www.rbnz.govt.nz)
• Banking Supervision Handbook (July 1998)
Netherlands
De Nederlandsche Bank (http://www.dnb.nl)
• Credit System Supervision Manuel
Spain
Banco de Espana (bibliobe@bde.es). http://www.bde.es
• Basic Regulatory Structure o f the Spanish Banking System, Annex 1 (2000)
Sweden
Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (http://www.fi.se)
• Capital Adequacy and Large Exposures (Credit Institutions and Securities 
Companies) Act (SFS 1994:2004) Amendments up to 1 March 2000
Switzerland
Swiss Federal Banking Commission (http://www.ebk.ch)
• Implementing Ordinance on Banks and Savings Banks, translated from  
Germany by KPMG Legal (www.kpms.ch)
United Kingdom
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Financial Services Authority (http://www.fsa.gov.uk)
• Interim Prudential Sourcebook: Banks, June 2001
United States
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (http ://www. federal reserve. gov)
• Bank Holding Company Supervision Manuel (December 2001)
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